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Chapter 1 – Introduction

1 Overview
This doctoral thesis builds on a rich literature investigating how education
policy affects students’ learning, motivation, investment, and decision-
making —all of which are determinants of the productivity of education
systems. Over the past decades, the education field has yielded one of
the most prolific strands of literature within applied economics research
(Machin, 2014). In part this reflects a growing demand for an evidence-
based design of education policy. Rigorous and thoughtful economic re-
search can often produce such evidence, which may guide policymakers in
the policy-design process (Hanushek et al., 2016).
Policy questions are ubiquitous in the education domain. In particular,
many dimensions of a child’s environment in school are determined by
policymakers, ranging from the small and specific (such as the number
of students in each class or the books used) to the large and general
(such as the length of compulsory education, financing, and tracking).
Another prevalent structural feature of the schooling process determined
by policymakers are the transitions from one educational stage to the
next. These milestone moments not only involve the replacement of one
set of education policies by another, but have evolved into rites of passage
in children’s lives, signifying the end of one stage of development and the
beginning of the next (Bharara, 2020; Evans et al., 2018).
Like more traditional rites of passage, these academic transitions are
often costly. Because of the institutional discontinuities they represent,
they are disruptive and challenging for many students (Anderson et al.,
2000; Curson et al., 2019; Rice et al., 2015; Rice, 2001; Symonds and Gal-
ton, 2014), forcing them to navigate a new educational context that often
involves a new school, new peers, and new teachers. Further, at each new
stage, students not only face new and challenging academic demands but
also heightened expectations of their independence and ability to assume
responsibility for their own schooling. Not surprisingly, these transitions
represent a period of particular vulnerability for many young people. An
extensive research literature has consistently found associations with neg-
3
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ative outcomes such as a decline in academic engagement and motivation,
a decline in grades, and an increased risk of dropout (see, e.g., Bharara,
2020; Eccles et al., 1993; Evans et al., 2018; Galton et al., 1999 or Mizelle
and Irvin, 2000).1 Because the number, timing, and structure of transi-
tions are all the result of policy, and imposed on students by policymakers,
there is a need for a solid base of evidence—particularly causal—on how
students navigate and prepare for them that can inform policy design so
as to minimize the negative outcomes associated with those transitions
(Rice, 2001; van Rens et al., 2018).
My aim for the thesis is to contribute to that evidence base. Empir-
ical studies, such as those in the following chapters, can provide insights
for policy on how best to prepare students for transitions, and how best
to support them in making well-informed choices. For example, ensuring
that students are adequately prepared for subsequent stages of schooling is
an important step in making the education system more efficient and pro-
ductive. Understanding how children and adolescents make investments
and choices in their schooling can help policymakers identify areas where
interventions might reduce inequalities in (opportunities for) human cap-
ital accumulation. Indeed, support and preparedness have been identified
in the education literature as key elements for effective transitions (An-
derson et al., 2000; Bharara, 2020).
I start, in Essay I, by investigating how students may respond to the
implicit incentives associated with stage transitions in cases where the
transition involves a transfer to a new school, and where enrollment in
specific schools is based on merit. In fact, having adequate academic
abilities is vital for successfully transitioning to more advanced stages of
schooling (Anderson et al., 2000). However, students often report faltering
motivation and engagement in school as they enter adolescence (Eccles et
al., 1993; Harter et al., 1992). A fundamental tenet of economic theory
is that we respond to incentives (Fehr and Falk, 2002). Policymakers
concerned with poor effort and motivation among students might therefore
consider rewarding those who perform well, so as to stimulate a more
optimal level of investment in schoolwork. There is indeed ample evidence
1I will discuss these transitions in greater detail in Section 3.
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for this type of response for older students, but we know very little about
whether young students respond similarly to such incentives (Bach and
Fischer, 2020). Not only are the benefits of schooling are less tangible
for teenagers because of the long-term nature of the pay-offs, the skills
necessary for implementing their preferred decisions, such as attention and
impulse control, may not be sufficiently developed in adolescence (List et
al., 2021). I test the validity of the hypothesis that young teenagers in
Norwegian middle school2 will respond to incentives by exploiting reforms
that caused high-school enrollment schemes to change from being strictly
based on neighborhood catchment areas to being based on merit in the
form of middle school grades. I find that teenage students do increase
their performance on high-stakes exams in response to such incentives.
Also, ability assessments suggest that the increase in performance reflects
actual learning and so is relevant for human capital accumulation. Hence,
my study contributes causal evidence that policymakers are indeed able
to influence the level of young students’ investment in school by providing
them with proper incentives.
In the second essay I take a step back to early childhood to investi-
gate gender differences in pre-academic skills among children on the cusp
of formal schooling. Building on an established literature on the impor-
tance of school readiness, my co-authors Mari Rege, Ingeborg Solli, Ingunn
Størksen and I demonstrate that girls score substantially better than boys
on measures of early learning. This implies that boys enter school at a
significant skill disadvantage to girls.
Policymakers routinely express particular concern for boys in the tran-
sition from childcare to formal schooling (Husain and Millimet, 2009).
Generally, this concern centers on boys being perceived as relatively less
“mature”, and less ready for the demands of school. In addition, they
are perceived as having less-developed academic and socioemotional skills
than girls at similar ages (DiPrete and Jennings, 2012; Lenes et al., 2020;
Stipek, 2012). In the essay I report on results from an intervention in
a sample of Norwegian preschools where we introduced more structured
2By “middle school” I refer to grades 8–10 of Norwegian compulsory school, which
roughly equates to lower secondary school in many countries.
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learning activities to be carried out with the children by trained teachers.
While the goal of the project as a whole was to test the efficacy of this
curriculum in improving school readiness, this particular study focuses
on differential benefits across gender. Although many countries are now
pushing toward universal provision of early childhood education, we know
very little about whether existing universal programs have a heteroge-
neous impact across child subgroups when it comes to preparing them for
later learning (Duncan and Magnuson, 2013; Phillips et al., 2017). Since
expanding equal opportunities to succeed in the transition to school is
often stated as an explicit policy objective underpinning such universal
provision (Havnes and Mogstad, 2015; Heckman, 2006), we need better
evidence of how curricular design interacts with child characteristics. In
our study, we find that the introduction of more structured activities
targeting important school-readiness skills was particularly beneficial for
boys. Hence, our intervention was successful in reducing the substantial
skill gap between boys and girls, which remained stable in the control
group over the sample period. This suggests that careful, evidence-based
curricular design and pedagogical practice can contribute to ensuring that
children transitioning from childcare to formal schooling will do so on a
more level playing field.
In the final essay, my co-author Eric Bettinger and I move to the other
end of the education system to consider the transition into higher edu-
cation in the United States. A college degree can be a major driver of
social mobility, with a far-reaching impact on the life trajectory of young
adults. However, despite the importance of the decision as to whether
and where to enroll in college, prospective students have very poor in-
formation on both the costs and the benefits of going to college (Avery
and Kane, 2004; Horn et al., 2003; Jensen, 2010). This is particularly the
case for high-achieving students in low-income and rural areas, who often
do not to apply to college at all, or apply to less selective colleges than
students from more affluent backgrounds with similar profiles (Dillon and
Smith, 2017; Hoxby and Avery, 2013; Hoxby and Turner, 2015). Provid-
ing students with accurate and objective information about colleges with
regard to typical graduate outcomes, such as unemployment rates and av-
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erage income levels, has therefore become an important objective for US
policymakers (Mabel et al., 2020).
However, numerous government-backed efforts and research-led inter-
ventions have yielded only a limited impact on enrollment rates, applica-
tion patterns, or completion rates (Barone et al., 2017; Bergman et al.,
2019; Bird et al., 2021; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2017; Cunha et al., 2018;
Gurantz et al., 2021; Hyman, 2020; McGuigan et al., 2016). In our study,
Bettinger and I use novel data from a large-scale survey of US college
graduates to argue that a plausible reason for this might be that students
rather seek advice from their parents (Oymak, 2018) and that their par-
ents, when giving such advice, tend to look back on their own time at
college and reflect on their subjective experiences and satisfaction. To
substantiate this argument we show that alumni satisfaction and willing-
ness to recommend one’s alma mater to others are weakly correlated with
labor market outcomes. In fact, even those with very poor labor market
returns report a high level of satisfaction. The importance of parental
advice for student decision-making, combined with the salience of sub-
jective experiences in former college students’ evaluations of the benefits
of a college education suggests that informational campaigns might have
more impact if they address not only prospective college students but also
their parents. Further, incorporating satisfaction-based measures in ex-
isting college-quality evaluations could also improve the information set
provided to students more generally.
The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: In Section 2, I
will expand on the conceptual framework underpinning the thesis. This I
will follow with a brief discussion about the nature of academic transitions
and their relevance for my essays in Section 3. Next, I will describe the
methodological approach used throughout the thesis in Section 4, with a
particular emphasis on causal inference, before Section 5 will conclude the
chapter with a summary of the essays and their findings.
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2 Conceptual Framework
The topics discussed in this thesis all fall within the human capital tradi-
tion of economic research, spawned by the seminal contributions of Becker
(1962, 1964), Schultz (1961), Mincer (1958), Ben-Porath (1967) and oth-
ers. Human capital theory posits that education is an investment in fu-
ture productivity through the development of skills valuable to the la-
bor market—what Becker (1962, p. 9) referred to as the “imbedding of
resources in people.” The decision whether to partake in schooling repre-
sents an investment problem where a rational agent chooses to do so only
if the expected return (in the form of expected future earnings) exceeds
the costs of obtaining the schooling.
Within this general framework for human capital, there is a strand
of research focusing on the production of skills and other educational
outputs. This strand, often referred to as the “economics of education,”
is characterized by Hanushek and Welch (2006) as having a dichotomous
objective: first, to use education-production functions to understand how
various inputs map to observable outcomes; and, second, to understand
the influence of structural and contextual factors, often resulting from
public policies, on educational investments and decision-making as well
as on heterogeneity in educational attainment.
To see how my three essays relate to these objectives, consider a simple
yet typical production function for human capital, expressed in Equation
(1):3
Mit = f(Cit, Pit, Sit | Ωit) (1)
Let our output of interest be a skill, and let Mit be our measure of that
skill—say, a test score—for student i at time t. Assume, for simplicity,
that M accurately measures all abilities, cognitive and noncognitive alike,
of relevance to the labor market and so is identical with i’s human capital.
The production of skills might be modeled as a function of inputs (each
the focus in one of my essays) from the child (C), the parents (P ), and the
(pre)schools (S), conditional on the current state of the skill formation
3This setup follows List et al. (2021) in notation and style.
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process, Ω, which captures the history of these inputs, the skill level in t−
1, and individual characteristics that do not vary over time. We generally
assume that the inputs in Equation (1) are complementary (so that low
investment in C will also reduce the productivity of investments in S and
P ), that M is increasing and concave in the inputs, and that previous skills
and investments influence both the skill level of the current period and the
productivity of investments made in that period. One implication arising
from these assumptions is that investing more in an input will produce
more educational output; our ability to do so is constrained by our budget
and by the concavity of f(·).
Production functions of this type are ubiquitous in education-economics
research, in part because they can be used to analyze a wide range of
policy-relevant issues (Machin, 2014). For example, even though there are
significant pay-offs to be earned in the labor market from investing in M ,
many students will fail to maximize Equation (1). Indeed, one of the ma-
jor puzzles in education economics is why so many students invest so little
into their schooling, when the potential benefits are so large (Levitt et al.,
2016). In the simple framework outlined above, we can characterize this as
a failure to invest in the input C, for example by not putting enough effort
into one’s schoolwork, thereby reducing the output of schooling. Because
underinvestment in C, and subsequent suboptimal production of skills,
will affect not only the individual but also the aggregate (i.e., society),
there is a role for policymakers to try to stimulate investments (Levitt
et al., 2016). However, it is not obvious how policy can influence private
investments such as effort. Essay I provides evidence about one channel
through which policymakers could stimulate investment in C indirectly,
through incentives, using merit-based enrolment to schools.
In contrast, policymakers have more direct influence over S, which
might capture — among other things— schooling-related expenditure in-
curred by the government, such as investments in school finances, facilities,
teachers’ salaries, or tuition subsidies. Starting with the landmark report
authored by Coleman et al. (1966), decades of economic research on ed-
ucation production centered on the relationship between school resources
and student achievement (Hanushek, 2020). In recent years, however,
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many economists have shifted their focus from the quantity of inputs to
their quality, as illustrated, for example, by the blossoming literature on
teacher quality (Hanushek, 2020). In Essay II my co-authors and I study
an intervention aimed at improving the process quality of early childhood
education through curricular design and pedagogical practice. Hence, our
intervention does not represent an increase in S, but a change in type of
S. In other words, if the intervention proves successful, the productivity
of S have improved resulting in increased educational output without (or
with very small) increases in expenditure by enhancing the quality of in-
struction. Moreover, under the assumption that the production of new
skills is influenced by the stock of skills from previous periods, raising the
productivity of S in period t will also make subsequent inputs of S in
period t + 1 more productive, underscoring the importance of investing
in skills early in order to be able to capitalize better on schooling at the
next stage (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
On a broader understanding, List et al. (2021) argue that models for
human capital formation, such as Equation (1), can also be used to under-
stand the formation of economic preferences, noting that human capital
formation is fundamentally a social activity and that “choices are mal-
leable through investments by children, schools, and parents” (List et al.,
2021, p. 17). In Essay III my co-author and I explore how choices regard-
ing educational investments by students might be influenced by parental
preferences. For example, let M denote a child’s risk aversion. The child’s
parent might affect M through the input P by transmitting their own risk
aversion to the child over the course of his or her childhood. This may
in turn cause the child to invest differently in education (changing the
input C) than he or she otherwise would have, for example by choosing
not to apply for college or by applying only to colleges close to home.
Such a channel — from parental inputs, through preference formation, to
economic decisions — is one plausible mechanism behind the “hidden sup-
ply” of high-achieving low-income students who do not attend selective
colleges despite the potentially great economic returns of doing so (Hoxby
and Avery, 2013). This is also the channel underpinning our proposed
mechanism in the essay, where we argue that parental preferences, which
10
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may not tend to maximize human capital or lifetime earnings, are im-
portant for understanding college choices made by students. We note
that most policy interventions aimed at increasing rates of college appli-
cation and enrollment have primarily targeted students and schools-̇– that
is, aimed to change the inputs C and S — but have largely left out the
students’ parents (input P ). If, again, we assume that the inputs are
complementary to one another, the lack of investment in P might explain
why these interventions in C and S have failed to move the outcomes
of interest, suggesting that future interventions should target a broader
range of inputs.
3 Transitions Between Educational Stages
The common theme overarching the essays in the thesis is that they all
examine aspects of educational success at a key transition: from compul-
sory school to high school (Essay I), from childcare to formal schooling
(Essay II), and from high school school to higher education (Essay III).
While there are several valid reasons for organizing schooling in distinct
stages (e.g., capitalizing on economies of scale to departmentalize and offer
more varied schooling options for older students), transitions are disrup-
tive in that they introduce institutional discontinuities (Rice, 2001). Typ-
ically involving a cluster of changes, transitions expose students to abrupt
changes in both the educational environment and the social context (in
terms of the model described in Section 2, this can be seen as an abrupt
change or discontinuity in the input S). For example, the transition from
preschool to primary school will entail a shift in pedagogical content from
a play-based to a more formal curriculum, with schedules and learning
goals (Jindal-Snape (Ed.), 2010), particularly in certain countries such as
Norway, where the second study was conducted. Children also face new
demands on their ability to regulate behaviors, such as paying attention
and following instructions (DiPrete and Jennings, 2012). In the transition
to high school (or, upper secondary school), the organizing principle of in-
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struction will typically change from single-teacher classrooms to subject
specialists (Symonds and Galton, 2014). Students will have to manage re-
lationships with many teachers and often with many peer groups, and they
must learn how to find their way to many different classrooms on a larger
campus (Bharara, 2020; Galton et al., 1999). As they grow older, students
will also be expected to assume more responsibility for their own school-
ing, and the decision to continue their studies will ultimately be placed
in their hands. All of these changes –—and many others –—contribute to
turning educational transitions into periods of “psychological disequilib-
rium,” where the crucial prerequisites for further learning include success-
fully adapting to new policies and rules, to heightened academic standards,
and to increasing levels of individual responsibility (Felner et al., 1981).
The challenging nature of transitions, and the negative outcomes of-
ten associated with them, are well documented in the educational sciences
(Anderson et al., 2000; Bharara, 2020; Eccles et al., 1993; Evans et al.,
2018; Galton et al., 1999; Mizelle and Irvin, 2000; Rice et al., 2015; Rice,
2001), particularly when it comes to achievement, mental health, and
well-being (van Rens et al., 2018). In response, substantial research ef-
forts have been undertaken to investigate measures intended to mitigate
the disruptiveness of transitions in order to minimize the risk of students
falling behind or dropping out (Bharara, 2020; Curson et al., 2019). My
thesis adds to this literature with regard to two key elements of educa-
tional transitions: academic preparedness and choice of institution. Below
I will explain how these elements relate to points of transition and how
they are conceptualized in economic research, and I will outline some of
the main policy questions related to them.
3.1 Academic preparedness
A key predictor of whether the transition to a new education level will be
difficult for a student is his or her preparedness. That is, “students must
possess the knowledge and skills they need to succeed at the next level”
(Anderson et al., 2000, p. 331). In the Norwegian context, this is evident
in the fact that higher academic achievement is associated with a reduced
12
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likelihood of dropping out after the transition to high school (Falch et al.,
2010), and the Norwegian Ministry of Education highlights insufficient
academic abilities as a primary predictor of high-school dropout (NOU
2019:2). Similarly, Scott et al. (1995) estimate that the dropout rate in
the bottom quartile for academic ability, as measured using a standardized
achievement test, is 26 times that in the top quartile. Anderson et al.
(2000) describe a process in which students who are unprepared for the
transition fail to adapt to new standards and expectations. This makes
them feel marginalized and rejected, and their sense of failure initiates
a process of gradual disengagement from school, often leading to conflict
and antagonizing behavior. For older students, this process can ultimately
lead to dropout: a sense of failing or not being able to keep up with one’s
schoolwork is one of the reasons most frequently given by students for
dropping out of school (Scott et al., 1995).
However, dropout is not the only cost associated with having aca-
demically unprepared students. Within the human capital framework
discussed in Section 2, the need for academic preparedness reflects the
notion that “skills acquired in one period persist into future periods [and
are] self-reinforcing” — the self-productivity principle argued by Cunha
and Heckman (2007, p. 35). In other words, there is a complementarity
between the skills accumulated by a student up to the point of transition,
and their ability to successfully navigate it. This relationship between
academic preparedness and subsequent educational productivity also re-
flects the notion that skills acquired in one period will bolster investments
in new (other) skills in subsequent periods (List et al., 2021). If so is the
case, then one logical implication is that students without sufficient skills
will not be in a position to capitalize very well on the investments made
in them after transitioning to higher stages of schooling, meaning that the
productivity of their inputs in producing human capital will be reduced.
For this reason, ensuring that students acquire sufficient academic abili-
ties at earlier stages of schooling is an important step toward increasing
productivity and enhancing human capital development in later schooling.
I discuss how policymakers can stimulate academic preparedness in
Essay I. As academic standards increase at more advanced levels of edu-
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cation, students will often experience a greater emphasis on measures of
ability as well as higher levels of competition. For example, while primary
school often centers on the mastery of core skills, which might be mea-
sured with M , there is later a gradual shift toward a greater focus on M
per se as an observable metrics of achievement, typically in the form of
grades and test scores. In some studies, this shift to the more impersonal,
evaluative, formal, and comparative environment of secondary school has
been linked to a decline in intrinsic motivation and in the commitment
to learn (Harter et al., 1992). Middle-school students themselves report
instead being more motivated by extrinsic factors, in particular by grades
(Anderman and Midgley, 1997; Eccles et al., 1993; Harter, 1981; Midgley
et al., 1995; Symonds, 2015).
However, the more rigorous grading practices might not compensate
fully for the decline in intrinsic learning motivation among adolescents.
Indeed, there is an abundant literature suggesting that motivation and ef-
fort correlate with how much is at stake in a given assessment (Napoli and
Raymond, 2004; Wise and DeMars, 2005; Wolf and Smith, 1995). This
manifests itself, for example, in cross-country ability assessments (such
as PISA and TIMSS), where high-income countries often do worse than
they would be expected to, considering their overwhelming advantage in
educational expenditure. Gneezy et al. (2019) show that this paradoxical
result is in fact largely explained by differences across cultures in effort
expended when stakes are low: students in Western cultures are likely to
put in the effort required to perform well only when a test really “mat-
ters.” One policy conclusion to be drawn from this is that policymakers
should ensure that students face proper incentives that reward effort.
In Essay II I study academic preparedness at the point of entry into
formal schooling— a transition that is increasingly emphasized by poli-
cymakers and researchers alike. A growing literature demonstrates that
effective early childhood programs can have substantial effects on early-
life skill development (Berlinski et al., 2008; Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe
and Lalive, 2018; Felfe et al., 2015; Heckman et al., 2010; Melhuish, 2011).
In turn, cognitive and socioemotional skills, such as numeracy, literacy,
and executive functioning, have been linked to success at the start of
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formal schooling and to longer-run academic achievement and social ad-
justment (Bennett and Tayler, 2006). Further, skill gaps appearing in
early childhood often persist into adulthood, with consequences for edu-
cational attainment and labor market participation (Cunha et al., 2006).
On the hypothesis that skill beget skills, interventions aimed at closing
such gaps should be targeted toward underachieving children and carried
out in early childhood, so as to build a foundation of skills on which later
learning can take place (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
Many countries are concerned with easing the transition from childcare
to school by mitigating the institutional discontinuities, but the pedagog-
ical approach taken to achieve a smoother transition varies. Whereas
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom promote
school readiness by investing systematically in key skills, childcare centers
in Norway and other Scandinavian countries typically have a more lim-
ited curricular focus (Engel et al., 2015). Scandinavian preschool teachers
tend to emphasize the value of free play rather than formal training of
key skills, aiming to facilitate learning through spontaneous engagement
and interaction between adults and children (Synodi, 2010). In fact, such
“unstructured” curricula are becoming increasingly popular in other coun-
tries aiming to provide universal childcare. However, one major concern
with this approach is that it gives preschool centers considerable freedom
with respect to pedagogical content, which may lead to large differences
in learning across centers (Engel et al., 2015; Rege et al., 2018). In partic-
ular, this heterogeneity in centers’ effectiveness in preparing children for
the transition to school could contribute to early-life skill gaps across child
subgroups. In Essay II, we investigate to what extent systematic invest-
ment in key school-readiness skills has differential effects across gender,
and we discuss the implications that this might have for the design of
curricula for the year closest to the transition from childcare to formal
schooling.
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3.2 Choice of institution
A second crucial dimension of the transition from one educational stage
to the next is “deciding” whether, and if so where, to go to school. The
first and last essays of the thesis broadly relate to school choice —in the
sense of choosing where, rather than whether, to enroll in high school and
college, respectively.
I use quotation marks to indicate that this decision-making process is
usually not solely a matter of preference. First, these choices are restricted
in many contexts. For example, many countries including both Norway
and the United States use district catchment areas based on residency to
decide enrollment into primary schools. Second, school choice typically
involves some sort of qualification process. Economic scholars have long
argued that the competitive force of the marketplace is a channel through
which we could increase the productivity of schools (Hoxby, 2003). In
an influential contribution, Friedman (1962) argued that allowing parents
and students to choose freely between schools would force the schools with
dwindling enrollment to make efforts to improve their educational output
or risk being closed down.
In the wake of Friedman’s theoretical work, a number of Western coun-
tries have adopted variants of school-choice systems. Particularly in the
United States, a flurry of research has studied their impact on the stu-
dents who gain access to selective schools (e.g., Bütikofer et al., 2020;
Cullen et al., 2006; Gibbons et al., 2008; Hsieh and Urqiuola, 2006; Lavy,
2010), on schools that face competition (e.g., Epple et al., 2002; Figlio and
Hart, 2014; Hoxby, 2003; Lindbom, 2010; Robert, 2010), and on parental
decision-making (e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2018; Abdulkadiroğlu et al.,
2020; Burgess et al., 2015; Hanushek et al., 2007). However, the extant
literature has primarily focused on the effects of school choice after the
right to choose has been exercised. In addition, we know much less about
the extent to which school-choice systems affect younger cohorts, par-
ticularly in contexts where the choice is tied to merit (Bach and Fischer,
2020). For this reason, previous work will typically not be able to separate
effects attributable to changes in student behavior from effects of changes
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in peer-group composition or in the incentives facing schools, teachers,
and administrators. This weakness of the literature also clouds our view
when it comes to learning how students prepare academically for more
advanced stages of schooling, and how that preparation might change in
response to changing incentives. Essay I aims to bridge that gap in the
literature.
The second strand of economic theory that relates to school choice
involves inquiring into what makes a school good. In economic theory,
this will often be operationalized as the productiveness, or value-added,
of a school. Within the human capital framework outlined above, school
quality plays an integral role in the investment problem facing prospec-
tive students. One of the primary predictions of the Becker model is
that people choose to invest in more education if the net benefits out-
weigh the costs. In that regard, school quality can be thought of as an
input in the profit function of schooling. More specifically to the choice
context, school quality matters for the investment decision of where to en-
roll — conditional upon the individual having chosen to undertake more
schooling in the first place. In a stylized model where agents have perfect
information, we would hypothesize that prospective students would enroll
in the most effective school that would accept them, conditional on their
budget constraint. However, there is abundant evidence that prospective
students actually have little, poor, and even wrong information about the
costs and benefits associated with pursuing college degrees, and about the
relative merits of potential institutions. Trusted adults such as parents
play a crucial role as advisors and sources of information for students who
are considering making the transition to higher education. Indeed, par-
ents generally provide a critical support function for students at points
of transition (Anderson et al., 2000), and their active participation can
contribute to smooth transitions between stages of schooling (van Rens
et al., 2018). However, parents may also have far from perfect information
and may rely mainly on personal, subjective knowledge. In Essay III, we
explore what might inform parents’ advice to prospective students as well
as the policy implications of how parents think about their own university
experiences.
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4 Methodological Approach
In methodological terms, all three studies included in this thesis can be
characterized as representing empirical, or applied, microeconomics. This
reflects the fact that my primary unit of analysis is the individual, in
most cases a student. Microeconomics studies the behavior and decision-
making of individual economic units, as well as their interaction with
other agents or institutions. My research is applied in the sense that I
make use of microeconomic principles and hypotheses to study real-life
contexts and events. It is empirical in the sense that I employ data to
investigate relationships between economic parameters of interest. In the
following section, I will summarize the methods used across the three
essays, reflect on why they are appropriate to answer the questions I ask,
and detail some of the strengths and weaknesses of each method. I start
with descriptive analysis, which I employ in Essay III, before I briefly
review under what conditions and assumptions the associations uncovered
in a descriptive analysis might have a causal interpretation, which is the
goal of the analysis in Essays I and II.
4.1 Descriptive Analyses
Quantitative descriptive analysis uses data to answer questions of what,
who, where, when, and to what extent (Loeb et al., 2017). Rigorous de-
scriptive analysis also aims to answer questions relevant for policy, re-
search, or both. For example, when discovering a previously unknown
phenomenon, description is a vital first step of scientific progress to gen-
erate hypotheses and to identify potential causal mechanisms worthy of
future investigation, or potential interventions that might solve problems.
Where causal research methods can uncover whether interventions
work, and which ones do, careful descriptive analysis might, for example,
provide insights into for whom it worked, and when: in what contexts and
under what conditions. For policymakers considering changes to educa-
tion policy, evidence based on causal studies devoid of descriptions —that
is, lacking information about the characteristics of the population, the fea-
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tures of the implementation, the nature of the setting, and so on — will
be left with only half the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. Descriptive analysis
is important to understand what types of interventions might be useful
or necessary in the first place. In this connection, Loeb et al. (2017, p.1)
characterize descriptive analysis as a way to provide an “understanding
[of] the landscape of needs and opportunities”.
In Essay III, Eric Bettinger and I study a novel data set containing
information on college graduates’ subjective evaluation of the education
they received. We use these data to construct a measure of alumni sat-
isfaction for over 4,000 higher-education institutions. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first effort of this sort in a US context, at least
at this scale. In order to provide some insights into how a measure of
alumni satisfaction might be relevant for research and policy, we conduct
a descriptive analysis to answer what satisfaction might be and what it
is not, who the satisfied alumni are, where they attended college, and to
what extent their level of satisfaction correlates with existing measures
of college quality, or with individual outcomes that graduates might care
about. By conducting this analysis, we also uncover a plausible hypothesis
for why informational interventions targeting prospective college students
seem to have limited effects on enrollment patterns. We believe that by
doing so, we provide some insights of relevance to future intervention de-
sign. In other words, we contribute to the “understanding of the landscape
of needs and opportunities” by suggesting a different path through that
landscape where opportunities might be more plentiful.
While a descriptive analysis of this sort is thus arguably useful, it also
has its limitations. We cannot, for example, answer the question of what
causes satisfaction. All we can do is describe the patterns we observe
in the satisfaction measure. While these patterns may well hint at the
causal mechanisms at play, we cannot identify them with any certainty.
For example, we find that alumni satisfaction is weakly correlated with
labor market outcomes. However, we cannot conclude on the basis of this
finding that individuals who report high satisfaction with their education
despite poor returns in the labor market are irrational. As we do not
manipulate college choices, we are unable to assess what their satisfaction
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levels would have been in a counterfactual scenario, and therefore to judge
to what extent high satisfaction reflects avoiding even worse outcomes.
Such questions of causality are therefore left for future research.
4.2 Causal Inference
While description is an important first step in intervention design, causal
evidence often has greater policy implications than descriptive evidence.
For example, if it is demonstrated that student achievement fell because of
the introduction of a new school policy, this provides policymakers with
more information than if it is simply observed that a drop in student
achievement coincided with the introduction of that policy. In the first
and second essays, the goal of the analysis is to estimate causal effects of a
treatment. In the second essay, the treatment is a new preschool curricu-
lum, administered by ways of an experiment, where units were randomly
assigned to either a treatment group, which implemented the curricu-
lum, or a control group, which did not. In the first essay, the treatment
is exposure to high school enrolment reform, with treatment assignment
characterized by naturally occurring events in a manner that is often re-
ferred to as a “natural” experiment. Common to the empirical strategy
in both studies is that the main goal is to estimate effects on relevant
outcomes that are directly attributable to the treatment received. Below
I will briefly summarize under what conditions and assumptions such es-
timates have a causal interpretation, and the methodological strategies
used to enable such an interpretation.
A typical framework for causal inference in the social sciences rests
on the consideration and characterization of the potential outcomes for
a unit. Using the notation of the Rubin (1974, 1977) framework, let the
outcome of interest be some Y . Assume that we have a treatment T and a
control C, and that the unit i have an equal probability of being assigned
to either. Then consider the unit prior to assignment to treatment. At
this point in time, there are two possible states in which we could observe
Y after the treatment has been administered: Yi(T ) and Yi(C). These
states are the unit’s potential outcomes. The quantity of interest that we
20
Chapter 1 – Introduction Methodological Approach
are trying to estimate — the causal estimand — then involves comparing
the potential outcomes for the unit with different treatment assignments.
Intuitively, the causal effect we are interested in can be understood as
follows: Given the treatment received by the unit and the corresponding
value observed for Y , what value of Y would have been observed if the unit
had been given the other treatment? Hence, the individual-level causal
estimand is given by Yi(T )− Yi(C).
The fundamental problem of causal inference, however, is that we can-
not observe values for Y for a given unit i under both treatments (Hol-
land, 1986). As Rubin (2005, p. 323) succinctly states, “[e]ach potential
outcome is observable, but we can never observe all of them.” In order
to quantify the causal effect, we must rely on assumptions about what
would have happened to i based on what happened to other units ex-
posed to different treatments. A crucial component of causal inference is
therefore that we observe multiple units. Assume, then, that we have two
units, i ∈ {1, 2}. Let unit i = 1 be the one randomly assigned to T and
i = 2 the one assigned to the control. In the simple two-unit case, the
best we can do might simply be to calculate the difference Y1(T )−Y2(C).
Does the difference in Y between T and C have a causal interpretation?
That depends on how reasonable it is for us to assume that Y2(C) is the
same value that would be observed for unit i = 1 if that unit had received
C instead of T . We might find this assumption reasonable if the units
are fairly similar on observable characteristics prior to the treatment and
there is little reason to fear that additional, unobserved “treatments” have
affected the units concurrently.
However, in small samples, like the two-unit case, an abundance of
differences between i = 1 and i = 2 will often lead to skepticism as to
whether Y1(T )− Y2(C) is a “sensible” estimate of the “typical” causal ef-
fect of T relative to C — in the terminology of Rubin (1974). To gain
confidence in our estimate we have to replicate it and see that a simi-
lar treatment yields similar results under similar conditions. Within the
context of a single study, this translates into a need for (many) more
than two observations. As the sample grows larger, random assignment
reduces the likelihood that all units assigned to the treatment condition
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will share some characteristic thought to be relevant for Y . For large sam-
ples, comparison of the average Y for those exposed to the treatment with
the average Y for those assigned to the control group will therefore often
yield a reasonable estimate of the typical causal effect, when assignment
to treatment is random.
In Essay II, our research design rests on these insights about the power
of random assignment. In our field experiment, we tested the efficacy of
a new curriculum by randomly deciding which preschools would be given
access to it, and which would continue with business as usual. Random-
ization ensures, in terms of expected values, that there are no confounding
treatments of relevance to the outcomes measured that may contaminate
the estimates. One classic example of such contamination is a study of
labor market outcomes after a job-training program where those individ-
uals who are most likely to benefit from the program are also most likely
to sign up for it. In such a case, it is not possible to determine whether
any differences in outcomes observed after the program are causal effects
of the program or simply manifestations of differences in baseline charac-
teristics between those individuals who signed up for the treatment and
those who did not. In our case, the causal interpretation we make of
our findings is predicated upon the assumption that our randomization
procedure shields us from such contamination.
A second assumption underpinning our causal interpretation is sta-
bility in treatment assignment, which is often referred to as the Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). In order to be able to in-
fer causal effects from the observation of multiple units, we must assume
that one unit’s treatment status does not affect (the treatment status
of) other units, and also that there are no different variants, in terms
of features such as treatment intensity or dosage, at any treatment level
(Imbens and Rubin, 2015). To illustrate the importance of this assump-
tion, consider our field experiment from Essay II, for which it is relevant
in at least two ways. First, SUTVA requires that the intervention re-
ceived in the treatment group does not affect the potential outcomes of
the control group. Since our curriculum was implemented in preschools
by practitioners, keeping all participants blind to their treatment status
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was infeasible. It is therefore conceivable that teachers in the control
group were discouraged by not receiving the resources that went along
with the treatment, and that in response they altered their pedagogical
practice. It is also possible that a teacher exposed to the treatment would
share the content of the intervention with colleagues working at centers
assigned to the control group. To mitigate concerns for such violations of
the SUTVA assumption, teachers were given strict instructions to refrain
from sharing resources with other preschool teachers, and they committed
to complying with this request. To minimize discouragement effects, we
provided explicit information at the start of the project that all control
centers would receive the intervention materials, after our posttreatment
assessments were conducted. Hence the only difference between treatment
and control centers related to when they would be able to make use of the
curriculum.
The second way in which the SUTVA is relevant for our experiment
regards implementation. The second element of the SUTVA requires that
the efficacy of a treatment must not vary within the sample. In a medical
trial, this would mean that the drug tested has the same potency for all
treated participants. In our case, teachers were given ample discretion
to adapt the curriculum to suit their pedagogical approach and to best
serve the needs of their child group. This was done to ensure that the
teachers would be comfortable with the materials and experience a sense
of ownership over them, which should lead to a higher average level of im-
plementation quality but could also lead to heterogeneity in implementa-
tion. Because we could not control what happened in preschools directly,
we are forced to trust that the teachers did not approach the interven-
tion too differently. In order to ensure high implementation quality and
teacher fidelity, all participants were given comprehensive training prior
to the start of the project. We also required teachers to fill out weekly
questionnaires detailing what they had done and why, and to inform us
of any issues, challenges, or changes. Further, members of our team regu-
larly contacted every teacher to discuss their progress during the project
period. All of these measures were taken to mitigate concerns about dis-
couragement, spillover, lack of fidelity in implementation, and treatment
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heterogeneity. While we cannot guarantee that the SUTVA holds in our
study, the causal nature of our estimates rests on the assumption that it
does hold.
Random assignment to treatment will have preferable properties in
most settings, but for many research questions it is infeasible, either be-
cause it would be impractical or prohibitively expensive or because it
would be ethically intolerable. In such cases, researchers may instead
resort to using observational data based on nonrandom assignment mech-
anisms but still aim to estimate relationships between parameters that
have causal interpretations. Typically, such studies rely on exogenous
variation in some explanatory variable of interest, again referred to as the
treatment, and measure how outcomes differ between units exposed to dif-
ferent types of treatments. Various research designs exploit this exogenous
variation to approximate the ideal experimental design.
In the first essay, I employ the difference-in-differences (DID) design,
one of the most common quasi-experimental methods for causal infer-
ence (Goodman-Bacon, 2021), in conjunction with exogenous variation
in enrollment rules stemming from policy reforms. The introduction of
these reforms can plausibly be deemed to be exogenous if the reforms are
uncorrelated with the outcomes we are interested in measuring. This as-
sumption would be violated if, for example, units (counties, in this case)
experiencing a downward trend in student performance were more likely to
adopt reforms. In DID designs, the validity of this assumption is assessed
by inspecting trends in outcomes between adopting and nonadopting units
in the periods prior to adoption. If these trends are found to be paral-
lel, the causal interpretation of the DID estimates rests on the assumption
that the trend in outcomes observed for the nonadopting units postreform
are similar to the trend that would have been observed in the adopting
units in the absence of the reforms. In other words, we argue that the non-
adopting units reflect a reasonable approximation of the adopting units’
potential outcomes.
While a causal interpretation hinges on stronger assumptions for a
DID estimate than for results from a randomized controlled trial (RCT),
there are several advantages to the DID design. The widespread use of
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the DID approach in applied economics is due not only to the simplicity
and elegance of the design, but also to “its potential to circumvent many
of the endogeneity problems that typically arise when making compar-
isons between heterogeneous individuals” (Bertrand et al., 2004, p.250).
Researchers will find this approach particularly useful in policy-relevant
settings where randomization is infeasible but where endogenous variation
in outcomes (due, e.g., to selection into treatment or omitted variables) is
still a concern (Meyer, 1995). What is more, collecting field-experiment
data is both costly and logistically challenging, meaning that it often
yields small or convenience-based samples. While this does not neces-
sarily threaten the internal validity of an experiment, it does limit our
ability to generalize results to other populations. In contrast, researchers
can leverage DID designs to study naturally occurring settings involving
large samples of individuals, often at relatively low costs. Particularly in
recent decades, comprehensive registries and data records have allowed
researchers to analyze samples that ostensibly cover entire populations of
interest (Hanushek, 2020; Machin, 2014). Not only can these analyses
arguably provide insights that more easily generalize to other contexts,
but they can also be better suited for exploring heterogeneous impacts
across smaller subgroups, which might be harder to do with precision in
an RCT with limited sample size.
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5 Summary of Essays
Essay I
Using High-Stakes Grades to Incentivize Learning
Effort by students is critical for the production of human capital, and pol-
icymakers are often concerned that students are not motivated enough to
capitalize on the learning opportunities they are given. One policy mea-
sure to consider in that regard is to provide students with incentives that
encourage effort and motivation. It has been shown in the psychology
literature that motivation correlates with test stakes, and the experimen-
tal economics literature has provided further causal evidence that raising
the stakes of tests using financial incentives increases both motivation
and effort, with some evidence that it might also increase performance.
However, paying students for performing on tests is not a viable policy
at scale. How, then, could policymakers use these insights at the policy
level?
The first essay in the thesis builds on the above-mentioned literature
investigating how raising the stakes on tests affects student performance.
One way to boost student performance could be to tie school enrollment to
past academic performance. If enrollment in specific schools is something
students care about, such a tie should provide them with an incentive to
put in the effort required to achieve the grades necessary. In fact, this line
of argument partly explains why merit-based school-choice systems have
become increasingly common in Norway.
In the essay, I exploit six instances of school-choice reform to inves-
tigate how students respond in terms of performance on the exit exam
they take at the end of compulsory school (grades 1–10). Even though
all students sit for the same test at the same time, the relevant changes
in high.school enrollment rules in Norway caused the final exit exam to
differ in importance across space and cohorts. My empirical strategy con-
sists in using a staggered triple-difference model to estimate the effects on
exam performance of being exposed to such a reform. The third difference
leveraged is the supply of schools that a student might find to constitute
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reasonable options, based on travel distance. I argue that the incentive
given by merit-based enrollment should have little effect on students in
rural areas, who for geographical reasons might have only a single high
school that they might realistically attend.
I find that middle-school students respond to the incentive given by
merit-based enrollment in a manner that economic theory would predict.
Tying the compulsory school exit exam to salient outcomes improves the
grades attained by 5–6 percent of a standard deviation –— an effect size
that is moderate, but nonetheless economically meaningful. My findings
also indicate that, as expected, the introduction of school choice as such,
without a sufficient supply of reasonable choices, has little effect on stu-
dents. A further interesting finding is that analysis of low-stakes ability
assessments suggests that actual learning—– and thus not only test-taking
behavior— is important for explaining the effect of the reforms. This find-
ing adds causal evidence to an as yet limited literature investigating the
extent to which young students’ investments in schooling are sensitive to
the structural incentives facing them. For policymakers this points to a
channel, easily applied at scale, through which student learning can be
stimulated.
Essay II
Reducing the Gender Gap in Early Learning: Evidence From a Field Ex-
periment in Norwegian Preschools
with Mari Rege, Ingeborg Solli and Ingunn Størksen
Although an extensive literature documents a persistent gender gap in aca-
demic achievement, we do not fully understand its origin. Recent evidence
suggests that there are substantial differences across gender in important
academic skills even before children start formal schooling. Such gender
differences in early learning have implications for the provision of early
childhood education and care (ECEC). While existing ECEC programs
have been shown to have promising effects in terms of child development
and outcomes later in life, the variety of contexts and program features
makes the literature far from unified with respect to the conditions and in-
puts that might support these beneficial effects. Even less is known about
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the potential distribution of effects, and about whether the conditions
that must be met are similar for all children.
Several studies report results indicating that girls might benefit more
than boys from enrolling in ECEC programs in terms of making them
ready for school, but so far few hypotheses or possible mechanisms for why
this might be the case have been discussed. One potential explanation is
that girls and boys seemingly spend their time in childcare very differently,
with girls much more likely to engage in activities that promote school
readiness and skills development. This suggests that boys may not be
exposed to many of the stimulating learning activities that girls seem
inclined to engage in of their own accord.
In this study, we use experimental data collected through an RCT in
a sample of Norwegian childcare centers to investigate whether providing
teachers with a curriculum of structured, yet playful, learning activities
yields differential effects across gender. We hypothesized that a more
structured curriculum with activities initiated by adults and including all
children would be particularly beneficial for boys, who might need more
support and scaffolding from teachers to engage in stimulating activities.
In line with that hypothesis, we find that the positive average effects
of the intervention on children’s school readiness is almost entirely driven
by the effect on boys. In contrast, we find little evidence that the curricu-
lum had any effect on girls compared with business as usual. Moreover,
we also find suggestive evidence that the boys who were at the bottom
of the skill distribution at baseline are the ones who improve the most.
With many countries experiencing a push toward universal provision of
preschool programs, our results underscore the importance of curriculum
design and pedagogical practices as well as the need to consider their
effects across child subgroups. Implementing curricula such as that fea-
tured in our intervention could potentially reduce gender gaps in early
learning by positively impacting the development of boys in particular,
thus improving their long-term academic achievement.
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Essay III
Alumni Satisfaction, Rankings, and College Recommendations
with Eric Bettinger
There is concern among policymakers that prospective students do not
have the information necessary to make informed decisions about their
college options. Information asymmetries routinely lead to poor matches
between students and colleges. For example, the vast majority of high-
achieving students in low-income families fail to apply to selective and
prestigious colleges (a population of students Hoxby and Avery (2013) re-
fer to as “the missing one-offs”), even when such colleges provide generous
financial aid. The policy response has been to invest heavily in college-
information interventions, such as the College Scorecard. By providing
high-school students with comprehensive data on college characteristics
and graduate outcomes, or college rankings based on various measures of
institutional quality, policymakers have hoped to improve matching and
to increase both enrollment and completion rates.
However, most of these efforts have proved to have little of the desired
effects. Survey evidence indicates that students, rather than relying on
these more or less objective data sources, tend to use parents and other
close family members as their primary advisors on college options and
decisions, by quite a wide margin. Trusted adults thus seem to have a
crucial role in the college-application process, but we know very little
about how those adults might think about colleges or how they reflect on
their own educational background. In other words, when asked to provide
advice by prospective college students, what elements of college do such
adults base their advice on?
In this study, we report on a novel data set containing detailed infor-
mation about how former college attendees perceive their own education
and about what factors might predict their willingness to recommend
others, such as their children, to follow a similar path. We begin by
constructing a measure of alumni satisfaction, ostensibly capturing the
respondents’ subjective evaluation of the value of the schooling they re-
ceived. We then go on to show that this subjective satisfaction measure
is poorly predicted by traditional measures of college quality. Neither in
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terms of school characteristics (such as selectivity, structural quality, or
ranking) nor in terms of labor market outcomes (employment status and
income) do we find much evidence that satisfaction correlates with the
return on investment from attending college. Instead, we show that most
alumni are very satisfied with their educational path, even those whose
labor market outcomes are in fact very poor. In the second part of the
analysis, we explore possible predictors of the willingness to recommend
one’s alma mater to others. Again we find that traditional measures of
college quality have little predictive power. Instead, our results indicate
that alumni primarily emphasize their own subjective satisfaction, rather
than more objective and tangible information. Moreover, results from
survey items about self-reported reasons for choosing one’s alma mater
suggest that, conditional upon actually choosing to go for a college edu-
cation, people primarily choose what specific college to attend for reasons
other than prestige, reputation, or labor market prospects.
Our satisfaction measures can provide policymakers with a fuller pic-
ture of why individuals choose to enroll in college and of what inputs
they use in deciding between college options. These insights might also
be relevant for college administrators looking to improve the recruitment
of future students, increase the retention of current students, and boost
donations from former students. For researchers, our results provide a
plausible reason for why information interventions often fail and also sug-
gest a path for refining such interventions in the future.
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I investigate whether policymakers can increase human capital
production by introducing merit-based enrollment through a nat-
ural experiment in Norwegian high schools. By exploiting varia-
tion across space and time I compare the performance of students
taking the same exit exam in compulsory school, but where the
test is high-stakes for only a subset of students. Using a staggered
triple-difference framework, I find that exam grades increase in the
high-stakes setting if students have a sufficient number of prospec-
tive schools within traveling distance. Results from low-stakes abil-
ity assessments suggest that actual learning— and not test-taking
strategy — could largely explain the observed effect.
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1 Introduction
Investments in human capital can yield great economic returns both for
the individual and for the economy in general. Typical models for the
production of human capital posit that it depends both on public inputs
such as investments in school resources, facilities, and teachers, and on
private inputs such as student effort. However, students often fail to in-
vest properly by making a sustained effort in school, perhaps because the
short-term costs are more salient than the rewards, which might material-
ize only in adulthood (Levitt et al., 2016). Whereas economic research has
provided a number of policy prescriptions for the design of the public in-
puts, it is less clear how policymakers can influence private investments by
students. This might be particularly challenging in the case of adolescent
students, who tend to be less intrinsically motivated and less engaged in
their schoolwork than younger students (Eccles and Midgley, 1989; Eccles
et al., 1993), instead increasingly seeking external sources of motivation
and validation, typically at ages when they transition to middle and high
school (Harter, 1981; Midgley et al., 1995).
Economic theory predicts that we are motivated by incentives. We
would therefore expect that grades will provide students with a stronger
incentive to learn in cases where they are high-stakes, in the sense that
they affect desirable outcomes, than if they are low-stakes (Becker and
Rosen, 1992; Grove and Wasserman, 2006; Main and Ost, 2014; Wise
and DeMars, 2005). This is illustrated by recent evidence suggesting that
low effort could explain why many developed countries produce subpar
performances in cross-country ability assessments, despite an overwhelm-
ing advantage in educational expenditure (Gneezy et al., 2019; Zamarro
et al., 2019). If proper incentives can motivate students to exert a sus-
tained learning effort, their improved effort should also increase human
capital production. However, we have very little knowledge on the ex-
tent to which adolescent students respond predictably to nonpecuniary
incentives in the school setting (Bach and Fischer, 2020).
One way to raise the stakes of grades— and to move the rewards
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reaped from investing more effort in school closer to the present — is to
adopt merit-based enrollment regimes when allocating students to schools.
As exemplified by the debate on school choice, a key argument in favor
of such policies rests on the hypothesis that letting students compete
for access to schools will incentivize effort if enrolling in specific schools
is desirable, thereby promoting academic achievement (Friedman, 1962;
Hoxby, 2003). However, we have little direct evidence in support of such
a disciplinary effect on students, and particularly on younger students
who have yet to exercise choice. This paper is therefore relevant for the
many cities and countries that have introduced variants of merit-based
high-school enrollment (e.g., Paris, Denmark, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom) but lack causal evidence of the effect that such policies have on
academic performance in adolescent students.
To investigate the incentivizing effect of high-stakes grades on aca-
demic achievement, I exploit a natural experiment created by regional
differences in Norwegian high-school admission regimes. Whilst histori-
cally the norm has been for students to enroll in their neighborhood high
school, several counties have in recent decades chosen to adopt merit-
based enrollment regimes, more colloquially referred to as “school choice”
policies. In these counties, oversubscription of schools is solved by ranking
students according to their compulsory school grade-point average (GPA),
admitting those with the highest average first. Given that school place-
ment is thus determined by grades in some counties but not in others,
economic theory predicts that students exposed to school choice will at-
tain higher grades, provided that school placement is an outcome they
care about. Using rich registry data from a sample period covering six
different school-choice reforms across Norway, I exploit the county–year
variation in enrollment regimes in a triple-difference framework as my
main empirical strategy. To mitigate concerns that county-specific trends
or shocks might influence the decision to introduce such reforms, I lever-
age the supply of schools within traveling distance from a student’s home
as the third difference. Specifically, I differentiate in terms of whether or
not a student, in practice, has a real choice of high schools, defined as
having at least three schools within traveling distance. If the prospect of
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being able to choose your high school is a driver of student performance,
students should not be induced to invest more effort if they have few ge-
ographically realistic options to choose from however well they perform.
This means that the triple-difference model not only estimates prereform
and postreform trends in the reforming counties as compared with non-
reforming counties, but also leverages de facto nonchoice students as a
within-treatment placebo group.
To ensure that changes in grading practices in response to the reforms
are not driving my results, I focus my attention on how students per-
form on the national, centralized exam that all Norwegian students are
required to take at the end of compulsory school. On this exam, stu-
dents are randomly drawn to be tested in one of the three core subjects
(mathematics, English, or Norwegian). All students assigned to the same
subject take the same exam on the same day. Grading is centralized and
double-blinded, and the result enters into students’ GPA— which is then
used to determine high-school placement in some counties, but not in
others. It should be noted that this is the first mandatory national exam
faced by Norwegian students and that it represents their last chance to
improve their GPA, as the teacher-awarded grades are finalized before the
exam (but not revealed to the students until after it). Qualitative stud-
ies indicate that Norwegian teenagers experience high-school choice as a
critical stage in their schooling, with far-reaching implications for their
educational and labor market prospects, and that earning good grades is
therefore vital to them (Bakken et al., 2018; Inchley et al., 2013; Ruud,
2018).
According to my results, performance on this final exam suggests that
imposing more high-stakes grades has a positive effect on grades earned. I
find robust estimates of a treatment effect of 5–6 percent of a standard de-
viation for those students who are both exposed to a school-choice reform
and have a sufficient number of schools within traveling distance — that
is, those for whom the exam might actually be experienced as high-stakes.
Contrary to common concerns that such merit-based systems might favor
certain types of students more than others, I find limited evidence that the
reforms had any heterogeneous effects on performance across subgroups.
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Rather, subsample analysis suggests that the response to the incentive is
fairly uniform, with some suggestive evidence that the effect is stronger
for students tested in mathematics.
There are at least two mechanisms that could explain the effect of
higher stakes. First, the students’ test effort could change. That is,
students faced with a high-stakes exam could put in more effort ahead of
and during the test itself. This could include adjusting their test-taking
strategy (e.g., taking more risks) or making sure to sleep and eat well in
the days before the exam. If so, the treatment effect would have limited
relevance for human capital development but rather imply that students
facing higher stakes will try a little harder on the exam and earn higher
grades than others for that reason. The second explanation, which has
stronger policy implications, is that students facing high-stakes grades
will make a sustained learning effort over time in order to acquire the
skills required to succeed on the exam. From a policy perspective, the
latter explanation suggests that changes to the incentive structure, in this
case stemming from changes to enrollment rules, can be instrumental in
increasing students’ human capital, with potentially long-lasting effects
on subsequent educational and labor market outcomes.
Results from applying the same triple-difference framework to low-
stakes national assessment tests conducted in the grade prior to the exit
exam indicate that average academic ability increased among exposed
students in the wake of the reforms, relative to the control group. This
evidence suggests that the learning-effort hypothesis is important for ex-
plaining the main effect. This is also corroborated by a dynamic response
in the treatment effect, where larger effect sizes are observed for cohorts
further removed in time from the reforms. This increasing effect is con-
sistent with the notion that students will adapt to the new regime over
time, so that younger cohorts are increasingly aware of the importance of
making a sustained effort throughout their schooling and not just toward
the end of their final year.
My paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, the results
are relevant for the literature examining the links between incentives and
academic achievement. A rich accountability literature has documented
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how schools, administrators, and teachers might respond to stricter perfor-
mance standards and outcome-based funding (see Figlio and Loeb, 2011,
and Deming and Figlio, 2016, for surveys). However, the present study
considers a setting where incentives change for the students only. In con-
trast to many other studies on related topics (e.g., Gibbons et al., 2008,
and Figlio and Hart, 2014), the compulsory schools are unaffected by the
reforms to high-school admission and thus have no reason to adjust their
behavior or effort. When it comes to student-level effects, a separate
but related body of work uses direct financial incentives to increase effort
and performance in test-taking situations (e.g., Angrist and Lavy, 2009;
Behrman et al., 2015; Bettinger, 2012; Fryer, 2011; Kremer et al., 2009;
Leuven et al., 2010). These experimental studies have successfully demon-
strated a causal link between extrinsic incentives, motivation, and effort
among students, although their effectiveness in moving outcomes has been
modest (Levitt et al., 2016). Paying students for their performance is also
costly in the long term and may not be feasible on a national scale. Hence,
the policy relevance of this body of research remains unclear. My paper
is therefore most closely related to Hvidman and Sievertsen (2019) and
Bach and Fischer (2020), which consider how students respond to other
nonmonetary incentives. The former work considers a grade re-scaling
reform in Danish high schools that led to students’ GPA being arbitrar-
ily raised or lowered, finding that those students who experienced a fall
in their GPA, which determines postsecondary enrollment, responded by
performing better in subsequent years, in terms of both teacher-awarded
grades and external exams. The authors argue that enhanced study ef-
fort is a plausible explanation for this effect. The latter work exploits
changes in Germany’s tracking system in early primary school. In this
case, students face a choice between different ability tracks rather than
schools, where some states employ binding recommendations from the
teachers based on previous performance. The authors find that relaxing
the emphasis on the recommendation in favor of more parental choice re-
duces student achievement, presumably owing to the reduced incentive to
perform well.
On a related note, the paper adds to the literature aimed at under-
45
Chaper 2 – Essay I Introduction
standing how competitive behavior implemented through school-choice
regimes can influence the efficiency of educational production (e.g., An-
grist et al., 2002; Cullen et al., 2006; Figlio and Hart, 2014; Hoxby, 2000;
Lavy, 2010). Theoretical studies postulate that allowing parents and stu-
dents to choose schools freely will improve the quality and productivity
on both the supply and the demand side through the disciplinary effect
of competition (Becker and Rosen, 1992; Costrell, 1994; Friedman, 1962;
Hanushek, 1986). Further, there could also be a positive sorting effect as
a result of students (or parents) being allowed to make choices that better
fit their needs and preferences, leading to more efficient allocation of stu-
dents across schools (Epple and Romano, 2003; Hoxby, 2003). However,
a weakness of this literature is that outcomes are often measured after
the right to choose has been exercised. This makes it difficult to evaluate
whether any gains achieved by introducing school choice are indicative of
greater learning effort on the part of students or are instead the result of
students being in different schools and peer groups. Unlike this literature,
I do not study the effect of school choice per se, but rather investigate
whether the prospect of being able to choose, given sufficient academic
success, can incentivize students to improve their performance earlier on
in their education. Hence my results give a clearer indication of the dis-
ciplinary effect of high-stakes grades on student behavior, as opposed to
school responses to competitive pressure or the effects of changing peer
groups.
Lastly, my paper contributes causal evidence to the interdisciplinary
stream of research into the significance of test consequences for perfor-
mance. The notion that academic tests devoid of consequences will be
too low-stakes to make students perform to the best of their abilities is
well established in the literature (Wise and DeMars, 2005). Although
the results in many cases stem from correlational studies, existing em-
pirical work indicates that motivation and effort are associated with test
stakes, while the evidence regarding performance is more mixed (Napoli
and Raymond, 2004; Wolf and Smith, 1995). A primary challenge in
this literature, as highlighted by a recent vein of research (Gneezy et al.,
2019; Segal, 2012; Zamarro et al., 2019), is separating effort and abil-
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ity in test-score outcomes. If policymakers are more interested in the
students’ ability than in their test scores per se, the policy relevance of
the association may be undermined by the fact that the correlation be-
tween test stakes and performance might simply reflect innate differences
in factors such as intrinsic motivation and stress resistance (Levitt et al.,
2016). To shed more light on the implications of my results, I exploit
low-stakes national assessment tests for a supplementary analysis where
I argue that test-effort effects are not the primary driver of the results.
I thus conclude that there is evidence suggesting that students respond
to incentives by exerting effort over time, thereby raising their academic
ability. This highlights a channel for policymakers to stimulate private
investment in human capital.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 describes
the institutional and theoretical setting for the analysis; Section 3 details
the data, sample, and empirical strategy used in the estimation; Section
4 contains results, while Section 5 investigates potential mechanisms; and
Section 6 presents conclusions from the study.
2 Background
2.1 Institutional Setting
The setting for this study is the universal, publicly funded primary and
lower-secondary school (henceforth “compulsory school”) in Norway, in
which attendance is free and mandatory. Norwegian schoolchildren start
compulsory school in August in the calendar year of their sixth birthday,
and it comprises ten grades and ends in graduation in the year when stu-
dents turn 16.1 Private options are limited, with the public-school partic-
ipation rate exceeding 96% in 2016 (Norwegian Directorate of Education
and Training, 2017). The allocation of students to individual compulsory
1In the Norwegian educational system, grades 1–7 make up primary school while
grades 8–10 make up lower-secondary school, which is roughly equivalent to middle
school or junior high school in the United States.
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schools is decided on the basis of neighborhood catchment areas. Since
having inclusive schools with heterogeneous groups of students is a policy
objective, formal parental influence on which school their child attends—
except through residential sorting — is limited. In the first seven years,
no grades are awarded, as relative performance, ranking, and competi-
tion between students are played down in favor of focusing on individual
development. Although classroom tests are given, they are typically not
scored or ranked in a traditional sense, but primarily serve as a tool for
the teacher to chart the progress of individual students. Grades 8 through
10 are seen as a separate stage of compulsory school, and students are
typically required to change schools after grade 7; this typically also en-
tails being assigned to a new class.2 Parental influence on assignment to
classes or schools remains limited, and nor is there any tracking at this
stage. Indeed, The Education Act (Opplæringslova) (1998) specifies that
the classes should reflect the aggregate population, without consideration
of ability, gender, or ethnicity, effectively advocating random assignment
of students to classes.3
Grade 8 also marks the introduction of teacher-assessment grades. In
general, grades 8 through 10 represent a more advanced level of study,
where subjects are more academically and theoretically oriented and where
students are regularly assessed using graded tests and assignments. Ev-
ery semester, students are given a transcript consisting of a grade on a
scale from 1 to 6 for each subject, set by their teachers. However, only
those grades received at the end of year 10 will enter their official school
record. The final teacher-assessment grades (in all subjects) along with
the grades from the above-mentioned final exit exam make up a student’s
compulsory-school GPA, with all grades given equal weight. Hence the
exit-exam grade is one out of approximately 13 grades on the transcript,
meaning that the direct impact of the exam on school placement may
2In this context, “class” refers to a set group of students within a cohort who you
a classroom and attend most subjects together. A class typically stays together for all
three years of middle school.
3Auestad (2018) shows that within a school, Norwegian students are in fact as-good-
as randomly distributed to classes in grade 8. She also finds that Norwegians rarely
move house in order to enrol their children in specific schools.
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be limited for the student population as a whole. Even so, a two-step
increase in the grade earned on the exam will by itself move a student
roughly five percentiles up in the GPA distribution, which is more than
enough to have a real impact for students who are at the margin of being
admitted to their first-choice school rather than their second-choice one.
Moreover, what is crucial for whether the incentive represented by the
exit exam has a performance-enhancing effect is not so much its objective
impact on outcomes as how it is perceived by students. Both Norwegian
and cross-country surveys indicate that Norwegian students experience
above-average levels of school-related stress toward the end of compulsory
school (Bakken et al., 2018; Inchley et al., 2013). Some studies report
that students in grade 10 link stress to internal and environmental pres-
sure to perform well, so that they do not spoil their chances of obtaining
a good education and having successful careers (Bakken et al., 2018). On
an anecdotal note, some students claim that not getting accepted to their
preferred school would mean that “everything is ruined” (Ruud, 2018).
The final exam represents the last opportunity to better their chances of
admission to their preferred school, and it is therefore likely that many
students will experience it as high-stakes.
After graduating from compulsory school, students can apply to enroll
in high school. While this is not mandatory, students have a statutory
right to acceptance for upper-secondary education, and very few end their
education before or immediately after finishing compulsory school.4 When
applying to high school, students make their first choice of education track,
choosing between a variety of vocational and academic programs.5 Within
programs, the allocation of students between high schools varies from
county to county, which is what provided the variation exploited in this
study. Administration of the high-school sector is a key task at the county-
government level, with decisions on the administration of admissions left
to county-level politicians’ discretion.
4For example, at the start of the 2015/16 academic year, 92% of 16–18-year-olds
were enrolled in high school, while only 192 individuals failed to complete their com-
pulsory education (Norwegian Directory of Education and Training, 2017).
5The vocational track leads to an apprenticeship within a trade. The primary
function of academic-track programs is to prepare students for higher education.
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2.2 High School Enrollment Reform
In simplified terms, current processes for high-school admission use one of
two opposing regimes. One of them, the neighborhood-catchment (NC)
regime, follows the principles of compulsory school in requiring students
to attend their nearest school, that is, the high school closest to their
place of residence that offers their preferred educational program. Propo-
nents of the NC regime emphasize that this allows students to stay close
to home, limiting lengthy commutes and keeping youths attached to their
local communities. It also serves to promote heterogeneity within the
student body, as it constrains students’ ability to self-select into specific
schools (on parameters other than program preferences). The opposing
type of regime is the school-choice (SC) regime, which allows students
to apply to any school within their county, regardless of its geographical
location. This includes the option of applying for the same program in
several schools, or for several different programs in the same school. In
densely populated areas, there will typically be several schools offering
the same programs, particularly the academic ones. Where the number
of applicants to a high school exceeds its capacity, students are ranked by
compulsory-school GPA, with the highest scores being prioritized. Ad-
mission is purely merit-based: grades are the sole determinant of student
allocation.6 The cutoff for admission to a particular school is thus equal to
the GPA of the last student admitted in that particular year (in the case
of ties, admission officials will perform a random draw between those at
the cutoff). Cutoffs vary substantially with the popularity and perceived
quality of schools and also fluctuate from year to year in accordance with
application patterns.7 Hence the SC regime places a significant emphasis
on the grades attained by students in compulsory school, meaning that
the final exit exam involves higher stakes for students in SC counties than
6For a few programs, such as music and sports, there are additional tests for ability
in the domain area. Moreover, in certain instances some counties also take into account
a student’s travel distance, but this is done on a discretionary case-by-case basis.
7For the least popular schools, admission will typically be uncontested, while it is
not uncommon for the cutoff in the most popular urban schools to exceed a 5.0 GPA
(out of a possible 6). Information about previous years’ cutoffs in specific schools is
made available to students.
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for students in NC counties.
Historically, prior to my sample period, the regimes have changed
frequently, with an increasing number of counties adopting SC policies
throughout Norway. While eight of nineteen counties were already using
an SC regime at the start of my sample period, the variation exploited
in this study is provided by the six counties that implemented reforms to
introduce SC in their high-school application process during the period
from 2002 to 2015.8 The geographical distribution of admission regimes
in the first and last years of my sample period is illustrated in Figure 1.
In the final year, 2015, only five counties still applied an NC regime. The
SC reform decisions followed a timeline similar to that presented in Figure
2. Thus, students in their final year at the time of the relevant vote had
only their last semester to adjust to the new regime.
A county survey of the student population conducted in the wake of
one such reform indicated that SC disrupted existing enrollment patterns
(Arbeidslaget Analyse, Utgreiing og Dokumentasjon, 2005). In the county
of Hordaland, one-quarter of the first cohort affected responded that their
preferred high school was not the one they would have been assigned in
an NC regime, and 75 percent of those had succeeded in enrolling in their
first-choice school. Of the remaining students, who would have preferred
to enroll in their geographically closest school, 85 percent were accepted
by their first-choice school. In both cases, acceptance rates indicate that
enrollment was competitive. However, there is substantial heterogeneity
across geography and ability, with the most popular schools being located
in city centers. Teacher responses suggest that the primary realignment
effect brought about by merit-based enrollment consists in allowing high-
ability students in suburban and rural areas to enroll in popular urban
schools, displacing low-ability students from the city centers who have to
settle for less competitive schools further away.
8Specifically, Akershus (2003), Hordaland (2005), Oslo (2009), Vest-Agder (2012),
Buskerud (2012) and Nordland (2014).
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(a) 2002
(b) 2015
Figure 1: Spread of School Choice Regimes in Norway
Note: Illustration of the increase in school-choice regimes in Norwegian
counties during the 2002–2015 period. Dark shading of counties indicates
some kind of school choice being in effect for students graduating from
compulsory school in that particular year.
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August:












Figure 2: Timeline for the School Choice Reforms
Note: Overview of the series of events of the school choice reforms in the sample.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
This paper investigates the relationship between high-stakes grades and
performance. The plausibility of this causal mechanism rests on the hy-
pothesis that linking performance to desirable outcomes creates an in-
centive that motivates students to exert more effort in school, and that
that effort subsequently has a causal effect on learning and human capital
accumulation. At the individual level, we would expect an increase in
such effort if students perceive, first, that such an increase is clearly re-
lated to performance in the relevant domain and, second, that the possible
outcomes are of sufficient value to them.9 In economic terms, we would
expect students to invest in school through effort if they expected long-
term rewards exceeding the short-term costs of that effort (Levitt et al.,
2016). Receiving a grade is not in itself enough to elicit such a response
if the associated consequences are not of sufficient magnitude (Grant and
Green, 2013). The Norwegian school-choice admission regimes plausi-
bly improve the situation by implicitly providing an extrinsic incentive
through a merit-based enrollment regime.
High-stakes grades can be expected to be a more effective incentive
9In psychology this is referred to as the expectancy-value theory of motivation
(Wigfield and Eccles, 2000).
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for some students than for others. Some studies have suggested that mo-
tivation to learn, in the sense of striving to acquire the skills demanded
by school, is an innate individual characteristic or trait (Brophy, 1987;
Segal, 2012). Students who have a strong motivation to learn (whether
innate or not) would be expected to work hard and try their best, even
in the absence of any extrinsic incentives that policymakers might offer,
simply because of their intrinsic drive. Segal (2012) finds that students
displaying these traits also perform well on low-stakes assessments, sug-
gesting that they are already properly motivated to capitalize on learning
opportunities even when there is no tangible benefit to be gained. Hence
high-stakes grades can be expected to provide a more effective incentive
for students who do not exhibit those characteristics. Assuming that such
students invest strategically in school, effort levels will also vary across
individuals, as a function of students’ relative probability of achieving
their desired outcome (Vroom, 1964). Further, it is often assumed that
effort and ability are complementary, and that the marginal effect of effort
on human capital production increases with ability (Oettinger, 2002). If
this is so, high-stakes grades will primarily improve the performance of
low-effort, high-ability students. All else being equal, this would lead to
such students being placed in better schools under a school-choice regime,
which could lead to adverse segregation effects.
By contrast, effort might be negatively correlated with ability if high-
achieving students are able to attain the maximum grade with less effort
than average students (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008). If so, we
might expect a ceiling effect to cause a negative bias in estimates at the
top of the ability distribution. Thus there might be little reason to expect
a difference in behavior between two such students exposed to opposite
regimes. As we can reasonably assume that motivation at least partly
maps to performance through effort, it is also reasonable to assume that
many high-achievers will already be sufficiently motivated. We might
therefore expect a stronger effect among low-achievers for whom faltering
motivation could be a root cause of their underperformance. Additionally,
some studies have demonstrated that boys respond more than girls to the
extrinsic incentives of a competitive environment (Azmat et al., 2016;
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Hopland and Nyhus, 2016). Provided that boys outnumber girls in the
low-achieving segment of the student population, a stronger treatment
effect on boys would indicate a stronger effect for low-ability students.
Tying test performance to desirable outcomes might also change the
way students approach the test itself. Since exams map a continuous
ability distribution to an arbitrary, discrete scale, the expected marginal
benefit of performing better is conditional on a given student’s latent abil-
ity level prior to the exam in relation to those discrete grades: if a student
is not near the margin between grades, the short-term expected marginal
benefit of effort is close to zero, while the marginal costs are positive.
Thus we would primarily expect to see a performance-enhancing effect on
students whose latent ability level is sufficiently close to a point where
they could earn a higher (or fall to a lower) grade, and who therefore have
positive expected marginal benefits from investing effort. In line with this
theoretical argument, some experimental studies have noted that the ef-
fect of introducing extrinsic incentives is greatest for a “marginal group”
of students, that is, for those who have success within their reach and are
neither at the top nor at the bottom of the ability distribution (Angrist
and Lavy, 2009). Therefore we might not expect to see any substantial
effect on the treatment group as a whole. However, for students who per-
ceive themselves to be at the margin between grades, such an incentive
might represent a sufficient nudge to make them put in more effort.
3 Data and Analysis
3.1 Data
The study relies on comprehensive registry data retrieved from the Nor-
wegian National Database of Education, maintained by Statistics Norway.
The registry of interest contains compulsory-school outcomes of every stu-
dent enrolled in a Norwegian school who graduated from grade 10, and
it covers the entire student population in the sample period. The sample
is limited to 14 adjacent cohorts during the period from 2002 to 2015,
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which include a total of 856,040 individuals. Central to the analysis are
records detailing the final grades attained by each student in all sub-
jects, both through teacher assessments and through written and oral
exams. Additionally, the registry contains information about the subject
in which a student was tested on the final exit exam as well as about
when and where students graduated. Individual identifiers allow me to
link school outcomes to other registries that provide rich details about de-
mographic characteristics, socioeconomic status (SES), and family origin.
These identifiers also allow students to be matched with their parents,
producing a rich set of potential covariates that can be controlled for in
the estimates.
The focus of the analysis is on students graduating from compul-
sory school, in specific counties exposed to either a school-choice or a
neighborhood-catchment regime. As each student is only observed once
(at the time of graduation), the data are organized as a repeated cross-
section, with dummies indicating from which county and in what year a
particular student graduated. Graduation takes place in the spring, and
most students subsequently enroll in high school the following August. Co-
horts are therefore referred to using the year in which they left compulsory
school.10 Similarly, the reforms are deemed to be in effect starting with
the first cohort whose members are able to exercise expanded choice in
their high-school applications.11 Details of current high school admission
systems are available in each county’s regulations (see www.lovdata.no).
Some of these also contain notes about significant changes made to the
admission regulations, but typically they do not include detailed infor-
mation about the timing of reforms. To determine when reforms were
implemented, I rely on two investigations carried out at the request of
members of Parliament that provide additional details on which counties
adhered to which systems at the times in question (Dokument 8:41, 2006;
Dokument 8:8, 2003). However, as the most recent of those investigations
10For example, the cohort enrolled in Grade 10 in the 2002/2003 academic year is
referred to as the 2003 cohort.
11If students graduating from compulsory school in the spring of 2003, in a reforming
county, can exercise school choice the following fall, the reform is defined as being
implemented in 2003.
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was carried out in 2006, I have supplemented information from public
records of county-parliament sessions for later cohorts. In addition, I have
cross-checked those records with newspaper articles from local media in
the relevant counties to determine the exact timing of the reforms.
3.2 Measures and Variables
The key outcome variable is a student’s grade on the final exit exam in
grade 10, standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for
ease of interpretation. As noted above, in the final semester of compul-
sory school, all students are randomly drawn for testing in a centrally
administrated written exam in either mathematics, English, or Norwe-
gian.12 The draw is randomized at the class level, so students in different
classes within a school will typically be tested in different subjects. It is
the responsibility of the individual municipalities in each county to imple-
ment the draw in a manner that ensures an even distribution of students
across exam subjects, and of exam subjects across schools (Norwegian
Directorate for Education and Training, 2018). All students selected for
testing in the same subject will take the exact same exam on the same
day, and their exam papers will be graded externally by compulsory-school
teachers in another part of the country. Both students and teachers re-
main anonymous throughout the grading process, which uses the same
integer scale from 1 (fail) to 6 (top) as teacher-assessment grades and is
based on an absolute standard criterion. This anonymity throughout the
process and the use of external graders makes the exam grade a more
reliable outcome measure than the full GPA, because it is plausible that
teachers’ grade-setting practices are endogenous to the high-school admis-
sion regime applied in a county in the sense that teachers in school-choice
counties could be more lenient in an attempt to help their students gain
admission to their preferred school. This is clearly less of a concern when
the teacher grading an exam does not know who the student is or where
12Additionally, students are tested in an oral exam with a similar randomized draw.
However, in this case all subjects are eligible for testing, and the exam is carried out
locally at each school. The grade from this exam is also added to the student’s GPA.
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he or she lives.13
In order to gauge whether students have a real choice of schools, I
construct a measure of the number of high schools within traveling dis-
tance from the student’s home. To determine whether a school belongs
to a particular student’s choice set, I use the commuting zones in which
students reside.14 These represent geographically demarcated areas inside
county borders within which traveling distances are such that an employee
could be expected to commute to work on a daily basis. The variable for
the number of schools available to a student thus indicates the number
of schools located in his or her commuting zone of residence in the year
when he or she graduated from compulsory school. Since there are two
main educational tracks to choose from in high school (academic and vo-
cational), I define “real choice” as having at least three high schools within
your commuting zone. By doing so, I ensure that at least one of the main
tracks will be available in at least two different schools in that region.15
A total of 599,885 observations (76 percent) satisfy this condition. How-
ever, as most Norwegian high-school students will not be able to obtain a
driver’s license until their final year (the age limit is 18), the commuting
zones probably approximate to the maximum traveling distance that a
student would consider for a daily commute. Because of their reliance on
public transport and other means of transportation, this definition will
likely overstate the true choice set that a student would consider, which
will bias effect sizes toward zero.
In addition to the commuting zone and the cohort-specific fixed ef-
fects necessary to estimate DID and triple-difference models, I control
for a rich set of conventional covariates. The Central Population Reg-
istry provides details on students’ gender, nationality, and year of birth.
Records of immigration status are used to construct an indicator of im-
13For the curious reader, I include results from using a GPA constructed from all
nonexam grades as the dependent variable in Table B.3 in the appendix. The effect
sizes in this analysis are largely similar to those estimated in the main analysis.
14Definitions and demarcations of these zones are given in an overview provided by
Statistics Norway— which refers to them as “economic areas.”
15I assess the sensitivity of the results to this definition in the appendix. Please refer
to Section 4.2 for more details
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migrant background, defined as being either a first-generation immigrant
or born in Norway but having at least one parent born outside of Norway.
Using unique identifiers, I link students with their parents, in order to
collect data on parental education and income. Education (the highest
level of education completed by each parent) is measured on Statistics
Norway’s nine-point scale.16 For income, I use the registered taxable in-
come in Norwegian kroner from official tax records for both parents in the
year that the student graduated, with household income being the sum of
these incomes rounded to the nearest 1,000. Then I divide, for each year
separately, households into deciles according to income rank; this is the
variable that I include in my analyses.
3.3 Sample Selection
The estimation sample is constructed from the universe of 858,306 indi-
viduals having graduated from compulsory school during the years 2002–
2015. Of these students, 3,057 were exempted from taking the exit exam
(e.g., owing to special education needs) and 835 were confirmed sick on
the day of testing. A further 1,863 students did not show up for the exam
without providing a reason for their absence. In accordance with Norwe-
gian guidelines, these were not given a failing grade but rather marked
as “Not graded.” In the present sample, these cases are coded as missing
values. An additional 61,605 observations are missing, mostly because of
a large teachers’ strike in 2008 that caused exams to be canceled. How-
ever, attrition analysis— available in Table C.1 in the appendix — shows
that grade missingness is not predicted by treatment status. In total,
68,370 observations without exam grades are excluded from the analysis,
leaving an estimation sample of 790,936 unique student-level observations.
In cases in which a student is registered with multiple graduation years
and outcomes (true for 2556 students, 0.29 percent of the gross sample),
I use the earliest observed result. In cases where information is missing
for covariates, dummies for missing values are constructed and included
accordingly, and the covariates are set to zero.
16See Statistics Norway (2001) for details.
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3.4 Summary Statistics
Table 1 details summary statistics for the estimation sample. Column 1
lists mean values and standard deviations for key variables computed for
the treated counties (those that implemented reforms to high-school en-
rollment during the sample period). Column 2 lists corresponding values
for the 13 nonreforming control counties.
Since Norway has a fairly homogeneous population, there are few dis-
parities in the demographic composition of the two groups. One notewor-
thy exception is the share of immigrants, which is markedly higher in the
treated counties. Those counties also have higher levels of average house-
hold income than the control counties, despite there being no discernible
difference in education level. This is probably due to the fact that some
of Norway’s largest urban areas, which have a higher frequency of income
outliers, are among the reforming counties. This fact is also reflected in
the average number of schools available to students as well as in the size
of the county cohorts. The average student in the treated counties has
thirteen high schools within his or her commuting zone and belongs to
an average graduating cohort of 100 students. By contrast, students in
control counties have an average of six high schools to choose from and
the average graduating cohort per school there consists of 89 students.17
Students are — by design — evenly distributed between exam subjects.
The only discrepancy found with regard to the exam-subject draw is that
the sample share of students tested in Norwegian is roughly 10 percent
smaller than that for the other subjects. This is due to the aforemen-
tioned teachers’ strike in 2008, which overlapped with the predetermined
date for the exam in Norwegian, meaning that it was mainly that exam
that was canceled. By contrast, exam performance varies substantially.
Figure 3 shows that the likelihood of earning the bottom two grades is
markedly higher for those selected to be tested in mathematics, all else
17While differences in observable characteristics do not bias the results in a DID de-
sign per se (unless underlying trends overlap with the timing of the reforms, which is
particularly unlikely in a triple-difference setting), I do control for a rich set of conven-
tional predictors of school achievement, such as parental background and socioeconomic
status, in all my estimations in order to increase the precision of the models.
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being equal. In fact, mathematics exams account for three-quarters of
all failing students while over half of the students who obtained the top
grade were tested in English. One potential concern is that changes in
the composition of draws across treatment status and time could threaten
the identification strategy. However, considering that the subject draw is














































Figure 3: Distribution of Exam Grades by Subject
Note: Grade distribution for each exam subject, measured as the fraction of students tested
in that subject attaining a specific grade. The exams are graded on a six point integer scale,
where 6 is the top grade, and 1 is a fail.
18Based on results not included here, I find that neither treatment status nor covari-
ates are predictive of being tested in mathematics rather than a language.
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Table 1—Summary Statistics
Treated Control
Mean SD Mean SD
Background characteristics
Female 0.488 (0.50) 0.488 (0.50)
Year of birth 1992.6 (4.11) 1992.6 (4.12)
Age at graduation 16.09 (0.95) 16.09 (1.04)
Immigrant 0.125 (0.33) 0.070 (0.26)
Mother’s education 13.32 (2.97) 13.14 (2.673)
Father’s education 13.47 (2.87) 13.12 (2.59)
Household income 893.2 (1690.8) 790.8 (785.7)
Educational setting
Number of HS in CZ 13.10 (9.44) 5.74 (4.67)
Share with >2 HS in region 0.83 (0.38) 0.70 (0.46)
Number of students in school 100.8 (53.26) 88.75 (51.79)
Written exam subject
Math 0.38 (0.48) 0.38 (0.48)
English 0.36 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48)
Norwegian 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44)
N 350,858 440,078
Note: Summary statistics for all students in treated counties compared with the control group.
Standard deviations in parentheses. The treatment group consists of the six counties which
implemented high-school enrollment reforms during the 2002–2015 period. All nonreforming
counties constitutes the control group. Immigrant is defined as having at least one parent
who was born outside of Norway. For the education measure, I convert Statistics Norway’s
nine-point scale for an individual’s highest completed degree to years of education using their
own conventions. For reference, completing high school is equal to 13 years of education.
Household income is reported in nominal NOK/1000. “HS” = high school, “CZ” = commuting
zone.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
The Triple Difference Model
The empirical model of interest in this study is the linear relationship
between student performance and high-stakes grades (as proxied by the
high-school admission regime), as expressed in Equation (1).
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yi = µDi + εi (1)
If students were randomized to admission regimes, the binary variable
Di in (1) would identify an unbiased causal effect on some outcome yi
of exposure to high-stakes grades. However, it is plausible to claim that
students are exposed to either regime in a nonrandom fashion. This gives
rise to concerns that (1) would falsely attribute mean differences between
the student groups to the regime to which they are exposed.
One way to overcome this identification issue is to exploit the fact that
counties implemented school-choice reforms at different points in time, in a
difference-in-differences setup (DID). In a potential-outcomes framework,
we can consider such a policy-induced change to the admission regime as
a treatment, with treatment status assigned by the binary variable D,
so that y1i is the outcome of student i exposed to such a school-choice
reform, while y0i is the potential outcome for that student in the absence
of that reform.
Di = {0, 1}
→ y0i = Outcome for student i |Di = 0
→ y1i = Outcome for student i |Di = 1
Since the potential outcomes for either condition are unobservable,
DID proxies the counterfactual outcomes for those treated by taking the
difference between pretreatment and posttreatment observations for a con-
trol group, under the assumption that the treatment group would have
followed a similar trend if they had not been treated.
DID = E(y1i, post − y1i, pre |Di = 1)− E(y0i, post − y0i pre |Di = 0) (2)
The analytical analogue to (2) would then be to estimate19
yict = αc + λt + µDc,t + εict (3)
19In this brief exposition I exclude nonessential covariates such as student character-
istics for the sake of simplicity.
63
Chapter 2 – Essay I Data and Analysis
where yict is the outcome of interest for student i in county c from cohort
t, and αc and λt are vectors of indicators controlling for unit- and time-
specific fixed effects. The variable of interest,Dc,t, is a binary indicator
that takes the value 1 if county c has been treated by time t and the value
0 otherwise. εict is an error term. Within this framework, µ̂ measures the
effect of being exposed to a school-choice reform, which is estimated by
taking the difference between pretreatment and posttreatment periods for
both the treatment group and the control group, and then the difference
between these two differences as laid out in (2).
The identifying assumption of the DID model is that of parallel trends;
this model posits that, in the absence of an intervention, the trends in
outcomes would be equal for treatment and control units, so that any
observed deviation from this trend is attributable to the policy change of
interest. Thus, in the absence of treatment, the DID framework assumes
that
E(yict | c, t) = αc + λt (4)
implying that any observed difference in posttreatment periods is the sum
of unit-specific mean differences (αc), and year-specific effects present
among all observations (λt). This implies that the potential outcome
of the treated cohorts should be unrelated to the timing of the policy
change. However, in a setting where the reform is a political decision, this
assumption might not hold entirely. For example, there might be unob-
served underlying trends in outcomes in the treated units that induced
these particular counties to consider school-choice reform in the first place.
Further, these reforms could be the result of changes in the political land-
scape that also led to other changes at the county level around the same
time (say, an increase in investment in the educational sector), and those
other changes might be correlated with student outcomes.
To assess the viability of the parallel-trends assumption, Figure 4
charts the trends in exam grades, measured as raw averages, for the treat-
ment and control groups. For this plot, I average the exam grade of
students in each treated unit in a window around the treatment occur-
rence, and then average these across units. I then construct a similar
64
Chapter 2 – Essay I Data and Analysis
time series for the nontreated students in the same windows, and average
over each relative time period. The resulting plot is a trend line centered
around the treatment occurrence for all treated units. Under the iden-
tifying assumption of the DID model, the trends in exam grades should
be parallel in periods prior to the reforms. Figure 4 suggests that this
assumption holds only modestly well. While the differences are not large
in absolute terms, the trends in the treatment and control groups appear
to deviate to a certain extent from one another. At the very least, the
plots in Figure 4 do not conclusively allow rejection of the possibility that
the treatment group is on a different pretreatment trend than the control
group. This raises concerns about the causal nature of DID estimates of
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Figure 4: Trend in Average Exam Grades
Note: The figure charts the average grade attained on the written final exit exam, by cohort
and treatment status. Circles (triangles) represent averages for students (not) exposed to a
school-choice reform in at that relative time point.
65
Chapter 2 – Essay I Data and Analysis
To mitigate such concerns, I leverage a third difference that exploits
a within-treatment placebo group to construct a triple-difference (DDD)
model. Specifically, I consider the supply of schools in a given commuting
zone, as detailed in Section 3.1, and make use of those students whom
I define as not having a real choice of schools. Those students are in
principle treated, because the statutory right to school choice is given
to all students in the county, but the minimal supply of feasible options
makes them de facto nontreated. However, they are exposed to the same
confounders and investments potentially underlying the trends depicted
in Figure 4 as the other students within a specific treatment unit. A
triple-difference model relaxes the parallel-trends assumption by adding a
second control group that is on the same trend as the treatment group be-
cause they are both part of the same treatment units, thus taking out the
variation in outcomes attributable to the trend rather than to the policy
change. The triple-difference model thus estimates the exam-performance
gap between those with and without choice in the treated units, relative to
the corresponding gap in the control units— and, moreover, it determines
whether this gap changes in posttreatment periods. That is, we identify
a treatment effect if the choice/no choice performance gap increases more
posttreatment in the treatment units than in the control units. The iden-
tifying assumption in this case is therefore that the trend in the choice/no
choice gap in exam performance is parallel between treatment and control
groups in the pretreatment period. The triple-difference estimate thus ac-
counts not only for changes that occur within the treatment group before
and after treatment relative to the control group, but also for changes
within the treatment group between students who should and should not
be affected by the treatment.
I assess the validity of this assumption in Figure 5, where I chart the
raw difference in grades attained between students defined as having a
choice of schools and those defined as having no such choice, separately
by time relative to the implementation of school-choice reform and to
treatment status. Although there is a slight indication of anticipatory
effects in the treatment group in the final pretreatment period (perhaps
because students and parents in urban areas are more attuned to ongo-
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ing discussions about a possible school-choice reform), the trends in the
treatment and control groups prior to the reforms are reasonably paral-
lel — clearly more so than in the double-difference case. It is evident that
the difference in performance between students living in commuting zones
with a large versus small supply of schools is stable over the sample period
in the nonreforming counties (the control group). By contrast, the corre-
sponding gap increases sharply in posttreatment periods in the treatment
group, which would suggest a treatment effect.
I estimate the treatment effect more formally by extending equation
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Figure 5: Trend in Choice/No Choice Differential in Average Exam Grades
Note: The figure charts the difference across choice status in average grade attained on the
written final exit exam, by cohort and treatment status. Circles (triangles) represent averages
for students (not) exposed to a school-choice reform in that particular relative time point.
Higher values on the y-axis indicate a larger gap in favor of students in choice commuting
zones.
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ordinary least squares:
yizct = αc + λt + µD
Choice
c,t,z +Dc,t + θz · αc + θz · λt + θz + ϕi + υizct (5)
As before, the dependent variable is the (standardized) grade attained in
the written exit exam in compulsory school by student i in commuting
zone z in county c, observed in year t, and αc and λt are vectors of
unit and time indicators. The binary indicator Dc,t takes the value 1
for students graduating in a treated county after a school-choice reform
took effect. The third difference is represented by the indicator variable
θz, which takes the value 1 for students going to school in commuting
zone z if and only if that zone has more than two high schools. The
variable of interest is thus D
Choice
c,t,r ,which is an interaction between Dc,t
and θz where the parameter µ̂ captures the DDD estimate of the effect
of imposing high-stakes grades. The triple-difference estimator is thus
essentially a three-way interaction between αc, λtand θz. The interaction
θz ·αc controls for county-specific differences in outcomes between students
living in a commuting zone with real school choice and those not living in
such an area, while θz · λt controls for the possibility that students with
real choice have a different linear time trend from those without choice.
To control for other predictors of academic achievement, I also add a
vector of student-level covariates, represented by ϕi, to all my models.
This includes gender, year of birth, immigrant status, parental education,
parents’ age when the student was born, and household income. In most
specifications, I also control for being tested in mathematics as well as for
subject-specific time trends.
Event Study Analysis
My primary mode of analysis will involve decomposing the aggregate re-
sults obtained with the framework outlined above using an event-study
type design. There are two reasons for this approach. First, estimat-
ing treatment effects for individual periods leading up to or following the
treatment point allows a more formal investigation of the validity of the
parallel-trends assumption than merely inspecting descriptive trends in
68
Chapter 2 – Essay I Data and Analysis
outcomes. The presence of statistically significant treatment effects in the
prereform periods would suggest that other confounding variables could
be correlated with either treatment or choice status and thus bias the
results.
Second, recent studies have highlighted that, in DID designs where the
timing and length of treatment exposure vary between units, estimates of
aggregate treatment effects represent a weighted average of all the pos-
sible two-by-two DID estimators in the sample, which can yield biased
results that are intuitively hard to interpret (Callaway and Sant’Anna,
2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021). For instance, the implicit weights assigned
to each estimator are given by relative unit sizes and by the variance of
the treatment indicator, that is, the timing of the treatment relative to
the sample period. These weights can be unreasonable; for example, they
might have negative values (de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfaeuille, 2020).
In such cases, an event study or “stacked” DID design might be a more ap-
propriate approach (Goodman-Bacon, 2021). The potential bias inherent
in DID and DDD designs with variation in treatment timing can be partic-
ularly problematic if the treatment effect is not homogeneous across units
and/or not static over the posttreatment period (Borusyak and Jaravel,
2018; Sun and Abraham, 2020). However, in such cases, even event-study
designs can suffer from biased estimates as a result of an unreasonable
implicit weighting of the estimators.
To overcome this issue, I follow the procedure introduced by Sun and
Abraham (2020) to estimate an interaction-weighted (IW) triple difference
model. A conventional event-study design decomposes a binary treatment
indicator into a set of leads and lags, each of which is interacted with the
treatment to achieve period-specific treatment effects at various points
in the window around the treatment occurrence, such as in the following
equation.


























c,t + θz · αc + θz · λt + θz + ϕi + υizct
(6)
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c,t,z are the binary
indicators taking the value 1 if the focal student in commuting zone z in
county c in time t graduates l periods from the implementation point of
the reform (with Choice denoting whether or not commuting zone z has
more than two high schools). Such a specification relaxes the assumption
that the treatment effect is static posttreatment, allowing estimates to
take a nonparametric functional form across periods. However, note that
when we estimate a model such as (6), we also assume that the treatment
effect is homogeneous across treatment units for a given l, meaning that
the period-specific estimates for all units follow the same dynamic path
for l ≥ 0. If the treatment units are in fact heterogeneous in terms of
baseline characteristics, this assumption quickly becomes unreasonable.
Sun and Abraham (2020) propose an alternative procedure that allows
the treatment effect to vary both across time and across treatment units.
Instead of a model specification like (6), they suggest estimating the
cohort-specific average treatment effect, CATTe,l, for each treated unit
e = 1, ... , 6 and then taking the weighted average of the relevant units
in l, with the weights determined by the sample share of each unit.20




c,t,z I thus estimate the set











l �=−l δe,l(1{EC = e} ·D
l,Choice
c,t,r )) in (6), where the resulting
coefficient δ̂e,l is the estimated CATTe,l for unit e in period l. For all l, I
then take the sample-share-weighted average across the relevant e to get
the IW DDD estimate v̂l for the observations in the lth period relative to
the treatment timing.
20In this study, the treated units e are the subsample of counties C that implemented
school-choice reform.
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4 Results
4.1 Event Study Analysis
I begin my discussion of results by presenting the estimates from the
event study outlined in the previous section. First, the results from the
IW event-study model are depicted in Figure 6. I report coefficients and
standard errors from both this and the conventional event-study model
in Table 2.21. As per convention, I set the period immediately prior to
treatment, l = −1, as the reference category. Depicted in the figure is
the output of an event study of the period-specific estimates, v̂l, of the
treatment effect of taking your exit exam in the lth period relative to
the implementation of high-stakes grades. Two things are evident from
this figure. First, there is scant evidence of any anticipatory effects. In
particular, the estimates for l = −4 and l = −2 are very close to zero.
The point estimate for l = −3 is negative and slightly larger in magnitude,
but nonetheless it is not statistically significant. This could indicate —
but does not provide strong evidence in favor of— slight differences in
trends between the treatment and control groups in the early periods,
but convergence in the period immediately prior to implementation. In
contrast, I find a moderately sized point estimate of 3.9 percent of a
standard deviation (0.039σ), significant at the 10% level, for l = −3 when
using the traditional event-study specification. This suggests that one of
the treated units for which the parallel-trends assumption holds less well
is overemphasized in the model. However, application of the sample-size
re-weighting approach offered by IW DDD makes this anticipatory effect
disappear in the aggregate.
Second, there is a clear dynamic response to the implementation of
high-stakes grades: first a sharp immediate response, which then fades,
but is followed by continually increasing point estimates as we move fur-
ther away from l = 0. The immediate effect is substantial, with a sig-
nificant estimate of 0.07σ. However, the period-specific estimates peak
for the cohorts graduating five years after the reforms, for which I esti-
21Full results, including all δ̂e,l, are available in Table D.1 in the appendix.
71
Chapter 2 – Essay I Results
mate a treatment effect of 0.10σ. Such an increasing effect size suggests
that younger cohorts of students adapt to the new incentive over time,
perhaps as the culture and focus within schools change as well.22 The
sharp increase in point estimates is in fact apparent only once the fully
treated cohorts— that is, those that through grades 8–10 under the new
regime — enter the sample. On the other hand, the quickly dissipating im-
mediate effect might suggest that the reforms and their potential effects
were highly salient for the first affected cohort (owing to media attention,
uncertainty about how it would affect school enrollment in the short term,
etc.) but less so for the second and third cohorts.
Despite the concerns outlined in Section 3.5, the coefficients reported
in Table 2 do not indicate that the difference between the IW and a
conventional event-study approach is large. In the third column, I re-
port p-values from tests of whether the estimates from these different
approaches are significantly different. I find that this is the case only
for l = −3. For all other l, I find broadly similar estimates, suggesting
that the conventional event-study approach would be a reasonable ap-
proach for this context. Nevertheless, the IW DDD remains my preferred
event-study approach throughout the paper, because of its more beneficial
properties and assumptions.
22An alternative explanation for this pattern of effects could be that the composition
of the treatment group changes toward the end of the sample window, as not all treated
units are observed in all relative time periods. If the units with the strongest response
are also those observed in later relative periods, this could potentially give a false
impression of this increasing treatment effect. To assess the validity of this concern, I
re-ran the analysis using different compositions of the treatment group; the results are
reported in Table B.1 in the appendix. Specifically, I re-estimated the model separately
using only the first three cases (the “early adopters”) and the last three cases (the “late
adopters”) in the treatment group, respectively. I also ran a model where I used the
middle four cases for which I could create a balanced sample window where all treated
units are observed in all relative time periods. The results from these exercises indicate
that, although it is apparent that the early and middle adopters are driving the observed
effects, they themselves display this dynamic increase in effect sizes. Hence the shape
of the event-study model does not seem to be an artifact of a changing composition
of the treatment group, but rather a reflection of the dynamics within the units most
strongly affected by the reforms.
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Figure 6: Event Study Estimates of the Effects of School Choice Reforms
on Exam Grades
Note: This figure presents the results from estimating an event-study type model decomposing
the dynamics of the treatment effect over periods leading up to, and following implementation
of the reforms. Reported are the coefficients estimated for indicators for being l periods
removed from the treatment, where l ∈ {−4, 6}. The model is saturated in period indicators
as the indicator for the first and last periods takes the value 1 for all preceding/subsequent
periods, respectively. l = −1 is omitted as the reference category. The shaded area represents
95% confidence intervals . I report full results in Table D.1 in the appendix.
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4.2 Aggregate Results
In this section, I present aggregate estimates of the average treatment
effect of implementing high-stakes grades for the posttreatment period as
a whole. Results from estimating the triple-difference model (5) using
ordinary least squares are presented in Table 3. For ease of exposition, I
report only the estimated coefficients for the three key parameters— the
indicator for school-choice reform (in essence the Treat×Post interaction),
the indicator for choice, and the triple interaction. First, in Column 1 I
present results from my preferred specification where I regress the stan-
dardized exam performance for each student on 5, controlling only for stu-
dent characteristics, parental background, and socioeconomic status (as
described in Section 3.1.1). Using this specification, I estimate an average
increase in the exam grade attained of 0.053σ. For an intuitive compari-
son of the effect size, 0.053σ is about half the estimated performance gap
between native and immigrant students using this specification. In line
with the identifying assumption of my triple-difference model, I cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no effect for the school-choice-reform indica-
tor alone. These results imply that imposing high-stakes grades through
school-choice reforms is effective in improving student performance if com-
bined with sufficient levels of choice so that the grades are actually per-
ceived as consequential.23
In Column 2, I re-estimate the model, adding an indicator of whether
a student was tested in mathematics as well as a subject-specific time
trend. Using this specification, I estimate a treatment effect of 0.048σ—
somewhat smaller, but substantively similar to the result in Column 1.
23An alternative to this approach would be to estimate a more conventional double-
difference model, and to subsample on the choice condition. Doing so yields broadly
similar results, with a DID estimate of the effect of the reforms of 0.042σ, significant
at the 5% level, for the choice subsample, and a nonsignificant estimate of -0.011 for
the no choice subsample.
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Table 2—Event Study Analysis
DDD estimates IW DDD estimates Difference
Relative time µ̂l v̂l p-value
-4 -0.022 -0.007 0.671
(0.039) (0.015)
-3 0.039* -0.020 0.001
(0.020) (0.018)
-2 0.013 0.002 0.613
(0.026) (0.015)
-1 Omitted Omitted
0 0.065** 0.071*** 0.816
(0.032) (0.015)
1 0.046 0.030* 0.580
(0.036) (0.015)
2 0.056 0.015 0.178
(0.035) (0.012)
3 0.034 0.041** 0.811
(0.036) (0.016)
4 0.071* 0.052** 0.574
(0.037) (0.023)
5 0.092 0.101*** 0.873
(0.057) (0.019)
6 0.070* 0.065*** 0.903
(0.037) (0.019)
N 790,905 790,905
Adj. R2 0.214 0.215
Note: Estimation of the timing of treatment effects using a conventional event-study design
and the Sun and Abraham (2020) IW event study approach. For this estimation, treatment
status is replaced with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only, except l = −4
and l = 6, which are one for all preceding/subsequent years. The year prior to implementation
is omitted for reference. In the Difference column I report p-values from tests of whether µ̂l
and v̂l are significantly different. Errors clustered at the commuting-zone level in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 3—Aggregate Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
School choice reform × 0.053** 0.048** 0.067** 0.050** 0.043* 0.054** 0.051***
Choice (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.13)
School choice reform -0.010 -0.010 0.003 -0.016 -0.008 -0.007 -0.029**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Choice 0.013 0.014 0.005 0.158* -0.011 0.019 0.071
(0.059) (0.068) (0.064) (0.090) (0.039) (0.061) (0.056)
N 790,905 790,905 790,905 526,303 615,454 750,264 790,905
Adj.R2 0.173 0.221 0.221 0.181 0.172 0.174 0.215
Covariates







Note: The table presents estimates of the average treatment effect on exam grade of impos-
ing high-stakes grades through merit-based school-choice admission schemes. The outcome
variable is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Panel A reports
results from estimating the DDD model specified in (5). The coefficient of interest is the
three-way interaction School choice reform × Choice in the top row, which gives the average
treatment effect of being a student graduating from a treated county, in a labor market region
with more than two high schools, after the treatment has been implemented. Conversely, the
School choice reform variable controls for the conventional two-way fixed effects difference-in-
differences estimator of graduating from a treated county in a posttreatment year. Choice is
a dummy equal to one for students who have more than two high schools within traveling
distance from their home. The triple difference model in practice interacts the DID estimator
with this dummy. The models in Column 4 and 5 exclude all observations from always-treated
and never-treated counties, respectively. In Column 6 I exclude all observations from the year
2008 from the regression. In Column 7 I aggregate the IW DDD event study results following
the procedures suggested by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020). Cluster-robust standard errors
clustered at the commuting-zone level in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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As a robustness check, in Column 3 I further examine if the treatment
counties were on a differential trend before the reforms were implemented
by controlling for a treatment-specific linear trend. In doing so, I relax the
parallel-trends assumption to see if such differences are driving the results.
As is evident from the estimate, controlling for such a trend increases the
key point estimates by 0.014σ relative to the preferred specification, while
the other parameters remain virtually unchanged. This substantiates the
notion that the effect estimated in fact stems from the school-choice re-
forms, and not from some other underlying trend specific to the treatment
counties. If anything, such (unidentified) underlying trends would appear
to depress the initial estimate of the treatment effects.
When I use the full sample of students available, all nonreforming
counties are designated as controls. This includes both counties that al-
ready had school-choice systems in place at the start of the sample period
and counties that applied a neighborhood-catchment regime for the du-
ration of that period. Given the dynamic path of the treatment effects
illustrated in Figure 6, the presence in the control group of counties that
had already implemented similar reforms prior to the start of my sample
period (the “always-treated”) could potentially bias the results (Goodman-
Bacon, 2021). For example, some counties could have implemented similar
reforms a short time before the start of my sample period and thus be
on a similar dynamic trend. To check if the results are sensitive to the
control-group specification, Columns 4 and 5 exclude always-treated and
never-treated counties, respectively. Hence in Column 4 the outcomes
for students in the six treated counties are considered only in relation
to students in those counties that never implemented high-stakes grades.
Conversely, Column 5 estimates the same model using only those counties
that were already “treated” prior to the start of my sample period. As
evident from the results in Table 3, neither approach changes the sub-
stance of the results: while point estimates in both cases are smaller,
they remain very close to, and are not significantly different from, those
of the main model. When the never-treated counties are excluded, the
p-value of the estimate does fall below the conventional 5 percent level,
but only just. In Column 6, I further consider whether the result is robust
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to dropping all observations from 2008 from the sample (in that year, a
large teachers’ strike caused about one-third of exit exams to be canceled,
primarily those in Norwegian; see Section 3 for details). It turns out that
dropping the observations from that year does not impact the estimates
in any meaningful way.24
Finally, in Column 7 I aggregate the event-study treatment effects
derived from the IW DDD approach. I follow the approach suggested
in Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) by averaging the group–time specific
effects for each treated unit (i.e. averaging over δ̂e,l for each e) before
averaging across units using the sample-share weights derived in the event-
study analysis. The resulting parameter is the average effect of being
exposed to the reforms experienced by all units that were ever exposed
(Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2020, p. 12). As was the case in the event
study, using the IW approach does not move the estimates in any way
that would cause the conclusions to change.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that students are incentivized by the prospect of being able to
choose high schools given adequate academic performance. They are also
consistent with the notion that, since a prerequisite for this mechanism
to be effective is having several options within a reasonable commuting
distance, students in treated counties but in commuting zones with few
choices are viable as a control group. The nonsignificance of the point
estimates for the school-choice-reform indicator supports this conjecture.
Similarly, having many schools within traveling distance does not in and
of itself seem to have an effect on performance. It is only when a suffi-
ciently large supply of schools is combined with school-choice reform that
grades are actually perceived as consequential, which boosts students’ per-
formance. What is more, these results do not appear to be sensitive to the
specific choice of school-supply threshold. Figure B.1 in the appendix in-
dicates that the effects are similar — if anything larger — when the choice
24I report results from additional robustness checks in Appendixes B and C. For
example, I consider alternative approaches to computing the standard errors, such
as clustering at the county level (and performing few-clusters corrections) and using
randomization inference rather than conventional t-tests. The results are robust to
these alternative approaches.
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threshold is set higher. In sum, this exercise suggests that the result is
not an artifact of my definition of what constitutes real choice. Rather,
it reinforces the notion that the choice set of schools must be sufficiently
large to create a competitive market that incentivizes students, suggest-
ing that this effect may increase with the supply of schools. Setting the
threshold at three thus represents a conservative constraint.
5 Mechanisms
5.1 Learning vs Test Effort
The results reported in Section 4 suggest that there is a mechanism by
which test scores are influenced by the imposition of higher stakes. From
a policy perspective, however, our main interest lies not in test scores per
se but in students’ accumulation of human capital. Indeed, one of the
main purposes of testing is to measure the extent to which students have
learned the skills they are supposed to learn. However, several papers
have pointed out that scores on tests involving low stakes will reflect not
only students’ ability but also their motivation and effort (Gneezy et al.,
2019; Heissel et al., 2021; Segal, 2012; Zamarro et al., 2019). One poten-
tial explanation for the difference observed in the present study between
treated and nontreated students could therefore be that those students do
not really differ in human capital but that what distinguishes them is that
the treated ones have a stronger incentive than the nontreated ones to put
effort into the exit exam and hence are likely to obtain better grades.
To explore whether the results reflect a sustained learning effort or
mere test effort, I exploit the fact that, for the past decade, the Norwe-
gian Ministry of Education has required all students to take a national
standardized assessment test in grades 5, 8, and 9, the latter test being
specifically implemented to measure students’ improvement over the first
year of the second stage of compulsory school. These tests are meant to
provide a comprehensive assessment of a student’s ability level at that
point in time, providing school managers and policymakers with a tool
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enabling them to determine where resources and measures should be di-
rected in order to improve student outcomes. For the students, however,
there are no formal consequences associated with the tests. Their test
scores do not factor into their grades, do not appear on any transcript,
and are available only to their teacher and to their parents. Hence these
tests are low-stakes in nature. According to economic theory, the rational
decision for a student, assuming that effort is costly, is therefore to devote
less effort to such tests than to high-stakes test such as the exit exam.
This, in turn, would imply that scores on these assessment tests may not
adequately reflect students’ true ability. Importantly, this does not change
as a result of school-choice reforms. Consequently, if turning the final exit
exam in grade 10 into a high-stakes test affects the effort students make to
learn throughout the second stage (grades 8–10; “lower-secondary school”)
and not just their effort ahead of and during that exam, this should be
observable in the development of scores on the national assessment test.
In other words, if students subjected to high-stakes grades put in more ef-
fort to learn, at least from the start of grade 8, they should have improved
their ability level between grades 8 and 9 more than other students. If this
is so, this would imply that the incentives provided in order to increase
effort have actually worked by placing those students on a higher learning
trajectory than they would otherwise be on.
I test the hypothesis outlined above by estimating triple-difference
models similar to those used in the main analysis as described in Section
4, with scores on the national assessment test in grade 9, that is, in the
year prior to the year of graduation, as the outcome of interest. As these
tests were introduced for ninth-graders in 2010, the analysis is restricted
to the 2010–2015 cohorts. I match grade 9 observations to the same
students’ scores in grade 8, so that I can control for previous performance.
I include students missing tests from eighth grade by constructing an
indicator equal to one if the subject score is missing and setting the score
to zero. Within the sample period, three counties implemented school-
choice reforms (in 2012 and 2014, respectively). This provides a staggered
DDD framework similar to that previously used. All students are tested in
both mathematics and Norwegian language/reading in both grade 8 and
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Table 4—National Assessment Test Event Study Results
DDD estimates IW DDD estimates Difference
Relative time µ̂l v̂l p-value
-2 0.023 0.039 0.571
(0.033) (0.033)
-1 Omitted Omitted
0 -0.011 0.010 0.376
(0.027) (0.023)
1 0.030 0.053*** 0.290
(0.024) (0.019)
2 0.053 0.071* 0.362
(0.035) (0.042)
3 0.055 0.070** 0.685
(0.038) (0.027)
N 249,602 249,602
Adj. R2 0.767 0.753
Note: The table presents results from a triple difference event-study analysis using performance
on the standardized national assessment tests in mathematics and reading in 9th-grade as the
outcome. The event study decomposes the results over the years leading up to, and following,
the implementation of the reforms using both the conventional, and the Sun and Abraham
(2020) IW event-study approach. I standardize the score of each test, take the mean, and
standardize the resulting composite score. The outcome is thus a representation of the general
skill level of the student in subjects applicable for the final exam. For these estimations,
treatment status is replaced with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only. The
year prior to implementation is omitted for reference. In the Difference column I report p-
values from tests of whether µ̂l and v̂l are significantly different. Cluster-robust standard
errors clustered at the commuting-zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
grade 9.25 To construct my outcome measure, I standardize the scores
on each test, average them across the tests, and standardize the resulting
average score once more. This composite score is thus a measure of a
student’s general skill level in the subjects covered by the final exit exam.
I present the results from this analysis in Table 4. That table includes
estimates from event studies similar to those described in Section 4.1,
decomposing the triple-difference results into leads and lags using both
25Students are also tested in English in grade 8, and I include those scores as well in
the controls.
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the Sun and Abraham (2020) interaction-weighted design and the con-
ventional event-study specification. As previously, I set l = −1 as the
reference category. For these grade 9 assessment tests, the period-specific
estimates display a similar dynamic evolution in terms of effect size as was
observed for the exit-exam grades (Figure 6). This is inconsistent with
the idea that the improvements in test scores result only from changes in
the amount of effort spent on the assessment tests themselves, as such an
effect should be observable immediately upon implementation and then
remain stable. In fact, I find no effect on the scores of those students
who took the assessment tests immediately after the implementation of
high-stakes grades. On the other hand, for the cohort of students who
where in grade 8 when the reforms were implemented, meaning that they
had ample time to adjust their effort levels to the new regime, I find a
substantial increase in the composite-score measure. Strong effects are
also evident for subsequent cohorts, amounting to approximately 0.070σ
(unfortunately, the sample period does not allow me to extend the anal-
ysis further into the posttreatment period). The fact that these effect
sizes appear with a similar dynamic rhythm as the increases in effect sizes
in the main analysis lends support to the claim that the main treatment
effect observed in scores on the final exit exam is not solely attributable
to test effort, but is also explained by an increase in what students have
actually learned — that is, in their ability level.26
5.2 Interactions Analysis
The channels through which the effect of this incentive might work could
also be illuminated by its differential effects across subsamples. For ex-
ample, a widely accepted notion is that a more competitive environment
in schools will benefit boys, who tend to thrive more than girls under such
26In the appendix I also report results from a similar analysis using the test scores
in grade 8 as the outcome. In this case, there is no clear pattern to the results — if
anything students appear to do somewhat worse after reform implementation, suggest-
ing that the change in behavior starts upon entry to lower-secondary school, not in
earlier grades. This is consistent with the notion that lower-secondary school marks
a new stage in the students’ trajectory, where grades and future academic paths are
more strongly emphasized.
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Figure 7: Event Study Results for Assessment Test Scores in 9th-grade
Note: This figure presents the results from estimating an event-study type model decomposing
the dynamics of the treatment effect of introducing high-stakes grades in 10th grade on low-
stakes assessment tests conducted in 9th grade. Reported are the coefficients estimated for
indicators for being l periods removed from implementation, where l ∈ {−2, 3}. The model
is saturated in period indicators as the sample period is constrained to the 6-year window
in question. l = −1 is omitted as the reference category. The shaded area represents 95%
confidence intervals. Full results are available in Table D.2 in the Appendix.
conditions (Almås et al., 2016; Azmat et al., 2016; Hopland and Nyhus,
2016). Certain other subsamples are also of particular policy interest,
including students from a low socioeconomic background. Socioeconomic
status (SES) is a major predictor of educational achievement, and there is
a large body of research into interventions at the compulsory-school level
aimed at improving the performance of students from low-SES households
(Dietrichson et al., 2017). Evidence that such typically at-risk students
respond positively to high-stakes grades— learning more in the process—
would therefore have obvious policy implications. Moreover, Almås et al.
(2016) demonstrate that there is a strong socioeconomic gradient in terms
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of competition preferences. In particular, boys from lower-SES households
are less willing to compete than boys from higher-SES backgrounds. If
we believe that the competitive pressure created by high-stakes grades
is the driving mechanism behind the observed increase in performance,
that increase could therefore also reflect an adverse segregational effect
across parental background in that boys from richer homes may benefit
to a particularly large extent.
In the following analyses I also consider whether students who were
tested in mathematics at the exit exam are more impacted by the treat-
ment than others. As students take only one exam, the subject they are
allocated can greatly influence their performance, all else being equal.
Generally, students tested in mathematics perform far worse than those
tested in a language subject, as illustrated in Figure 3. In this particular
case, it is plausible that mathematical skills can be improved more by
high-effort behavior such as cramming and repetition, and may thus be
more responsive to high-stakes grades. Conversely, language skills may
be harder to improve through effort alone, in that they require a longer-
term maturation process. This hypothesis takes into account evidence
suggesting that students’ vocabulary and language skills are strongly tied
to their parental background (Buckingham et al., 2013; Dustmann, 1997),
and that scores on language tests often appear to be less receptive to
interventions than scores on mathematics tests (Bettinger, 2012).
For this purpose, I extend (5) to incorporate either gender or SES as














µβ(4 linear terms) + ϕi + υizct
(7)
27This presentation and specification of the quadruple-difference estimator follows
the approach used by Muralidharan and Prakash (2017).
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D
Choice
c,t,r,g takes the value 1 if student i of gender (SES) g in commuting
zone z in county c in cohort t takes her exam in a treated county after
a school-choice reform has been implemented there, and her commuting
zone has more than two high schools. In the model I control for all possible
interactions among the four main variables, represented by
∑
15
β=2 µβ , and
for student-level characteristics ϕi. I estimate the model separately for the
full sample and for the subsamples tested in mathematics and language,
respectively.
Table 5 presents the results from estimations of the quadruple-difference
models. Panel A reports results for the gender specifications. Evidently,
the estimates do not indicate any gender-specific differential effects of the
admission reforms. While I find large and significant point estimates for
the effect of the reform in general, the estimates for the differential effect
on girls are small and statistically insignificant. This is the case both for
the overall sample and across exam subjects. As the top row reports the
marginal effect of being a treated girl, the coefficients for School choice re-
form ×Choice give the average treatment effect for treated boys. Columns
1 and 2 indicate that boys randomly drawn to be tested in mathematics
respond more strongly to the reforms than those tested in language, but
these estimates are imprecise and not significantly different from each
other.
Panel B considers low-SES students, defined as having a mother whose
highest completed level of education is at most compulsory school (which
is true for 22.7% of the sample). Following Almås et al. (2016), we would
expect these students to respond less strongly to a competitive incentive
and hence to manifest smaller treatment effects. However, as with gender,
I find limited evidence of such a differential effect using the quadruple-
difference model. As reported in Table 5, I find small positive coefficients
for both the total sample and the language subsample. Although neither
is close to being statistically significant, in both cases the direction of the
estimate is the opposite of what the literature would have us expect. This
is also the case for the mathematics subsample, for which I find a mod-
erately sized point estimate of 0.054σ. At face value, such an estimate
suggests that treated low-SES students who were tested in mathematics
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increased their performance more than treated students with other socioe-
conomic backgrounds who were also tested in mathematics. While this
estimate is also imprecisely estimated, it provides a suggestive piece of
evidence that, if anything, the reforms served to reduce the SES gap in
performance on the mathematics exam.
Overall, however, the conclusion to be drawn from the analysis pre-
sented in this section is that I find limited evidence of differential treat-
ment effects across important subsamples. Instead, the positive effect of
the admission reforms on student performance seems to be rather uniform
across the subsamples considered here, with some evidence that the effect
is stronger for students tested in mathematics, in particular for those with
a low-SES background. It would appear that these results should miti-
gate our concern regarding the possibility of strong segregational effects
of school-choice policies such as those studied in this paper.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I investigate the incentivizing effect of high-stakes grades on
student learning. I exploit a natural experiment created by regional dif-
ferences in Norwegian high-school admission regimes to compare scores on
the final exit exam of compulsory school, which is a high-stakes exam for
some students but not for others. I use the supply of schools within stu-
dents’ traveling distance as a third source of variation, to distinguish stu-
dents who have a real choice of schools from those who have such a choice
only in theory. In line with theory-based predictions, my triple-difference
model reveals that tying the final exit exam of compulsory school to salient
outcomes improves the grades attained, with an effect size of 5–6 percent
of a standard deviation. The effect size is moderate, but it is still eco-
nomically meaningful. For example, the magnitude is equal to about 20%
of the unconditional gender gap in exam performance, and to 10% of the
SES gap. While several papers have demonstrated a causal link between
test stakes and performance, either through smaller field experiments or
by using financial incentives, this paper provides evidence for the
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School choice reform × Choice × Female -0.028 -0.015 -0.017
(0.022) (0.040) (0.022)
School choice reform × Choice 0.080*** 0.099* 0.064**
(0.027) (0.056) (0.028)
School choice reform -0.037** -0.024 -0.048**
(0.016) (0.037) (0.024)
School choice reform × Female 0.005 -0.021 0.006
(0.019) (0.038) (0.018)
Choice × Female 0.042 0.045 -0.021
(0.030) (0.039) (0.028)
Female 0.396*** 0.180*** 0.494***
(0.022) (0.036) (0.024)
N 790,905 297,414 493,491
Adj.R2 0.174 0.214 0.181
Panel B: Socioeconomic Status
School choice reform × Choice × Low SES 0.013 0.054 0.014
(0.028) (0.033) (0.036)
School choice reform × Choice 0.056** 0.075 0.043
(0.028) (0.056) (0.029)
School choice reform -0.015 0.004 -0.034
(0.014) (0.033) (0.022)
School choice reform × Low SES -0.020 -0.087*** 0.010
(0.021) (0.031) (0.024)
Choice × Low SES 0.001 0.029 -0.025
(0.023) (0.037) (0.031)
Low SES -0.802*** -1.012*** -0.735***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.040)
N 771,445 289,554 481,891
Adj.R2 0.163 0.208 0.168
Note: This table reports results from subsample analyses of differential treatment effects across
gender and socioeconomic status. Column 1 estimates effects for the full sample, while columns
2 and 3 estimate identical models for those tested in mathematics or a language separately,
using the preferred specification from Table 3. In panel A I consider differential effects be-
tween boys and girls. In Panel B I consider whether the effects interact with socioeconomic
background. Here I use the mother’s education to determine socioeconomic status, where low
SES indicates that her highest level of completed education is at most compulsory school (10
years). Errors clustered at the commuting-zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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viability of exploiting such a mechanism to stimulate students’ invest-
ment of effort in school. Indeed, the results indicate that the change to
a merit-based enrollment regime in high school in and of itself improves
performance in younger students. That is, performance improves at a
stage where no tracking or sorting of any kind is conducted. However,
a crucial prerequisite is that the supply of schools must be sufficient to
create a sense of real choice. Introducing school choice has little impact
if students have only one or two schools within a reasonable traveling dis-
tance. Further, my analysis does not find any significant heterogeneity
in treatment effect across exam subject, socioeconomic status or gender –
— a result that contrasts with the results of earlier studies suggesting that
school-choice enrollment regimes might have adverse segregational effects
(Altonji et al., 2015; Hsieh and Urqiuola, 2006; Lindbom, 2010)
Building on a growing body of work exploring the relationship be-
tween effort and performance in low-stakes assessments (Gneezy et al.,
2019; Segal, 2012; Zamarro et al., 2019), I assess the extent to which my
results can be explained by a sustained learning effort, as opposed to a
more punctual test-taking effort, on the part of students. By contrasting
performance on the final exit exam with scores on comprehensive abil-
ity assessments conducted in earlier grades, I demonstrate that students
exposed to a school-choice enrollment regime appear to be on a higher
learning trajectory than students in the control group. These results im-
ply that the main treatment effect is not only a result of increased test
effort but is also indicative of a higher, sustained learning effort through-
out the final years of compulsory school. Evidence of students making
a long-term investment in their schooling should increase the relevance
of this study for policymakers. The effect sizes are nontrivial, but nev-
ertheless moderate, which suggests that some students respond more to
these incentives than others. While identifying those students lies beyond
the scope of the present study, policymakers can be expected to be in-
terested in finding out who they are, in order to thoroughly assess the
distributional effects of implementing high-stakes grades.
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Figure A.1: Time Series of Average Exam Grade – Treatment
Note: The figure charts the average grade attained in the written final exit exam for students
in the Choice and No-choice students respectively, by subject and treatment status. For
reference, exam grades run on a scale of 1 (fail) to 6 (top grade). A circle (triangle) indicates
the average for students with more (fewer) than two high schools within traveling distance in
that particular year. Treatment group refers to the six counties that introduced school choice
reforms during the sample period, indicated by the gray dashed reference lines.









































Figure A.2: Time Series of Average Exam grade – Control
Note: The figure charts the average grade attained in the written final exit exam for students
in the Choice and No-choice students respectively, by subject and treatment status. For
reference, exam grades run on a scale of 1 (fail) to 6 (top grade). A circle (triangle) indicates
the average for students with more (fewer) than two high schools within traveling distance in
that particular year. Treatment group refers to the six counties that introduced school choice
reforms during the sample period, indicated by the gray dashed reference lines.
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Figure B.1: Treatment Effect Estimates Across Choice Thresholds
Note: The figure shows results from estimation of my main triple difference model with various
thresholds for what constitutes a real choice of schools. The numbers on the x-axis indicate
the minimum number of schools required for the choice indicator to take the value 1. My
preferred specification used throughout the paper, sets this threshold at 3. In the case where
the threshold is set to 1, the triple difference model collapses to a conventional difference-
in-difference model. The dots represent point estimates from separate regressions, with the
shaded area indicating the 95% confidence interval of the estimates. The outcome variable is
standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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Figure B.2: Randomization-Based Inference
Note: The figure shows the results from conducting a randomization-based inference test,
as prescribed by Athey and Imbens (2017) and Bind and Rubin (2020). The test simulates
and approximates the likelihood of a treatment effect appearing by random chance due to
the fact that a fixed number of units were assigned to treatment, and not a random sample
of the population. Thus there might be unobserved differences that would make this set of
units particularly likely to benefit from the treatment, or have other differences in baseline
characteristics that would produce a false positive treatment effect estimate. Randomization
inference randomly re-assigns treatment status, and re-estimates the treatment effects arising
from these placebo assignments. By re-iterating this process multiple times the algorithm
produces a distribution of placebo effects from assignments under which the null hypothesis
should be true. By comparing the fraction of iterations in which the absolute value of the
estimate exceeds the “true” estimate to the total number of iterations, randomization inferences
produces an intuitive p-value. In the figure presented here I report results from a procedure
where I re-assign treatment 5000 times. I follow MacKinnon and Webb (2020) and base the
inference on the t-statistic rather than the β-coefficient as the treated units vary in size. The
dashed line indicate the t-statistic obtained in the “true” model, while the solid line gives the
distribution of placebo results. The procedure produced 260 placebo assignments in which the
absolute value of the estimated t-statistic exceeded that of the true model. This corresponds
with a p-value of 260/5000 = 0.052.
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Table B.1—Early vs Late Adopters
Event Study Results
Early Late Balanced
Relative time adopters adopters panel
-4 0.010 -0.065**
(0.014) (0.029)
-3 -0.057** 0.030 -0.015
(0.028) (0.020) (0.019)
-2 0.002 0.002 -0.003
(0.019) (0.025) (0.016)
-1 Omitted Omitted Omitted
0 0.106*** 0.003 0.068***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.012)
1 0.082*** -0.065*** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.015)
2 -0.017 0.028 0.016
(0.019) (0.032) (0.013)








N 763,030 607,346 698,235
Adj. R2 0.213 0.210 0.212
Note: The table presents results from a triple difference event study analysis where I split the
treatment in various composition based on their relative timing of reform. In the first column
run the analyzis using the ‘early adopters’, i.e. the first 3 counties in the sample period to
implement school choice reforms as the treatment group. Similarly, in column two I run the
analyses using only the latter 3 counties, the ‘late adopters’, in the treatment. In column 3 I
consider a ‘balanced’ panel using the middle 4 reform cases for which I am able to construct
a sample window where I observe the entire treatment group in all relative time periods (3
pretreatment and 4 posttreatment). In each of the analyses I exclude observations from the
nonfocal treatment counties as including them in the control group potentially could bias the
results. The event study decomposes the results over the years leading up to, and following the
implementation of the reforms using both the conventional, and the Sun and Abraham (2020)
interaction weighted event study approach. For these estimations treatment status is replaced
with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only. The year prior to implementation
is omitted for reference. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level
in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.2—Alternative Approaches to Standard Errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
School choice reform × Choice 0.053** 0.053** 0.053** 0.053** 0.053* 0.053*
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024)
t-statistic 2.39 2.42 2.21 2.22 2.22 2.22
p-value 0.017 0.016 0.030 0.039 0.067 0.052
School choice reform -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Choice 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.052) (0.056) (0.059) (0.045)
N 790,905 790,905 790,905 790,905 790,905 790,905









Note: The table presents estimates of the average treatment effect, using the preferred DDD-
specification from Table 3. Each column represent a separate estimation of this model with
various approaches for computing the standard errors. In columns 1–4 I vary the level of
clustering of the errors, starting with the school level and ending up at the county level.
Beneath the point estimates and standard errors I also report the t-statistic and p-value of the
main coefficient of interest, i.e. the three-way interaction School choice reform × Choice. In
columns 5 and 6 I consider the fact that clustering at the county level implies that I only have
19 clusters, a number that is arguably too small to provide valid inference (Cameron and Miller,
2015). Therefore I perform two corrections to the few-clusters problem to assess the sensitivity
of the results to this issue. In column 5 I perform a Wild-T cluster bootstrap, as suggested
by Cameron and Miller (2015). In column 6 I perform a randomization inference procedure,
which has been shown to yield appropriate rejection rates even with very few clusters (see
e.g. Athey and Imbens (2017) and Bind and Rubin (2020) for a discussion of the method’s
merits, and MacKinnon and Webb (2020) for a practical illustration). For the latter, I keep
the number of treated units within a given year fixed to the sample number in that year, but
randomly assign treatment status to counties. This procedure is then repeated 5000 times
to produce a distribution of placebo treatment results, which the estimated treatment effect
of the true treatment assignment is then compared against. Evidently, the overall result of
these exercises is that the main aggregate result of the study is robust to these standard error
considerations. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.3—Aggregate Results Using GPA as Outcome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
School choice reform × 0.056** 0.052** 0.060** 0.055** 0.040* 0.055** 0.037**
Choice (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.014)
School choice reform -0.009 -0.004 0.010 -0.013 0.002 -0.009 0.012
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.014)
Choice 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.168*** 0.023 0.011 0.034
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.036) (0.049) (0.047)
N 851,857 851,857 851,857 567,755 661,252 789,519 851,857
Adj.R2 0.275 0.277 0.277 0.280 0.273 0.276 0.276
Covariates







Note: The table presents estimates of the average treatment effect on GPA of imposing high-
stakes grades through merit-based school choice admission schemes. The GPA is calculated
using all nonexam grades, i.e. those set by the student’s teachers, and is standardized to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Results stem from estimating the DDD model
specified in (5). The coefficient of interest is three-way interaction School choice reform ×
Choice in the top row which gives the average treatment effect of being a student graduating
from a treated county, in a labor market region with more than two high schools, after the
treatment has been implemented. Conversely, the School choice reform variable controls for
the conventional two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator of graduating from a
treated county in a posttreatment year. Choice is a dummy equal to one for students who have
more than two high schools within traveling distance from their home. The triple difference
model in practice interacts the DID-estimator with this dummy. The models in Column 4
and 5 exclude all observations from always-treated and never-treated counties respectively. In
Column 6 I exclude all observations from the year 2008 from the regression. In Column 7
I report an aggregation of unit-time specific effects derived from an IW DDD model using
the approach suggested by Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020). Cluster-robust standard errors
clustered at the commuting zone level in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure C.1: Share of Students Missing
Note: The figure reports kernel density plots for the fraction of students whose exam grade
is missing in a given school in a given year, calculated using all students for whom the school
ID is observed (4,682 missing values are excluded). Panel (a) shows the kernel density for all
years, with the exception of 2008 which is excluded. The distribution for 2008 is shown by
itself in Panel (b).
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Year
Unknown reason Explained absence
Figure C.2: Missing Values by Year
Note: The figure charts the number of students with an exam grade missing for each cohort.
The dashed line counts students whose absence is explained in the registry (exempted, sick or
no-shows) while the solid line counts unexplained missing values. For the former group exam
subject is known. Y-axis values are in thousands.
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Year
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Figure C.3: Missing Values by Year
Note: This figure charts the number of students who were tested in a particular subject, for
each cohort. Y-axis values are in thousands. Those for whom information on subject is missing
are listed as ‘Unknown’.
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Table C.1—Predicting Missing Values
All missing Sick Exempt No-show
(1) (2) (3) (4)
School choice reform × Choice 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.008) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
School choice reform -0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Choice 0.029 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.014) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
N 854,539 854,539 854,539 854,539
Adj.R2 0.141 0.006 0.009 0.005
Note: This table lists results from estimating identical triple difference models to those in the
main analysis, but using various categories of missing values as the outcome variable. Column
1 pools all categories (and those without explicit reason for ‘missingness’) and regresses a
dummy equal to one if the exam grade is missing for the preferred specification as described in
Section 3.2. Columns 2–4 repeats the estimation for each known reason for absence separately.
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the commuting zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Appendix D:
Full Event Study Results
Table D.1—Main Event Study Results
DDD IW DDD Cohort-specific ATT estimates
estimates estimates after l periods
Relative time µ̂l v̂l δ̂1,l δ̂2,l δ̂3,l δ̂4,l δ̂5,l δ̂6,l
-4 -0.022 -0.007 . 0.015 -0.240 0.107 . -0.037
(0.039) (0.015) . (0.019) (0.070) (0.034) . (0.036)
-3 0.039* -0.020 . 0.037 -0.001 0.009 -0.129 0.056
(0.020) (0.018) . (0.022) (0.041) (0.045) (0.047) (0.025)
-2 0.013 0.002 . -0.000 -0.104 -0.025 0.017 0.092
(0.026) (0.015) . (0.027) (0.031) (0.078) (0.030) (0.028)
-1 Omitted Omitted
. . . . . .
0 0.065** 0.071*** 0.177 0.080 -0.059 -0.014 0.058 0.058
(0.032) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.045) (0.040) (0.040)
1 0.046 0.030* 0.100 0.103 -0.075 -0.112 0.037 -0.025
(0.036) (0.015) (0.028) (0.032) (0.036) (0.048) (0.035) (0.035)
2 0.056 0.015 0.028 0.052 -0.001 0.057 -0.110 .
(0.035) (0.012) (0.044) (0.027) (0.035) (0.044 ) (0.020) .
3 0.034 0.041** 0.099 0.071 -0.107 0.010 0.041 .
(0.036) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026) (0.046) (0.036) (0.039) .
4 0.071* 0.052** 0.144 0.113 . . -0.095 .
(0.037) (0.023) (0.036) (0.028) . . (0.035) .
5 0.092 0.101*** 0.097 0.102 . . 0.105 .
(0.057) (0.019) (0.030) (0.029) . . (0.035) .
6 0.070* 0.065*** 0.127 0.130 . . -0.050 .
(0.037) (0.019) (0.023) (0.035) . . (0.022) .
N 790,905 790,905
Adj. R2 0.214 0.215
Note: Estimation of the timing of treatment effects using the both the conventional event study
design, and the Sun and Abraham (2020) IW cohort design. For these estimations treatment
status is replaced with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only, except l = −4
and l = 6 which is one for all preceding/subsequent years. The year prior to implementation
is omitted for reference. δ̂1,l - δ̂6,l gives the results for the cohort-specific treatment effect at
each relative time point, if the cohort is treated at that point. The IW DDD estimate is the
weighted average of the observed CATTs at any given l. Errors clustered at the commuting
zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.2—National Assessment Test Event Study Results
(9th Grade)
DDD IW DDD CATT estimate
estimates estimates after l periods
Relative time µ̂l v̂l δ̂1,l δ̂2,l δ̂3,l
-2 0.023 0.039 0.157 -0.078 0.014
(0.033) (0.033) (0.085) (0.031) (0.017)
-1 Omitted Omitted
0 -0.011 0.010 0.075 -0.073 0.011
(0.027) (0.023) (0.047) (0.040) (0.017)
1 0.030 0.053*** 0.091 0.026 0.035
(0.024) (0.019) (0.040) (0.018) (0.021)
2 0.053 0.071* 0.113 0.018 .
(0.035) (0.042) (0.064) (0.044)
3 0.055 0.070** 0.178 -0.066 .




Adj. R2 0.767 0.753
Note: Estimation of the timing of treatment effects using the both the conventional event study
design, and the Sun and Abraham (2020) IW cohort design. For these estimations treatment
status is replaced with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only, except l = −4
and l = 6 which is one for all preceding/subsequent years. The year prior to implementation
is omitted for reference. δ̂1,l - δ̂6,l gives the results for the cohort-specific treatment effect at
each relative time point, if the cohort is treated at that point. The IW DDD estimate is the
weighted average of the observed CATTs at any given l. Errors clustered at the commuting
zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table D.3—National Assessment Test Event Study Results
(8th Grade)
DDD IW DDD CATT estimate
estimates estimates after l periods
Relative time µ̂l v̂l δ̂1,l δ̂2,l δ̂3,l
-2 -0.009 0.024 0.016 0.068 0.001
(0.034) (0.029) (0.056) (0.059) (0.030)
-1 Omitted Omitted
0 -0.007 0.004 0.007 0.061 -0.040
(0.024) (0.024) (0.032) (0.058) (0.030)
1 -0.084** -0.058* -0.092 0.068 -0.116
(0.037) (0.032) (0.053) (0.070) (0.036)
2 0.050 0.084 0.046 0.138 .
(0.053) (0.057) (0.087) (0.053) .
3 -0.101*** -0.069** -0.088 -0.045 .




Adj. R2 0.174 0.174
Note: Estimation of the timing of treatment effects using the both the conventional event study
design, and the Sun and Abraham (2020) IW cohort design. For these estimations treatment
status is replaced with an indicator equal to one in that particular year only, except l = −4
and l = 6 which is one for all preceding/subsequent years. The year prior to implementation
is omitted for reference. δ̂1,l - δ̂6,l gives the results for the cohort-specific treatment effect at
each relative time point, if the cohort is treated at that point. The IW DDD estimate is the
weighted average of the observed CATTs at any given l. Errors clustered at the commuting
zone level in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Abstract
Early-childhood programs attract considerable policy interest as a
tool to prepare children for formal schooling. However, we have
limited knowledge about whether conditions for early learning are
similar for all children. Program attendance seems to have less effect
on boys, but so far there is little evidence suggesting reasons for
why this might be the case. In this field experiment, we investigate
whether a more structured curriculum can reduce the gender gap
in early learning. While girls have higher skills at baseline, we find
that the intervention primarily benefits boys, with effects persisting
into formal schooling.
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature documents persistent gender gaps in academic
achievement, across a variety of outcomes and educational contexts (e.g.,
Autor and Wasserman, 2013; Bedard and Cho, 2010; DiPrete and Buch-
mann, 2013; OECD, 2015). Boys are not only outperformed by girls in
test scores, but also disproportionately represented in negative statistics
such as school dropout, behavioral problems, and special needs, the ef-
fects of which spill over into adulthood with links to college enrollment,
unemployment, and even crime (Fortin et al., 2015; Goldin et al., 2006;
Vincent-Lancrin, 2008).1 Still, the origins of these gaps are not fully un-
derstood. Many hypotheses have been proposed as to why they might
emerge once children have started school, but there is also evidence of
substantial differences across gender in terms of skills crucial for learning
even before children start formal schooling. (Brandlistuen et al., 2020;
Magnuson and Duncan, 2016).
Such early gender differences have relevance for policy debates about
the provision of early childhood education and care (ECEC). In earlier
decades, the perception that boys are more immature than girls has caused
an increasing prevalence of delayed school entry for boys, but there is lit-
tle evidence to suggest that such “academic redshirting” has long-term
positive effects on child development and educational attainment (Dem-
ing and Dynarski, 2008). In contrast, ECEC programs have attracted
increasing interest from policymakers as research has demonstrated how
participation in such programs can improve school readiness, with poten-
tial long-term gains in academic and labor market outcomes (Berlinski
1Even though, over the past decades, women have surpassed men by substantial (and
increasing) margins in terms of educational attainment, it is still the case that women,
on average, earn less than men and are disproportionately less likely to hold powerful
positions in society (DiPrete and Buchmann, 2013). However, while women might still
face barriers to capitalizing on their education in the labor market, particularly older
cohorts of women now in the latter half of their labor-market career, the earnings gap
has halved over the past 40 years despite increasing wage inequality overall (Blau and
Kahn, 2007).
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et al., 2008; Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe and Lalive, 2018; Felfe et al.,
2015; Heckman et al., 2010; Melhuish, 2011). However, the variety of pro-
gram contexts, designs, and features makes the literature far from unified
with respect to the conditions necessary for child development (Phillips
et al., 2017; White et al., 2015). Even less is known about the distribu-
tion of potential effects, and about whether the conditions for realizing
these benefits are similar for all children (Duncan and Magnuson, 2013;
Phillips et al., 2017). The evidence of gender-specific returns to ECEC
enrollment is mixed (Magnuson et al., 2016), but several studies report
results indicating that girls might benefit more in terms of skill devel-
opment than boys (e.g., Anderson, 2008; Cornelissen et al., 2018; Felfe
et al., 2015; Fessler and Schneebaum, 2019; Goodman and Sianesi, 2005;
Havnes and Mogstad, 2015). However, so far the literature provides little
evidence — or even discussion — when it comes to why this might be the
case.
One potential explanation is that girls and boys seemingly spend their
time in childcare very differently, particularly in unstructured settings
(Early et al., 2010; Tonyan and Howes, 2003). When given the opportu-
nity, girls are much more likely to engage in activities that promote school
readiness and skill development (Stangeland et al., 2018; Størksen et al.,
2015). In contrast, boys engage more in spontaneous and physical be-
havior, shifting attention between activities rapidly and interacting with
adults to a lesser extent. This suggests that boys may be less exposed
to many of the stimulating learning activities that girls seem inclined to
engage in of their own accord.
These observational insights suggest that a more structured curricu-
lum could decrease gender gaps in early learning. We investigate this
hypothesis using data from a randomized controlled trial (RCT) carried
out in the context of the universal preschool system in Norway (see Rege et
al., 2021, for aggregate treatment results).2 The intervention introduced
a more intentional practice through a structured, comprehensive curricu-
2The project was preregistered in the AEA registry (code AEARCTR-0002241),
where gender heterogeneity was specified as part of our analysis plan.
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lum for groups of five-year-olds in their final year of preschool, with the
goal of improving their school readiness. This practice contrasts with the
prevalent Norwegian ECEC pedagogical philosophy, which largely centers
on child-initiated free play.
To that end we recruited 71 ECEC centers, where the teachers in
the treatment group were provided with a curriculum encompassing age-
appropriate intentional skill-building activities to be implemented for all
five-year-olds. This curriculum was coupled with a thorough professional-
development program as well as further support throughout the interven-
tion. The activities were embedded within a playful learning approach and
targeted key school-readiness skills in the areas of mathematics, language,
and executive functioning.
We rely on data collected through detailed one-to-one assessments by
certified testers blind to treatment status to investigate the effects of the
intervention. We find that there is a substantial gender gap in school
readiness at baseline, and that this gap is not mitigated by business-as-
usual pedagogical practice. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis, we
find that the average improvement in school readiness brought about by
the intervention — as was first reported in Rege et al. (2021) — is almost
entirely driven by a treatment effect of about 20 percent of a standard
deviation on the boys. In contrast, we find little evidence that the new
curriculum had any effect on the girls. This is true both for the posttreat-
ment assessment and for a one-year follow-up at the end of first grade.
The positive effects seen for boys persist across the transition to formal
schooling. We also find suggestive evidence that the boys at the bottom
of the skill distribution at baseline are the ones who improve the most. In
a heterogeneity analysis we estimate decreasing treatment effects on boys
as we move up the rank distribution of baseline scores, suggesting that
the efficacy of the intervention decreases with the initial skill level. For
girls, we find no such relationship at all.
Our results have important policy implications. With many countries
experiencing a push toward universal provision of preschool programs,
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there is a need for robust evidence on how curricular design and pedagog-
ical practice might have heterogeneous impacts on child subgroups. To
date, much of the curriculum in universal preschool programs is fairly non-
specific and unstructured. This is particularly the case in many Nordic
and Central-European countries, where childcare pedagogy emphasizes
the value of free play, autonomy and spontaneous engagement between
teacher and child (Engel et al., 2015; White et al., 2015). This holistic
approach to child development offers individual ECEC centers substantial
discretion with regard to pedagogical content. However, the unstructured
nature of learning activities could also give rise to heterogeneity in school
readiness. Hence, implementing curricula such as that featured in our in-
tervention could potentially reduce gender gaps in early learning by having
a positive impact on the development of boys, while not being detrimen-
tal to girls. Furthermore, the persistence of the treatment effects as the
children transition to formal schooling suggests that these curricula have
the potential to help reduce gender gaps in later academic achievement as
well.
We also contribute to the literature on several fronts. First, the paper
highlights the need for a better understanding of what constitutes process
quality in early childhood education (Phillips et al., 2017) — as opposed to
structural quality, which has been the focus of much economic research.
We present evidence underscoring the importance of curriculum design
and intentional practice as a channel for promoting child development.
Second, our paper also addresses the knowledge gap on heterogeneous
impacts of childcare participation (Duncan and Magnuson, 2013; Phillips
et al., 2017). We provide causal evidence for a plausible channel through
which boys and girls could be affected differently. Thus our study also
contributes to the literature investigating the origins of gender gaps in
educational outcomes. Our high-quality assessment data allow a precise
characterization of the scope of early gender gaps, while also allowing us
to follow the development of those gaps in the crucial transition from early
childhood care to formal education.
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2 The Scope and Origins of Gender Gaps in Early
Learning
The extant literature on gender gaps in early learning suggests that girls
start formal schooling with a significant advantage in school-readiness
skills (e.g., Brandlistuen et al., 2020; DiPrete and Jennings, 2012; Mag-
nuson and Duncan, 2016). Although gender gaps at school start are not
necessarily caused by the preschool programs the children may have at-
tended, several studies report results suggesting that such programs might
be particularly beneficial for the development of girls, although gender
differences in program effectiveness are rarely an explicit focus in those
studies (Magnuson et al., 2016). Anderson (2008) provides a prominent
example by revisiting the Perry Preschool, Abecedarian, and Early Train-
ing projects and finding that those early model programs benefited girls
over boys by a difference of about 40 percent of a standard deviation.
While differential effects of such a magnitude have rarely been replicated
elsewhere in the literature, a meta-analysis of 23 early preschool programs
revealed that girls benefited significantly more than boys in terms of cogni-
tive, achievement, behavioral, and mental-health measures, although the
differences were small (Magnuson et al., 2016). In contrast, boys benefited
much more than girls in terms of other school outcomes such as detention
and need for special education. There is also some evidence that programs
affect boys more in the long term (Domond et al., 2020; Gray-Lobe et al.,
2021).
There are at least three plausible mechanisms through which preschool
programs might affect boys and girls differently. First, if girls enter
preschool age with better-developed pre-academic skills— and skills beget
skills (Cunha and Heckman, 2007) — we would expect developmental tra-
jectories during preschool to be different for boys and girls. However,
not only do boys and girls typically enter preschool at a roughly equal
level of development (Magnuson et al., 2016), but there is also seemingly
no gender difference in the aptitude for developing early language and
mathematics skills (Spelke, 2005).
Second, preschool teachers might be inclined to foster a learning en-
118
Chapter 3 – Essay II Institutional Background
vironment better suited for girls’ development. For example, the lack of
male role models in ECEC might be particularly detrimental for boys
(Sumsion, 2005), and there is indeed some evidence that increasing the
share of male teachers would be beneficial for their development (Drange
and Rønning, 2020; Gørtz et al., 2018). Other studies have indicated
that teachers have different expectations for the behavior of boys and
girls, where the latter are to a larger extent expected to behave in self-
regulated manners, such as by sitting still, waiting for their turn, and
playing quietly (Lenes et al., 2020).
Third, girls and boys might spend their time in preschool differently,
particularly in unstructured settings. Broadly, girls have in fact been
found to be more likely to spend their time in cognitively stimulating
activities during free-play time, while boys are more likely to engage more
in spontaneous and physical behavior (Early et al., 2010; Tonyan and
Howes, 2003). Further, girls are more likely to interact with adults, hence
developing higher-quality relationships with teachers. In turn, the degree
of teacher–child interaction has been found to be a consistent indicator of
classroom quality as well as a predictor of child development in preschool
settings (Mashburn et al., 2008). Indeed, Howes et al. (2008) find that
effective preschool classrooms are characterized by intentionality in the
way teachers engage and interact with the children, and that opportunities
to learn are more plentiful in classrooms where teachers manage time more
actively.
In this context, there is a strand of research that highlights the poten-
tial benefits of more structured curricula for child development (Clements
and Sarama, 2011; Diamond et al., 2007; Dillon et al., 2017; Schmitt
et al., 2015; Weiland and Yoshikawa, 2013). These studies argue that
preschool staff can target school-readiness competences through a more
intentional and systematic approach to learning situations. This could be
particularly important for boys, who might need more support and scaf-
folding from teachers to engage in stimulating activities (Størksen et al.,
2015). In this paper, we therefore ask whether providing staff with more
structured learning activities to carry out with all the children improves
boys’ school readiness, so that they start formal schooling on a more equal
footing with girls.
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3 Institutional Background
Norway invests heavily in ECEC by subsidizing all preschool centers that
adhere to governmental regulations. Parental payments are capped at
approximately USD 300 per month per child, which reflects about 15
percent of the total cost of childcare enrollment (Norwegian Directorate
for Education and Training, 2019). Price reductions are given for siblings,
and free enrollment is offered to households with incomes below certain
thresholds. As a result, Norway is among the OECD countries with the
highest public spending on ECEC. Children are typically first enrolled in
ECEC between ages 1 and 2, and all children are guaranteed enrollment
in a center in their municipality. These heavy subsidies have led to a
near-universal take-up. As of 2020, 92.2 percent of all children aged 1–5
years were enrolled in formal childcare, and 97.5 percent of all five-year-
olds were.3 Once enrolled, most children remain in ECEC until they start
compulsory schooling in August of the calendar year in which they turn
six.
The Norwegian center-based ECEC is founded on a social pedagogical
tradition emphasizing free play and child-initiated activities in preschool
child groups (Engel et al., 2015). While play is seen as an activity that
may facilitate learning, a cornerstone of the Norwegian philosophy is that
play also has an intrinsic value and is a goal in and of itself. There is no
set curriculum to guide the provision of ECEC. Rather, individual centers
are given substantial discretion in how to structure daily activities for the
children in order to meet the goals of a framework plan that loosely out-
lines the purpose, values, and learning areas of Norwegian ECEC (OECD,
2015).4 Against this backdrop, current pedagogical practice emphasizes
unstructured and spontaneous play to such an extent that it is often given
priority over adult-driven activities even when those are preplanned and
scheduled (Synodi, 2010). Indeed, Karlsen and Lekhal (2019) find in their
case studies that 60 percent of the ECEC day consisted of free-play activ-
3Aggregate data on participation is available at https://www.ssb.no/en/utdanning/
barnehager/statistikk/barnehager
4An English-language version is available at https://www.udir.no/globalassets/
filer/barnehage/rammeplan/framework-plan-for-kindergartens2-2017.pdf
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ities and that center staff spent almost half of that time away from play
situations, indicating that children spend a significant portion of their
time at the ECEC center without interacting with adults.
This emphasis on free and autonomous play contrasts with the Anglo-
American school-readiness tradition found in the United States and the
United Kingdom, where preparing children for formal schooling is a more
explicit pedagogical objective. The structured yet playful curriculum in-
tervention investigated here should be seen as a step toward a more in-
tentional school-readiness perspective in Norway. While the intervention
does not abandon the tenets of the social-pedagogical tradition, it does
incorporate some of the intentional and structured practices of the school-
readiness philosophy.
4 Experimental Design and Measures
4.1 Experimental Design
This paper investigates gender-specific effects on school readiness in a
randomized controlled trial conducted in Norwegian preschools. We re-
cruited participants from two Norwegian counties. First we invited all 30
municipalities in those counties to sign up for the project, of which 15
did. Then we invited all publicly regulated childcare centers operating in
those 15 municipalities to participate. Out of 190 centers, 72 signed up.
One center in the control group later withdrew from the project, leaving
us with a sample of 71 participating centers.
For the randomization procedure, we split the centers in 15 blocks,
matched for size and geographic location. The resulting blocks consisted
of 4 to 6 centers, with the total number of children ranging from 29 to 92.
Parental consent was collected prior to randomization, but we accepted
late consenters because of the lengthy time between initial collection and
the start of the intervention. Of 701 parental consents collected (92%
consent rate), 18.8 percent were submitted after our initial deadline. The
late consenters were skewed toward the treatment group. This could be
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because the teachers, who were in charge of collecting the consent sheets,
might have been more invested in the project and worked harder to get
parents to sign up once they became aware that they would be in the
treatment group. For this reason, we include an indicator for late consent
in all our estimations. However, excluding all late consenters from the
sample yields broadly similar results (see Table D.5 in the appendix).
As the curriculum was developed by the project team and hence is not
covered by existing preschool-teacher training, the project period started
with teachers in the treatment group receiving training in the form of a 15
ECTS (i.e., roughly corresponding to half a semester full-time) university
course on the pedagogics and practices of playful learning.5 This training
also allowed us to obtain extensive feedback from the practitioners on
the curriculum and to revise it accordingly. The teachers subsequently
implemented the curriculum starting in the fall of 2016. We conducted
our baseline assessment immediately prior to implementation (T1). The
treatment group then proceeded with the intervention for nine months,
before we conducted the postintervention assessment in late spring 2017
(T2). We reconnected with the children one year later for a follow-up
asessment once they were nearing the end of first grade (T3).
Throughout the intervention period, the control group followed a
business-as-usual condition, implementing the curricular content that they
would normally implement. However, the teachers in the control centers
were informed that they would receive the training, the curriculum docu-
ments, and any accompanying materials when the participating children
left for primary school. This was made clear early in the process, in an
effort to mitigate any discouragement effects in the control group that
might bias the results.6
5Størksen et al. (2021) detail the theories, concepts, and processes underpinning the
practical implementation of the project.
6Our project did not involve the parents, and it was up to the centers to keep
them informed about daily activities. As we did not survey the parents, we cannot
speak to how aware they were of the project or whether they may have responded in
a compensatory manner, for example upon learning that their child was in the control
group. However, because the activities in the new curriculum did not differ radically
from existing practices and represented only a small part of the regular schedule, we
believe that such adjustments from parents are unlikely. It should also be noted that
there are very limited short-term opportunities to move children between centers, for
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4.2 Intervention Content
Our intervention is a bundle of several components. The main feature
is the preschool curriculum, which consists of structured and intentional
skill-building activities centered around playful learning. The playful as-
pect requires activities to be interactive and engaging at a level appro-
priate for the age group to master (Weisberg et al., 2013). Concretely,
the curriculum consisted of a booklet with 130 activities, most of which
would already be familiar to many Norwegian preschools.7 However, they
differed in both design and content, as well as in the level of intentionality
with which they were to be implemented in order to stimulate school-
readiness skills. Examples of activities include puzzles and games to cul-
tivate number and quantitative thinking, dialogical reading to stimulate
language, and stories and images where the children had to identify emo-
tions.8
We encouraged teachers to develop their own approach to the curricu-
lum. The activities were flexible, allowing teachers to adapt their difficulty
and complexity to best fit the needs of their child group. The only re-
quirement was for teachers to commit to spending at least 8 hours a week
doing activities with their five-year-olds, Given that nearly all Norwegian
children of this age spend 30–40 hours a week in childcare, our intervention
took up only a modest proportion of the preschool schedule. Even so, it
represented a substantial increase in the time devoted specifically to the
stimulation of school-readiness skills, which, according teacher reports,
ranged from 0 to 3 hours a week prior to the intervention.
To improve implementation quality, we assisted the teachers with su-
pervision and guidance throughout the intervention. Three times per
semester, a team member would call the teachers to answer questions or
discuss challenges they faced. The teachers were also required to answer
a weekly questionnaire in which they reported on implementation fidelity.
example to enrol them in one of the treatment centers, as centers do not typically have
any available slots in the middle of the academic year.
7The booklet was also published as a book after the end of the project, and it is
now widely available to practitioners and researchers (Størksen et al., 2018).
8See appendix material in Rege et al. (2021) for a more comprehensive description
of the curricular content.
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Because child groups are typically mixed-age, the five-year-olds had to
be separated from the rest of their group for the activities. The teachers
also needed time to prepare the week’s activities. To cover the centers’
costs associated with hiring additional and temporary staff we provided
them with lump-sum transfers equivalent to the cost of a part-time (50
percent) position for nine months. Similarly, we covered the costs of a
50-percent position for four months as the teachers participated in the
training course.
4.3 Measures
We center our assessment around the construct of school readiness (Ben-
nett and Tayler, 2006). Conceptually, this encapsulates (both cognitive
and socioemotional) skills that support a successful transition to formal
schooling, as well as constituting the foundation on which later learning
is achieved. The assessment consisted of age-appropriate, validated tests
for measuring early skills. All tests were conducted in one-to-one sessions
using a tablet computer, both for the child to interact directly with and
for the tester to record answers and scores on.
We used the following measures to assess the children’s skills:
Numeracy—–To measure early mathematical skills, we used the Ani Ba-
nani Math Test (ABMT), which assesses the understanding of numeracy,
geometry, and problem solving using a playful tablet application. The
children help a monkey with different tasks, such as counting bananas
and setting the table with enough plates for their birthday-party guests.
ten Braak and Størksen (2021) assess the psychometric properties of the
ABMT and find strong predictability of later mathematical achievement
as well as discriminant validity against related constructs. They do note
signs of gender bias in three items, but this was not consistent across
samples, and nor was gender predictive of the latent construct. Still, for
robustness we run our analyses both with and without those three items,
finding that this does not affect results (see Table D.6 for details).
Language—–To assess vocabulary, we use a short version of the Nor-
wegian Vocabulary Test (NVT; Størksen et al., 2013). The children were
presented with images on the tablet and asked to name the object de-
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picted. To assess phonological awareness, we used a 12-item blending
task that is part of the official literacy screening battery of the Norwe-
gian Directorate for Education and Training. A word is presented in by
phonemes (language sounds), and the child has to select the one out of
four options on the tablet that corresponds to that word.
Executive functioning—To assess executive functioning, we used three
tests: Wechsler’s Digit Span Test (Wechsler, 2003) for measuring working
memory; the Head-Toes-Knees-Shoulders task (McClelland et al., 2014) to
assess behavioral self-regulation; and the Hearts and Flowers task (David-
son et al., 2006), which is widely used to measure cognitive flexibility in
young children.
From each of these six tests we created three outcome measures by
standardizing scores within each wave (T1–T3) to a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1. We then averaged across tests within each domain
(numeracy, language, and executive functioning) and re-standardized the
resulting index. We also averaged across indices and re-standardized to
construct a sum-score measure.
We conducted the T1 and T2 assessments at local science museums.
Participating centers were invited to spend a day at the museum, and
we assigned a time slot for assessment. At that point, the children were
lined up at the assessment station by the center staff. Children standing
in line were continuously assigned to the next available tester, meaning
that child-to-tester matching was naturally randomized. Testing took
place over several days, and centers from both the treatment and control
groups were invited each day. The testers were blind to treatment status,
and they had been trained and certified prior to data collection. At T3,
the children had moved on to primary school and hence were spread across
multiple sites. For this wave, testers traveled to schools, where staff let
children leave the classroom to be assessed.
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5 Data and Empirical Strategy
5.1 Sample
Out of the 701 children for whom we collected parental consent, 658 par-
ticipated in the T1 baseline assessment while 650 participated in the T2
postintervention assessment. For the T3 follow-up we were able to locate
and assess 661 children. Although we did not explicitly balance the sam-
ple on gender, shares of boys and girls were equal in each wave, with the
difference in absolute numbers ranging from 2 at T1 to 9 at T3.
We construct our analytical samples from the children observed in the
T2 and T3 waves, respectively, and run our analysis on these samples
separately. Although this means that the T2 and T3 samples will be
slightly different, there is a substantial overlap as 620 children participated
in both waves. For those missing at baseline, we impute test scores using
predicted values based on child and parent characteristics (gender, birth
month, mother’s and father’s education and earnings, immigrant status,
and indicators for the preschool center). We add an indicator for missing
baseline scores in all our estimations.9
As is evident from our contact rate across waves, attrition was gener-
ally low. Even more importantly, as we show in Table D.2, attrition rates
were balanced across gender and treatment status.
5.2 Summary Statistics
We combine our assessment data with registry data from Statistics Nor-
way relating to child and parent characteristics. The key variables used
in our analyses are listed in Table 1, where we report means and stan-
dard deviations for the T3 analytical sample separately across gender and
treatment status.10 Birth month is a running variable taking a value of
1 (December) to 12 (January), so that a higher value indicates an older
child. Immigrant status is denoted by an indicator taking the value 1 if
the child’s mother or father is a non-Western immigrant. Mother’s and
9In Table D.7 in the appendix we replicate our analysis after excluding observations
with imputed pre-scores. It does not affect our overall results and conclusions.
10The appendix provides similar information for the T2 sample.
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father’s education is measured in years of schooling, and their annual
earnings are measured in Norwegian kroner on a running scale rounded
to the nearest 50,000. We also report summary statistics on the baseline
scores of the children. The values presented correspond to the average of
the subgroup relative to a sample mean of 0 and expressed in standard
deviation units. In the final row, we report the proportion of children
without baseline scores.
Table 1 also presents results (in the columns labeled Difference) from
a test to determine whether child and parent characteristics and baseline
scores are balanced across treatment status within each gender. The test
consists of regressing the covariate on treatment status while controlling
for randomization block. For both genders, background characteristics are
sufficiently balanced: no differences that are significant at conventional
levels are uncovered. In addition, the magnitudes are also too small to
be economically meaningful. We find that treated boys, on average, score
somewhat higher at baseline than those in the control group, but their
scores are not significantly different. However, we do find a gap in the
girls’ language score which is of a meaningful magnitude. Such imbalances,
even though they might occur by random chance, highlight the importance
of controlling for baseline performance, which we do in all our preferred
specifications.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
We leverage the randomization to treatment to identify the gender-specific
effects of our intervention. To quantify these effects, we use ordinary least
squares to estimate models of the form
yi,c = α+ γ1(Boyi × Tc) + γ2(Girli × Tc) + δGirli + βXi + ǫi,c (1)
where yi,c is the score for the outcome of child i enrolled in center c. Treat-
ment status is denoted by the indicator Tc taking the value 1 if the child’s
center was randomized to treatment. We interact the treatment indicator
with gender so that γ1 and γ2 capture the average treatment effect of be-
ing treated for boys and girls separately, enabling us to test whether these
effects are statistically different from 0. We also report results from tests
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Table 1—Descriptive Statistics and Balance Test
Boys Girls
Control Treat Difference Control Treat Difference
Child characteristics
Birth Month 6.380 6.249 -0.265 6.139 6.091 0.028
(3.153) (3.260) (0.386) (3.307) (3.091) (0.305)
Immigrant 0.114 0.161 0.041 0.128 0.224 0.091
(0.319) (0.369) (0.045) (0.336) (0.418) (0.059)
Mother Education 14.333 14.128 -0.115 14.433 14.123 -0.224
(2.495) (2.520) (0.260) (2.602) (2.635) (0.291)
Father Education 13.896 13.656 0.260 13.676 13.786 0.007
(2.426) (2.422) (0.291) (2.640) (2.532) (0.310)
Mother Earnings 344,680 329,301 -17,695 345,774 333,160 -12,373
(225,887) (200,712) (31,008) (216,475) (200,750) (30,897)
Father Earnings 571,014 565,968 1,805 525,675 559,337 38,296
(268,260) (262,916) (27,804) (256,313) (284,157) (29,256)
Baseline Scores
T1 Sum Score -0.123 -0.068 0.016 0.172 0.039 -0.116
(1.050) (0.970) (0.133) (0.964) (1.021) (0.081)
T1 Math -0.117 -0.090 0.010 0.140 0.080 -0.055
(0.982) (1.019) (0.113) (0.915) (1.024) (0.130)
T1 EF -0.115 -0.044 0.047 0.064 0.089 0.045
(1.055) (0.982) (0.141) (0.958) (1.019) (0.090)
T1 Language -0.065 -0.030 -0.017 0.212 -0.075 -0.270*
(0.986) (0.941) (0.110) (1.069) (1.018) (0.126)
Missing T1 Scores 0.070 0.052 -0.020 0.046 0.029 -0.024
(0.257) (0.222) (0.032) (0.211) (0.167) (0.026)
N 142 193 335 151 175 326
Note: The columns provide means (standard deviations) for child characteristics and T1 test
scores separately by gender and treatment status for the T3 analytic sample. The columns
labeled Difference represent the estimated coefficient (standard error) from regressing each
covariate against treatment status, while controlling for randomization block. Regressions are
also clustered on the block level.
to determine whether the effects are statistically different from each other.
Our preferred specification includes controls for baseline test scores, block
fixed effects, and a vector of child and parent background characteristics.
128
Chapter 3 – Essay II Results
We also add indicators for turning in the consent sheet on time and for
being assessed at baseline. ǫi,c is the error term. We estimate the models
separately for each of the outcome measures, and for T2 and T3 scores.
For our skill-heterogeneity analysis, we extend (1) to include indicators
for specific segments of the test-score distribution at baseline. Hence we
estimate the model
yi,c =α+ φ1(Boyi × Tc ×BS
Boy
i ) + φ2(Girli × Tc ×BS
Girl
i )





i + δGirli + βXi + ǫi,c
(2)
where BSBoyi is an indicator taking the value 1 if child i is a boy with a
baseline score in the relevant segment, and BSGirli is the female equivalent.
We focus primarily on those scoring in the bottom 10, bottom 25, bottom
50, top 25 and top 10 percent. The coefficient φ captures the marginal
treatment effect of being a child in the particular segment relative to the
rest of the treated children of the same gender.
We compute standard errors that are robust to serial correlation by
clustering at the level of randomization (the blocks). A potential con-
cern with this approach is that 15 clusters are too few to provide reliable
inference (Cameron and Miller, 2015). To assess whether this concern
is warranted here, we also use two alternative approaches that are more
robust to small-sample issues. First, we account for the small number of
clusters by performing a Wild T bootstrap procedure. Second, we per-
form a permutation test (randomization inference) where we randomly
reassign treatment status within the blocks to estimate a distribution of
placebo treatment effects with which we can compare are our true effect
estimate (Abadie et al., 2020; Athey and Imbens, 2017). In our results,
we report p-values obtained from estimations both with and without these
corrections.
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6 Results
6.1 Descriptive Evidence
We begin our presentation of the results with a discussion of the descrip-
tive evidence relating to early gender gaps in our sample. In Figure 1 we
present differences in school-readiness skills measured by test-score per-
formance at baseline. The bars indicate the gap in average scores between
girls and boys in standard deviation units (σ). Assuming that we can in-
terpret the sum score as a measure of the child’s overall school readiness,
we find that girls are, on average, about 0.15σ more ready for school than
boys. Moreover, we find that girls score better on all measures, with the
largest discrepancy found for mathematics (0.2σ).
While average scores may provide useful information, they may also
mask important variation over the skill distribution. In Figure 2 we
present density plots for the distribution of baseline scores across the four
skill measures. We find that boys are more likely to score in the bottom
half of the distribution than girls. For all measures, there are about 60
percent boys among those scoring 1.5σ or more below the mean. However,
there are equal numbers of boys and girls scoring 1.5σ or more above the
mean. This suggests that the discrepancies are driven in large part by low-
achieving boys at the bottom of the distribution. To determine whether
the boys in the lower parts of the skill distribution are particularly re-
sponsive to our intervention, we perform a skill-heterogeneity analysis in
Section 6.3.
While our data do not allow us to investigate the extent to which
the centers actually cause these gender gaps, we find little evidence that
business-as-usual mitigates them. Indeed, from T1 to T3 the gender gap in
the sum score actually increases from 0.29σ to 0.34σ in the control group
(although the difference is not statistically significant). This is driven
by growing gender gaps in executive functioning and language, while the
mathematics gap decreases, particularly once the children start formal
schooling.
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Sum Score Math EF Language
Figure 1: Gender Skill Gap Prior to Treatment
Note: The bars represent the difference in average scores between boys and girls on our four
school-readiness measures at baseline. Higher values on the y-axis indicate a larger gap in
favor of girls. Scores are standardized so that values represent difference in skills in standard
deviation units.
6.2 Main Results
We report the main results from estimating Equation (1) in Table 2. In
the leftmost panel we find large and positive point estimates for the treat-
ment effect on boys at the T2 assessment. For the sum score measure we
estimate that the intervention improved boys’ school readiness by 0.19σ.
For an intuitive comparison, this effect size is equivalent to 4 months of
development for the boys in the control group. For girls, we find much
smaller and statistically insignificant estimates. Such a pattern of large
discrepancies is found consistently across all our outcome measures. The
intervention seems to have a limited effect on girls, while boys seem to be
the primary beneficiaries, with effects of meaningful magnitudes across all
131























































−2 0 2 4
Language
Boys Girls
Figure 2: Distribution of Baseline Scores by Gender
Note: The figure presents density plots of the baseline test scores on our four school-readiness
measures. The scores are standardized so that 0 corresponds to the sample mean on that
measure. We use epanechnikov kernels in all plots.
measures, except language.
In row 3 we report the results of testing for significant differences be-
tween the two gender-specific estimates. While the difference in point
estimates for all measures is substantial—ranging from 0.087σ to 0.16σ—
we often lack the precision necessary to attain significance at conventional
levels for outcomes other than the sum score measure. Even so, we argue
that the meaningful and consistent differences found between the esti-
mates strongly suggest that the boys are the primary beneficiaries of our
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intervention, and also that our results provide moderately strong evidence
that the difference is not zero (Romer, 2020).
In the rightmost panel we find a similar pattern for treatment effects
at the one-year follow-up. In fact, T3 estimates actually exceed T2 ones.
For boys, we find large, positive effects, while for girls we find small effects
that are both statistically and substantively insignificant. The gender dif-
ference in the sum score measure is 0.20σ. The largest effect is on boys’
mathematical skills, for which we estimate a treatment effect of 0.33σ,
which also reflects a substantial increase from the T2 assessment.
Table 2—Gender Specific Treatment Effects







Treatment Effect 0.191* 0.197 0.201* 0.059 0.235* 0.330** 0.137 0.108
Boys (0.079) (0.120) (0.071) (0.083) (0.097) (0.089) (0.110) (0.099)
Treatment Effect 0.046 0.110 0.041 -0.041 0.025 0.117 -0.028 -0.027
Girls (0.069) (0.090) (0.083) (0.086) (0.089) (0.114) (0.055) (0.105)
Difference -0.145+ -0.087 -0.160 -0.010 -0.201+ -0.213 -0.165 -0.135
(0.082) (0.104) (0.102) (0.101) (0.118) (0.160) (0.137) (0.084)
p-value 0.098 0.420 0.140 0.340 0.097 0.206 0.248 0.132
Wild Cluster 0.127 0.431 0.150 0.419 0.109 0.241 0.263 0.138
RI 0.133 0.433 0.150 0.419 0.072 0.093 0.188 0.278
N 652 650 652 648 661 661 660 659
Adj. R2 0.61 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.55 0.40 0.41 0.52
Note: Each column in each panel presents the regression coefficient of treated (standard error)
interacted with gender using ordinary least squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives
the total treatment effect on that gender, so that the difference between them represents the
marginal effect. The Difference panel reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant
differences between the gender specific estimates. Below we report three sets of p-values com-
puted using clustering on block, the Wild T bootstrap procedure, and randomization inference
respectively. For both assessment periods we regress outcome on the treatment–gender interac-
tion, controlling for baseline test scores, gender, birth month, parental characteristics (mother
and father’s education level, earnings, and indicator for non-Western country of birth), and
indicators for late consent and not having participated in the T1 assessment. All regressions
are clustered on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Boys Girls
Figure 3: Heterogeneous Effects by Baseline Skills
Note: In this figure we plot estimates of the marginal treatment effect of placing in a spe-
cific segment of the Sum Score distribution for your gender at baseline. Each of the five
circle/diamond pairs represents a separate regression, where the plot gives the estimated coef-
ficient of the three-way gender×treatment×baseline score segment interaction. For example,
the left-most circle gives the marginal treatment effect for boys scoring in the lowest 10% of
boys at baseline, relative to the treatment effect for all other boys. The grey lines indicate
90% confidence bands.
6.3 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity by Baseline Skill
Policy discussions often have a particular focus on low-achieving boys,
who are deemed to be at greatest risk and the most vulnerable (see, e.g.,
Chetty et al., 2016, and Autor et al., 2020). Against this backdrop, we
consider it relevant to investigate whether treatment effects are hetero-
geneous to the baseline skill level. To do so, we plot the results from
estimating (2) in Figure 3. What are presented in the figure are five pairs
of plots representing results for boys and girls, respectively, stemming
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from separate regressions. As an example, the leftmost circle (diamond)
represents the marginal treatment effect for boys (girls) scoring in the low-
est 10 percent of boys (girls) at baseline, relative to the treatment effect
for all other boys (girls). Moving along the horizontal axis implies moving
upward in the baseline skill distribution.
We see a clear downward trend in the marginal effects for boys. Start-
ing with those scoring in the lowest 10 percent at baseline, we find a
marginal treatment effect of over 0.5σ, although imprecisely estimated.
It should be noted that this marginal effect is in addition to the aver-
age treatment effect on treated boys, meaning that the total effect sums
up to about 0.7σ. The marginal effect then declines rapidly as we move
to higher-achieving boys, converging to zero for the top of the distribu-
tion. This pattern suggests that the majority of the treatment effect is
concentrated in the group of initially low-achieving boys.
For girls, we do not find a similar pattern. If anything, we find some
indication that the highest-achieving girls may have benefited the most
from the intervention. Overall, however, the small (if any) treatment ef-
fect on girls seems fairly homogeneous across the distribution.
7 Implications
Our overall finding is that there are substantial gender gaps in early skills
crucial for future learning, measured prior to enrollment in formal school-
ing.11 This implies that Norwegian girls start school with a significant skill
advantage over boys. This difference in school readiness may explain, at
least partly, why boys tend to fall behind as they progress through the
education system.
The structured curriculum investigated in the present study boosts
school readiness on average, and we find that these positive effects are
11In a related paper, Thijssen et al. (2021) show that the boost in executive function
stemming from the intervention is particularly crucial as it also bolsters the devel-
opment of language and mathematical skills after the children move on to primary
school.
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strong primarily for boys. Moreover, we present suggestive evidence that
the lowest-achieving boys benefit the most from this curriculum. Our
intervention could therefore improve conditions for later learning in this
group. In sum, these results imply that introducing more structured ac-
tivities could be beneficial for boys in contexts where ECEC practice is
primarily centered around free play.
Our findings are therefore relevant for the design of early childhood
curricula and pedagogical practice. The extant literature has emphasized
the need for a better understanding of the process and heterogeneous
impacts of early childhood education. Our study suggests that failing to
provide boys in particular with the appropriate amount of scaffolding in
their ECEC environment might exacerbate gender gaps in early learning.
In general, further prying open the black box that is ECEC quality, so as
to understand its impact on other child subgroups, is an important task
for future research.
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Appendix A:
Experimental Design and Compliance
This section provides additional details on the experimental design. After
randomization and collection of informed consent the intervention followed
the timeline laid out in Figure A.1. Starting in the fall of 2015 the partic-
ipating teachers in the treatment group received training in the form of a
credit-earning course at the University on how to incorporate the curricu-
lum in their daily practice. Participants earned 15 ECTS for completing
the course, equivalent to 1/4 of a full course load for one academic year
in the Norwegian university system. The class consisted of insights from
the theoretical and empirical research literature on the pedagogics behind
playful learning, and was to a large extent practice-oriented. Required
learning activities included four two-day lecture gatherings over a period
of eight months, and teachers were expected to practice practice playful
learning activities with their current five-year-olds (who are not part of
the sample used in the analysis) between class gatherings. The course
also allowed us to collect feedback from the teachers on the feasibility and
usefulness of the curriculum, and adjust accordingly.
The teachers subsequently implemented the curriculum starting in the
fall of 2016 This coincided with the start of the Norwegian academic year,
which runs from medio August to late June. We conducted the baseline
assessment, referred to as Assessment T1 in the figure, in the final week
of August, immediately prior to implementation. The treatment group
then proceeded with the intervention the following nine months, before
we conducted the postintervention (T2) assessment in June of 2017. We
then reconnected with the children one year later to conduct our follow-up
assessment (T3) in March of 2018. The teachers in the control group were
offered the same teacher training as the treatment group received in the
fall of 2017 once the participating children had started primary school.
We assessed compliance through weekly surveys of the participating
teachers. In electronic questionnaires the teachers reported, among other
things, how many hours they had spent conducting activities from the
curriculum. In Figure A.2 we present the distribution of time spent per
Chapter 3 – Essay II Appendix
week as reported by the teachers. We requested that they spent at least 8
hours a week doing so, and find in the surveys that 60 percent of centers
spent an average of 7 or higher over the implementation period. In total
the teachers were requested to submit 34 weekly reports, with the major-
ity of centers successfully doing so for all weeks (see the bottom panel of
Figure A.2 for the distribution). Of the 974 reports collected in total 67
percent report having met the 8 hour request the previous week, while in
contrast only 16 percent reported spending less than 6. Based on these
teacher reports we evaluate compliance to be satisfactory.
Figure A.1: Experimental Design
Note: 71 preschool centers randomly split between control and treatment. Preschool year
2015/2016: Teachers in treated centers attended the teacher training and helped revise the
curriculum. 2016/2017: Teachers in treated implemented the structured curriculum with the
five-year-olds in their center. 2017/2018: Teachers in control received the teacher training.
We assessed in August 2016 (baseline, T1), June 2017 (postintervention, T2), and March 2018
(follow-up, T3). The figure was first presented in Rege et al. (2020).



























5 6 7 8
Mean hours per week
Figure A.2: Number of Weekly Reports (Top) and Hours Spent on Activ-
ities (Bottom) by Centers
Note: These figures were first presented in Rege et al. (2020).
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Bottom 10% Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 75% Top 90%
Boys Girls
Figure B.1: Math
Note: In figures B.1–B.3 we plot estimates of the marginal treatment effect of placing in a
specific segment of the score distribution for your gender at baseline, for separately for each of
the three skill domains. Each of the five circle/diamond pairs represent a separate regression,
where the plot gives the estimated coefficient of the three-way gender×treatment×baseline
score segment interaction. For example, the left-most circle gives the marginal treatment
effect for boys scoring in the lowest 10% of boys at baseline, relative to the treatment effect
for all other boys. The grey lines indicate 90% confidence bands.
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Figure B.2: Executive Function



























Bottom 10% Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 75% Top 90%
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Figure B.3: Language
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Appendix C:
Heterogeneity by Socioeconomic Background
The policy interest in the vulnerable boys partly stems from the fact
that lower achievement tend to overlap with other forms for disadvantage
such as having parents with low education or income. To assess whether
our skill heterogeneity results might be driven by low skills proxying for
socioeconomic background we perform a similar estimation as that carried
out in 6.3 by considering the model
yi,c =α+ φ1(Boyi × Tc × Lowi) + θ1(Boyi × Tc ×Highi)+
γ1(Boyi × Lowi) + φ2(Girli × Tc × Lowi)+
θ2(Girli × Tc ×Highi) + γ2(Girli × Lowi)+
δGirli + βXi + ǫi,c
(3)
In (3) we follow the approach used in (1) to estimate the average treatment
effect on the treated boys and girls separately, but further decomposing
the estimate by splitting by socioeconomic status. We report the results
from this estimation in tables 3 and 4, using education and income respec-
tively to denote the socioeconomic status (SES) of the household. For the
former we take the average of the mother and father’s years of education,
and define households as high or low SES using a median split. Similarly
for the latter we construct household income by averaging across parents,
and then splitting the resulting income distribution at the median. As
such, Low and High are indicators taking the value 1 if the household is
below (above) the median in terms of education or income.
We find limited evidence that the gender-specific treatment effects
vary across socioeconomic background. While there are some discrepan-
cies in the specific skill domains, notably the executive function measure,
there are no indication overall that the benefits of our intervention vary by
parental background.12 The results are similar using both education and
12This result is consistent with a similar analysis in Rege et al. (2021) where the
authors investigate whether the treatment effect varies by parental background for the
sample as whole, and find no evidence of such heterogeneity.
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income to denote the socioeconomic status of the households, and imply
that the heterogeneity in treatment effects by baseline skills is not merely
picking up differences across children of different backgrounds. Rather, it
suggests that low-achieving boys in particular are benefiting more from
our intervention regardless of social class. This result is consistent with
a similar analysis in Rege et al. (2020) where the authors investigate
whether the treatment effect varies by parental background for the sam-
ple as whole, and find no evidence of such heterogeneity.





Low Education x Treat 0.207 0.352 0.042 0.106
(0.146) (0.109) (0.157) (0.175)
High Education x Treat 0.256 0.320 0.210 0.102
(0.089) (0.129) (0.173) (0.103)
Females
Low Education x Treat -0.010 0.081 -0.085 -0.021
(0.165) (0.211) (0.128) (0.146)
High Education x Treat 0.050 0.146 0.028 -0.047
(0.069) (0.095) (0.055) (0.115)
N 661 661 660 659
Adj. R2 0.55 0.40 0.41 0.52
Note: Each column in each panel presents the regression coefficient of treated (stan-
dard error) interacted with gender and an indicator for high or low SES using ordinary
least squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment effect for that
gender-SES pairing, so that the difference between them represents the marginal effect
with regards to SES. We denote SES status by computing the average years of education
for the parents of each child, and then split the sample at the median. Each column
represents one regression. In each of the models we follow the specification presented
in (4) and regress the outcome on the treatment-gender-SES interactions, controlling for
gender×SES, baseline test scores, gender, birth month, parental characteristics (mother
and father’s years of schooling, earnings, an indicator for non-Western country of birth),
and indicators for late consent and not having participated in the T1 assessment. The
analysis is based on T3 data. All regressions are clustered on, and control for, random-
ization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Low Income x Treat 0.240 0.368 0.071 0.138
(0.138) (0.086) (0.154) (0.134)
High Income x Treat 0.233 0.304 0.189 0.183
(0.149) (0.150) (0.163) (0.127)
Females
Low Income x Treat 0.021 0.116 -0.083 0.018
(0.122) (0.135) (0.128) (0.114)
High Income x Treat 0.041 0.1131 0.043 -0.072
(0.102) (0.148) (0.080) (0.124)
N 661 661 660 659
Adj. R2 0.55 0.40 0.41 0.52
Note: Each column in each panel presents the regression coefficient of treated (stan-
dard error) interacted with gender and an indicator for high or low SES using ordinary
least squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment effect for
that gender-SES pairing, so that the difference between them represents the marginal
effect with regards to SES. In this table we denote SES status by computing house-
hold earnings as the average of mother and fathers income, and then split the sample
at the median. Each column represents one regression. In each of the models we
follow the specification presented in (4) and regress the outcome on the treatment-
gender-SES interactions, controlling for gender×SES, baseline test scores, gender,
birth month, parental characteristics (mother and father’s years of schooling, earn-
ings, an indicator for non-Western country of birth), and indicators for late consent
and not having participated in the T1 assessment. The analysis is based on T3 data.
All regressions are clustered on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗
p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Appendix D:
Additional tables and specifications
Table D.1—Balance Test for T2 Analytical Sample
Boys Girls
Control Treat Difference Control Treat Difference
Child characteristics
Birth Month 6.277 6.296 -0.070 5.987 6.081 0.128
(3.187) (3.290) (0.355) (3.185) (3.135) (0.265)
Immigrant 0.108 0.161 0.049 0.133 0.222 0.080
(0.311) (0.369) (0.040) (0.341) (0.417) (0.062)
Mother Education 14.314 14.150 -0.107 14.436 14.175 -0.150
(2.566) (2.575) (0.265) (2.621) (2.610) (0.328)
Father Education 13.910 13.645 -0.276 13.728 13.756 -0.053
(2.509) (2.520) (0.318) (2.619) (2.492) (0.295)
Mother Earnings 347,142 329,301 -19,694 336,093 310,234 -27,654
(225,887) (200,712) (30,109) (218,945) (212,404) (33,959)
Father Earnings 562,409 556,487 -4,658 528,667 560,976 37,772
(266,498) (257,256) (28,644) (252,128) (278,473) (29,722)
Baseline Scores
T1 Sum Score -0.131 -0.015 0.016 0.166 0.033 -0.103
(1.058) (0.979) (0.1377) (0.911) (1.034) (0.073)
T1 Math -0.121 -0.084 0.003 0.133 0.063 -0.060
(1.012) (1.042) (0.119) (0.898) (1.045) (0.110)
T1 EF -0.103 -0.055 0.026 0.069 0.079 0.039
(1.058) (0.976) (0.139) (0.958) (1.020) (0.094)
T1 Language -0.093 -0.032 0.008 0.200 -0.062 -0.226
(0.963) (0.933) (0.118) (1.027) (1.025) (0.140)
Missing T1 Scores 0.064 0.038 -0.028 0.040 0.029 -0.014
(0.245) (0.191) (0.025) (0.196) (0.168) (0.024)
N 141 186 327 151 172 323
Note: The columns provide mean (standard deviation) for child characteristics and T1 test
scores separately by gender and treatment status for the T3 analytic sample. The column
labeled Difference is the estimated coefficient (standard error) from regressing each covari-
ate against treatment status, while controlling for randomization block. Regressions are also
clustered on the block level.
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Table D.2—Attrition
With Late Consenters Without Late Consent
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
Treated × Boy 0.023 -0.006 0.027 0.021 -0.000 0.026
(0.031) (0.018) (0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.029)
Treated × Girl 0.013 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.008
(0.025) (0.015) (0.022) (0.029) (0.016) (0.023)
Female 0.034 0.007 0.002 0.042 0.013 -0.005
(0.030) (0.018) (0.025) (0.034) (0.016) (0.026)
Difference -0.010 0.007 -0.014 0.021 -0.000 0.026
(0.031) (0.021) (0.030) (0.033) (0.024) (0.029)
N 691 691 691 561 561 561
Adj. R2 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.05
Note: In this table we present results from regressing indicators for participating
in assessments at T1, T2 and T3 respectively on treatment status, gender and
their interaction. We use a specification akin to (2) in section 5.3. In the
row labeled Difference we test for significant differences in the estimates for the
treatment-gender interactions. In the right-most panel we repeat the estimation,
but exclude all late consenters from the sample. All regressions are clustered on,
and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table D.3—Main Results: Excluding Baseline Scores







Treatment Effect 0.240* 0.222 0.238* 0.120 0.281+ 0.350* 0.170 0.165
Boys (0.105) (0.142) (0.091) (0.103) (0.133) (0.119) (0.138) (0.124)
Treatment Effect 0.001 0.068 0.042 -0.110 -0.037 0.059 -0.035 -0.114
Girls (0.074) (0.111) (0.086) (0.096) (0.097) (0.132) (0.074) (0.105)
Difference -0.240* -0.087 -0.197 -0.230 -0.319* -0.291 -0.205 -0.279*
(0.105) (0.141) (0.102) (0.131) (0.137) (0.177) (0.160) (0.115)
p-value 0.039 0.143 0.130 0.101 0.036 0.123 0.220 0.030
Wild Cluster 0.066 0.291 0.145 0.106 0.052 0.141 0.234 0.043
RI 0.094 0.282 0.179 0.158 0.032 0.059 0.170 0.067
N 652 650 652 648 661 661 660 659
Adj. R2 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.22
Note: In this table we replicate the results from Table 2 in the main text using a specification
where we exclude baseline test scores from the controls. Each column in each panel presents the
regression coefficient of treated (standard error) interacted with gender using ordinary least
squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment effect on that gender,
so that the difference between them represents the marginal effect. The Difference panel
reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant differences between the gender specific
estimates. Below we report three sets of p-values computed using clustering on block, the
Wild T bootstrap procedure, and randomization inference respectively. For both assessment
periods we regress outcome on the treatment-gender interaction, controlling for gender, birth
month, parental characteristics (mother and father’s education level, earnings, an indicator for
non-Western country of birth), and indicators for late consent and not having participated in
the T1 assessment. All regressions are clustered on, and control for, randomization block. +
p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table D.4—Main Results: No covariates







Treatment Effect 0.230+ 0.242 0.223+ 0.087 0.276+ 0.357* 0.183 0.128
Boys (0.124) (0.147) (0.108) (0.116) (0.138) (0.124) (0.137) (0.123)
Treatment Effect -0.042 0.091 -0.005 -0.191 -0.086 0.061 -0.041 -0.230
Girls (0.096) (0.093) (0.112) (0.122) (0.102) (0.123) (0.077) (0.136)
Difference -0.272* -0.151 -0.229 -0.277+ -0.362* -0.296 -0.224 -0.358**
(0.104) (0.120) (0.138) (0.134) (0.134) (0.173) (0.170) (0.111)
p-value 0.021 0.230 0.119 0.058 0.017 0.110 0.209 0.006
Wild Cluster 0.029 0.226 0.149 0.066 0.024 0.130 0.219 0.008
RI 0.056 0.309 0.121 0.085 0.021 0.052 0.152 0.027
N 652 650 652 648 661 661 660 659
Adj. R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08
Note: In this table we replicate the results from Table 2 in the main text using a specification
where we include no additional controls outside of randomization block fixed effects. Each
column in each panel presents the regression coefficient of treated (standard error) interacted
with gender using ordinary least squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total
treatment effect on that gender, so that the difference between them represents the marginal
effect. The Difference panel reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant differences
between the gender specific estimates. Below we report three sets of p-values computed using
clustering on block, the Wild T bootstrap procedure, and randomization inference respectively.
All regressions are clustered on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗
p<0.01.
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Table D.5—Main Results: Excluding Late Consenters







Treatment Effect 0.132 0.093 0.161* 0.057 0.195+ 0.291* 0.097 0.091
Boys (0.084) (0.120) (0.075) (0.092) (0.094) (0.099) (0.123) (0.084)
Treatment Effect 0.001 0.094 -0.029 -0.066 0.040 0.133 -0.010 -0.025
Girls (0.078) (0.096) (0.083) (0.092) (0.092) (0.135) (0.053) (0.095)
Difference -0.131 0.001 -0.190 -0.123 -0.156 -0.158 -0.106 -0.115
(0.090) (0.119) (0.109) (0.113) (0.099) (0.177) (0.135) (0.072)
p-value 0.169 0.994 0.103 0.294 0.139 0.386 0.444 0.130
Wild Cluster 0.154 0.994 0.119 0.256 0.157 0.421 0.440 0.115
RI 0.137 0.994 0.144 0.367 0.220 0.246 0.431 0.397
N 532 530 532 528 534 534 533 532
Adj. R2 0.63 0.44 0.54 0.52 0.55 0.40 0.42 0.50
Note: In this table we replicate the results from Table 2 in the main text using a specification
where we exclude all observations of children whose parents submitted their consent sheet
after the deadline (130 observations, 18.8 percent of the gross sample). Each column in each
panel presents the regression coefficient of treated (standard error) interacted with gender
using ordinary least squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment
effect on that gender, so that the difference between them represents the marginal effect. The
Difference panel reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant differences between the
gender specific estimates. Below we report three sets of p-values computed using clustering
on block, the Wild T bootstrap procedure, and randomization inference respectively. All
regressions are clustered on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗
p<0.01.
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Table D.6—Main Results:
Excluding Items 3, 11 and 17 From The ABMT







Treatment Effect 0.190* 0.194 0.208+ 0.263*
Boys (0.084) (0.118) (0.103) (0.105)
Treatment Effect 0.035 0.102 0.010 0.101
Girls (0.065) (0.102) (0.095) (0.109)
Difference -0.155+ -0.092 -0.198 -0.162
(0.080) (0.119) (0.126) (0.164)
p-value 0.072 0.451 0.137 0.342
Wild Cluster 0.089 0.453 0.164 0.377
RI
N 652 650 661 661
Adj. R2 0.61 0.39 0.52 0.28
Note: In this table we replicate the results from Table 2 in the main text
using a specification where we exclude the three items of the Ani Banani
Math Test that ten Braak and Størksen (2021) reported showed signs of
gender bias. We only report results for those measure where the ABMT is
included. Each column in each panel presents the regression coefficient of
treated (standard error) interacted with gender using ordinary least squares.
The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment effect on that
gender, so that the difference between them represents the marginal effect.
The Difference panel reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant
differences between the gender specific estimates. Below we report three
sets of p-values computed using clustering on block, the Wild T bootstrap
procedure, and randomization inference respectively. All regressions are
clustered on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗
p<0.01.
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Table D.7—Main Results: Excluding Imputed Pre-scores







Treatment Effect 0.197* 0.210 0.212** 0.050 0.247* 0.320** 0.173 0.112
Boys (0.077) (0.125) (0.068) (0.085) (0.095) (0.083) (0.116) (0.099)
Treatment Effect 0.032 0.091 0.013 -0.055 0.019 0.093 -0.035 -0.011
Girls (0.072) (0.091) (0.082) (0.097) (0.091) (0.112) (0.053) (0.112)
Difference -0.175* -0.119 -0.199+ -0.105 -0.228+ -0.227 -0.208 -0.123
(0.080) (0.109) (0.102) (0.106) (0.115) (0.153) (0.134) (0.0096)
p-value 0.046 0.293 0.071 0.341 0.067 0.160 0.143 0.219
Wild Cluster 0.069 0.310 0.084 0.340 0.076 0.190 0.148 0.222
RI 0.058 0.271 0.074 0.401 0.048 0.073 0.096 0.338
N 625 623 625 621 629 629 628 627
Adj. R2 0.65 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.41 0.43 0.53
Note: In this table we replicate the results from Table 2 in the main text using a specification
where we exclude all observations not assessed at T1, for which we imputed the pre-scores
(33 observations, 4.8 percent of the gross sample). Each column in each panel presents the
regression coefficient of treated (standard error) interacted with gender using ordinary least
squares. The coefficient for the interaction gives the total treatment effect on that gender,
so that the difference between them represents the marginal effect. The Difference panel
reports coefficients and errors for tests on significant differences between the gender specific
estimates. Below we report three sets of p-values computed using clustering on block, the Wild
T bootstrap procedure, and randomization inference respectively. All regressions are clustered
on, and control for, randomization block. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Abstract
While college-access organizations as well as state and federal gov-
ernments invest millions of dollars in informational campaigns, rank-
ings, and college websites, students often rely more on parents and
other trusted adults for information on college options. We use new
data from a nationally representative survey of adults to identify
the extent to which those who attended college are willing to recom-
mend their own university experience. We demonstrate that alumni
place more value on their personal experiences than on prominent
rankings in formulating recommendations. Interestingly, individuals
with low economic outcomes also express high levels of satisfaction
and willingness to recommend their own college experience to oth-
ers. We discuss the implications of such strong preferences and the
potential of satisfaction as an additional metric for college evalua-
tion.
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1 Introduction
Colleges are the primary vehicle for intergenerational changes in inequal-
ity. Not only do college graduates earn 67 percent more than high school
graduates, they are also only half as likely to be unemployed (Ma et al.,
2016). Moreover, low-income students who make it into highly selective
colleges have similar economic outcomes to students from more affluent
backgrounds in the same schools (Chetty et al., 2017, 2020).
Traditional human capital models suggest that students might ratio-
nally choose to attend college based on their expected costs and benefits.
However, economists have repeatedly demonstrated that students’ expec-
tations differ dramatically from the truth, both in that they overestimate
the cost of tuition (Avery and Kane, 2004; Horn et al., 2003) and the
barriers to securing financial aid (Bettinger et al., 2012) and in that they
underestimate the market returns to education (Jensen, 2010; Wiswall
and Zafar, 2015). This lack of accurate expectations has motivated many
large-scale experiments focusing on providing additional information and
application assistance to students, but the results of such interventions
have been disappointing at best (Barone et al., 2017; Bergman et al.,
2019; Bird et al., 2021; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2017; Cunha et al., 2018;
Gurantz et al., 2021; Hyman, 2020; Kerr et al., 2020; McGuigan et al.,
2016).
Most of the interventions to date focus on institutions, governments,
and/or high school officials providing accurate information to students.
However, survey data suggest that students are more likely to talk to
their parents than to seek out other sources (Otto, 2000; Oymak, 2018).
While high school counselors play a part, students generally turn to par-
ents and peers before professionals (Carrell and Sacerdote, 2017; Mulhern,
2020). Indeed, information and nudge-style interventions seem to be more
effective at improving educational outcomes when targeting parents rather
than children (Oreopoulos, 2020). The importance of private information
held by family members about college options is also underscored by the
fact that several studies find striking similarities in the enrollment pat-
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terns of siblings (Aguirre and Matta, 2021; Altmejd et al., 2021; Goodman
et al., 2015). Given parents’ importance as advisors, private information
held by those of them who themselves attended college might be partic-
ularly salient for student decision-making. In this paper, we attempt to
understand the information and perceptions that adults have about col-
leges. We introduce a new data set which focuses on how alumni view
their college experiences. To our knowledge, only one other paper has
used these data (Rothwell, 2019).
Our data come from a nationally representative survey of the US work-
ing population initiated by the Strada Education Network in collabora-
tion with Gallup. Their newly established Education Consumer Survey
provides a sample that includes rich information about individual labor
market outcomes and experiences with college from about 323,000 re-
spondents. Importantly, our data include information about individuals’
satisfaction with college and measures of their willingness to recommend
their college to others.
We find that the majority of alumni are very satisfied with the edu-
cation they received and report a high willingness to recommend others
to follow the same educational path that they took. This is true across a
wide spectrum of individual and institutional characteristics. For exam-
ple, we find little evidence that satisfaction is correlated with subsequent
labor market success. In fact, individuals with seemingly “bad” economic
outcomes from a particular institution also express high levels of satisfac-
tion and willingness to recommend their college to others. Further, we
demonstrate that satisfaction-based measures of college quality are corre-
lated with existing college ratings but that they predict the willingness to
recommend to others with greater power than any other traditional rank-
ing, while many other quality metrics are found to have little predictive
power at all.
Traditional interventions often rely on high school counselors trans-
mitting accurate information on college options to students. However, if
parents are their primary advisors, such information might have limited
effect on college choices. And if more objective data about college quality
is less salient for parents, it is valuable to know on what information they
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base their recommendations instead. While our survey data cannot ob-
serve the recommendations alumni might give directly — and while they
are subject to the usual concerns regarding accuracy — our results do pro-
vide evidence consistent with the notion that parents place greater empha-
sis on their subjective experience from college, which is cognitively more
readily available, than on more objective measures and rankings (see, e.g.,
the availability heuristic [Tversky and Kahneman, 1973]). In particular,
satisfaction proves to be the strongest predictor by far of alumni’s willing-
ness to recommend their alma mater to others. Our results also underscore
the salience of private information in the college decision-making process
(Altmejd et al., 2021). To that effect, the satisfaction construct might
represent a broader array of variables that are important to potential stu-
dents, such as the consumption value of college attendance, affordability,
social fit, and safety — to name only a few. While satisfaction may not be
a good proxy for all of policymakers’ goals, it might provide some insight
into students’ attendance patterns. For college administrators, our results
provide insights that might be relevant for improving the recruitment of
future students, enhancing the retention of current students, and boosting
donations from former students.
2 Satisfaction: A Basis for Recommendation
A conventional human capital model in the tradition of Becker (1962)
posits that individuals rationally choose if and where to go to college based
on the expected costs and returns of obtaining higher education. It follows
logically from such models that people choose to enroll in college only if
they perceive that the net benefits exceed those of other options, From
the point of view of the economic scholar, this is an investment decision
problem. However, the extant literature indicates that the information
on the basis of which students make their college decisions is at best in-
complete or insufficient, which often result in mismatches between student
and college quality (Campbell et al., 2021; Dillon and Smith, 2017; Hoxby
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and Turner, 2015; Mabel et al., 2020). For example, compared with more
affluent students with a similar academic profile, high-achieving students
in low-income and rural areas are more likely to apply to less selective
colleges or to fail to apply to college at all, despite the fact that in many
cases students would actually pay less if they enrolled in a selective college,
because of generous financial aid (Hoxby and Avery, 2013).
A common reaction by both scholars and policymakers to these em-
pirical findings is to highlight the need for more and better information.
While academics have tried to create more rigorous measures of college
quality (e.g., Chetty et al., 2017; Hoxby, 2019; Smith et al., 2017), pop-
ular rankings such as the US News and World Report Ranking, Forbes
Top Colleges, London Times Educational Supplement, and the Shanghai
Rankings have captivated both universities and students. Further, gov-
ernment agencies in the United States have increasingly published data on
outcomes for colleges, with perhaps the most notable effort coming from
the White House College Scorecards. Each of these indices is built from a
comprehensive set of outcomes ranging from school quality (e.g., faculty
and facility characteristics) over graduate outcomes (e.g., earnings and
job placement) to admissions practices (e.g., selectivity and yield). As an
example, the US Government claimed at the launch of its College Score-
card that this would “provide [counselors, parents and students] with the
information they found most valuable in making decisions about where to
enroll” (U.S. Department of Education, 2013, italics added)
Despite these efforts, there is limited evidence that the information
provided by such rankings and databases influences the college decision-
making process (Hurwitz and Smith, 2018; Mabel et al., 2020). While
some experimental evidence suggests that students may be receptive to
expert information (e.g., Hoxby and Turner, 2015), they frequently rely
on information and advice from trusted adults, such as parents, who may
lack expertise (Oymak, 2018). In turn, parents who themselves attended
college might hold private information and preferences with regard to col-
lege options that prospective students use to inform their decisions. How-
ever, if these trusted adults rely on different, more subjective, or imperfect
information compared with that available from professional sources in for-
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mulating their advice, this channel may provide a plausible explanation
for why informational interventions aimed at students often do not suc-
ceed, and for why mismatches continue to occur despite the many efforts
made to reduce information asymmetries and barriers.
If students mostly ignore the ostensibly objective measures of college
quality in choosing between institutions, what then are they using to
formulate expectations? If indeed they are relying on advice from parents
and other adults not professionally associated with schools, then what
do those adults draw upon when formulating their perceptions about the
benefits and costs of colleges?
To answer this question, we use new data on alumni satisfaction.
These satisfaction indices may be more suited for understanding how
adults think about their willingness to recommend their educational path
than the more objective external metrics. While we do not have a specific
definition of satisfaction, it likely encapsulates a broader set of outcomes
and experiences, including not only the college’s perceived impact on out-
comes, but also the consumptive value of attending. For policymakers,
satisfaction metrics may not only provide additional information about
colleges beyond traditional rankings, but also provide greater insight into
the experiences and perceptions of adults who might be giving important
advice. However, depending on the outcomes that policymakers might
be hoping to maximize, it is unclear whether they would prefer students
to place more or less weight on such subjective advice than they do at
present. We discuss the policy implications in the conclusion of the paper.
To demonstrate that alumni base their college recommendations on
subjective satisfaction, we rely on several established measures of college
quality, as well as on new survey data that include self-reported evalua-
tions of the college experience. Those new data come from the recently
established Strada–Gallup Education Consumer Survey (ECS), an annual,
nationally representative survey of the US labor force aimed at tracking
consumer satisfaction with postsecondary education. In the ECS, respon-
dents rate their college experience across a variety of dimensions. Respon-
dents also detail their subsequent labor market outcomes and describe to
what extent they attribute these outcomes to the schooling they received.
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The survey and its features were first described in Rothwell (2019), in
which the author assessed its validity for measuring subjective satisfac-
tion and wellbeing.
2.1 Measures of satisfaction
We base our general satisfaction index on six survey items pertaining to
students’ assessment of the quality of the education they received at the
institution where they obtained their highest level degree. These items,
listed in Table 1, ask respondents to indicate on a five-point scale the de-
gree to which they agree with a statement about their college experience
(from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”). To construct our satisfac-
tion index, we standardize the responses for each item to a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one, before averaging across all items for each
individual and standardizing again. Hence the index is scaled in a manner
that gives it a natural interpretation in comparison with other measures.1
To mitigate response bias and potential endogeneity in outcomes of
interest, we further construct a leave-out mean of the average satisfac-
tion among the peers of a particular respondent. Respondents’ peers are
primarily identified as those graduating from the same institution in the
same year. However, since the existence and number of peers vary greatly
between institutions and cohorts we include all students graduating from
the same institution as a given respondent within +/– 5 years of his or her
graduation year in our peer satisfaction measure. Even so, we anchor the
measure by restricting our analysis to cases where we can observe at least
one peer in the same graduation year as the respondent. For any given
individual, this leave-out mean gives the average satisfaction of all the
other alumni present in the 10-year window, which we then standardize.
2
1Cronbach’s α for the items in the satisfaction index is 0.86.
2Because the respondents are distributed over a large time window with regard to
graduation year, the number of observations per institution per year is in many cases
too small to yield reliable measures of a pure institution-by-cohort leave-out mean. We
therefore resort to using the 10-year moving leave-out mean described above to approx-
imate peer satisfaction. We construct the leave-out-mean peer measure by summing
the satisfaction scores for all peers, subtracting the satisfaction of the individual in
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Table 1—Survey Items Used in the Paper
Satisfaction Index
1. You received a high-quality education
2. You would not be where you are today without your education
3. You learned important skills in your college courses that you use in day-to-day life
4. The coursework you took is directly relevant to what you do at work
5. Your education experience make you attractive to potential employers
6. Your education was worth the cost
Willingness to Recommend
1. You would recommend the educational path you took to others like you
Attribution to College
How helpful have each of the following been to you so far in your career?
1. The highest level of education you received at your terminal institution
2. The field you studied at your terminal institution
3. The people you met through your college during your studies
4. The reputation of the institution where you got your highest level of education
5. The courses you took during your studies
Note: The table lists all the items used in the analysis in this paper. The satisfaction and
willingness-to-recommend items are measured on a five-point scale ranging from “Strongly
disagree” to “Strongly agree”. The attribution-to-college items are measured on a four-
point scale.
We consider a variety of outcomes and how they relate to alumni
satisfaction. For our main research questions we explore the likelihood
that respondents will recommend their educational path to others, such
as their children. In this context, we pay particular attention to the survey
item involving the statement “You would recommend the educational path
you took to other people like you,” which is answered using on a five-point
scale from “Very unlikely” to “Very likely.”
question, and then divide on the n-1 observations obtained for that institution in that
graduation window. In models not included in the paper, we also tried constructing a
similar peer measure using all available observations from a given institution, regardless
of graduation year. Using this approach did not yield substantively different results,
but it strikes us as an intuitively less reasonable definition of “peers,” given the wide
174
Chapter 4 – Essay III Satisfaction: A Basis for Recommendation
2.2 Additional measures
We compile institution-level characteristics from three sources. First, we
use the unique college identifiers collected by Gallup to link the respon-
dents’ colleges to the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS) database and the College Scorecard. From these, we measure
an array of covariates such as the composition of the student body, en-
rollment and completion rates, school profile and choices of majors, and
proxies for structural quality such as instructional expenditures, faculty
salary, and more. However, we note that many of the covariates in the
IPEDS and College Scorecard are based on undergraduate cohorts while
our satisfaction measure tracks the last institution attended, which might
be graduate school. Still, to the extent that these measures serve as prox-
ies for overall characteristics of a college, we use the same measures for
respondents who have a postgraduate education. We collect the data at
an institution-year level for all the years for which a given variable is avail-
able. All monetary values are adjusted to 2016 levels, before we average
over all years by institution. The resulting averages are then standardized
and matched to the survey respondents using the unique college identifier.
We are able to match 99.6% of the sample to their college’s covariates.
For certain analyses we combine a large subset of these characteristics in
an index we refer to as Structural quality by standardizing each variable,
taking a simple average, and re-standardizing the resulting composite.3
Additionally, we make use of the public data provided by Chetty et
al. (2017) on college productivity. Following its publication, their index
for social mobility has been advocated as a candidate for measuring col-
lege quality (e.g., Barr and Castleman, 2018). In particular, we use their
span in graduation year.
3We include the following covariates: admission rate, completion rate, retention rate
for undergraduates, average SAT score, size of the undergraduate cohort, fraction of full
-time faculty, average faculty salary, fraction of first-generation students, median family
income, fraction of students receiving Pell grants, fraction of students receiving student
loans, tuition for in- and out-of-state students, net cost for low-income students, average
total cost of attendance, instructional expenditure per full-time student equivalent,
median graduate debt, and indicators for whether a school is a public institution and
a four-year institution.
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measure of college-specific mobility rates— measured as the fraction of
students entering the college from the lowest quintile of the income distri-
bution who subsequently end up in the highest quintile — as an alternative
approach to our satisfaction index. In addition, we consider their “1% mo-
bility,” which measures the fraction of low-income students who end up
in the top 1 percent of the income distribution. We use their rating as a
contrasting predictor of alumni satisfaction and willingness to recommend
one’s college. From the Chetty et al. (2017) database we also collect in-
formation about the selectivity of each college, measured using Barron’s
Selectivity index, which uses a six-point scale ranging from “Most selec-
tive” to “Nonselective”. In models where we make use of Barron’s index
we also include institutions that are unranked, in a category marked “Not
ranked”.
Finally, we consider colleges’ position on the Forbes Top Colleges rank-
ing. We use the 2018 edition, which ranks 650 colleges and universities
according to a broad set of metrics including postgraduation salaries and
debt, retention and graduation rates as well as “signs of individual suc-
cess including academic and career accolades”(Coudriet, 2018).4 As with
the Chetty et al. mobility measures, we make use of the Forbes ranking
as an example of established measures of college quality to contrast with
our satisfaction index when it comes to predicting alumni’s willingness to
recommend their educational path and alma mater to others.
3 Data and Analytic Framework
Gallup collected the data on a rolling basis between June 2016 and Jan-
uary 2019, producing a representative sample of the US labor force con-
sisting of 323,218 surveyed individuals aged 18–65 years. Each individual
was asked to answer a comprehensive set of questions about their college
experiences and outcomes and their labor market outcomes as well as
4The full list is available at https://www.forbes.com/top-colleges. The list we use
in our analysis was retrieved from that address on June 14, 2019.
176
Chapter 4 – Essay III Data and Analytic Framework
to provide information about their demographic and socioeconomic sta-
tus and background. Throughout our analysis, we use this background
information to characterize subsamples. For labor market outcomes we
consider two separate indicators. First, we consider the respondents’ em-
ployment status measured with a categorical variable indicating whether
they are employed full-time, self-employed full-time, part-time employed,
unemployed, or not in the workforce. Second, we use a five-point categori-
cal variable for level of income to designate where respondents rank in the
income distribution. Unfortunately, since the ECS asks their interviewees
only about current income, we do not have access to the respondents’ wage
profiles. For socioeconomic background, we define low parental education
as having a mother who did not complete high school.
3.1 Sample
We base our analysis sample on the 183,049 respondents who enrolled in
college at some point and can be linked to their institution through the
unique college identifier. At its core, the ECS asks how the respondents
would evaluate their college experience. In line with that, the inaugural
survey in 2016 contains information only about college graduates. How-
ever, subsequent years also include noncompleters and individuals who
never attended college. Because of the focus of the survey, however, re-
spondents who never enrolled in college were asked only a limited number
of items. For this reason, we focus our analysis— with the results having
to be interpreted through that lens— on the reasoning behind, and ex-
periences of, going to college, conditional upon having enrolled (but not
necessarily completed) in the first place.
The College Subsample
Starting from the sample of college enrollees, we impose some necessary
sample restrictions. To begin with, among the initial 183,049 observations,
10,308 are still in school and thus excluded. We define individuals as still
being in school if their projected year of graduation is later than the year
in which they were interviewed or if they report that they are still at-
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tending college courses full-time. Further, we exclude five observations
that are inconsistent in that the individuals concerned claim to have at-
tended a college but do not acknowledge in other survey questions that
they completed even “some college.” Finally, another 364 observations are
either missing all the satisfaction items, or the crucial item asking them
about their willingness to recommend their educational path to others.
We exclude these, as well as those who are the sole observation from their
institution and for whom it is thus not possible to construct a leave-out-
mean satisfaction measure. Imposing these restrictions leaves an analysis
sample of 171,317 observations.
As we noted above, an important limitation of the data is that we
observe only students’ terminal institution. For most (73.4%), this is their
undergraduate institution, but for others it represents graduate school.
Match With Other Data Sources
Of our analysis sample of 171,317 observations, 155,619 (90.8%) can
be matched to the mobility-rate measures retrieved from the Chetty et
al. (2017) open database. We observe the Barron’s Selectivity rank for
155,487 observations. Further, we successfully match the set of covariates
obtained from the College Scorecard and IPEDS data bases to 170,619
(99.6%) observations. A total of 88,936 individuals (51.9%) attended a
school ranked in the 2018 Forbes Top Colleges list. We code the rank in
increasing order, with the value 1 representing the 650th placed college
and 650 representing the top-ranked one. Unranked institutions are given
a rank of zero, and we include a dummy indicating whether or not the
institution was ranked at all.
3.2 Summary Statistics
The ECS is a nationally representative survey, designed to mirror the US
working population. In Table 2 we present summary statistics on key
variables for both the full sample retrieved from Strada and our analysis
sample. As the latter is conditioned upon the respondent being linked
to a postsecondary institution, it is not representative in the above sense
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but rather constitutes a subsample of individuals who at least attended
college for some time. Although only two-thirds of all ECS respondents
attended some college, in demographic terms the analysis sample is not
markedly different from the full sample, albeit slightly more likely to be
White, and coming from higher socioeconomic backgrounds (measured by
parental education). However, the restricted sample is obviously more
educated and hence has higher incomes and a higher likelihood of being
employed. Still, only 65 percent of college attendees report that they are
employed full-time. In terms of education, the average respondent in the
analysis sample has a four-year college degree and attended a selective
school ranked in the lower third of the Forbes college rankings, with a
Chetty et al. mobility rate of 2%. Individuals and their peers are very
satisfied with their education and report a high willingness to recommend
their educational path to others. They attribute a substantial part of their
labor market outcomes to the education they received at their terminal
institution.
3.3 Analytic Framework
Our goal is to demonstrate how adults might recommend colleges. In
particular, we demonstrate that college rankings and other government-
backed scorecards provide less of the basis for recommendations than indi-
viduals’ subjective satisfaction with their own college experience. Loosely
speaking, we hope to conduct a “horse race” between existing metrics of
school quality and the ECS’s more subjective measure of satisfaction.
To do this, we conduct two complementary activities. As a first step,
we focus on individuals’ willingness to recommend their own experience
for our main analysis. Here we run simple predictive models to show what
measures predict individuals’ willingness to recommend. We argue that
the relative effect sizes of the metrics in explaining the willingness to rec-
ommend provide a good indication of what the respondents in the samples
base such recommendations on. The results suggest that satisfaction has
the most predictive power, far beyond any alternative metric. In fact,
most other metrics seem to have little predictive power at all. We show
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the robustness of these results by conducting similar analyses on a battery
of subpopulations where school satisfaction could and should conceivably
be lower. The superiority of our satisfaction indices as a predictor of the
willingness to recommend proves to be remarkably consistent across all
our models.
As a second step, we investigate what might cause alumni to be satis-
fied. First we explore satisfaction levels across a variety of labor market
outcomes and school characteristics. In doing so, we demonstrate that
alumni satisfaction is remarkably high and stable across the covariates
that we consider. Second we discuss the respondents’ self-reported rea-
soning for pursuing and choosing a college education. Third, we discuss
the overall correlation between our satisfaction measure and existing mea-
sures of college quality. We demonstrate that satisfaction metrics are in
most cases positively correlated with other rankings, and that rankings
are stronger predictors of peer satisfaction than of individual satisfaction.
In a supplemental analysis in the appendix, we also assess the validity
of satisfaction as an alternative instrument for college quality. Following
Rothwell (2019), we use earnings as an example “ruler” to demonstrate
that satisfaction indices in many cases have greater predictive power than
models based on rankings. The results indicate that, at worst, our indices
perform as well as established quality measures in explaining alumni in-
come levels. The fact that our satisfaction metrics are predictive of real-
life outcomes adds to their salience as indicators of students’ academic
experiences and perceptions of the value of college.
It should be emphasized that our goal is not to provide causal evi-
dence on satisfaction. We do not manipulate either satisfaction or rank-
ings in any experimental or quasi-experimental way. Rather, our goal is to
demonstrate a positive relationship between the recommendations adults
give about college and their subjective satisfaction with their own col-
lege decisions. If indeed parents’ recommendations matter, and they are
based on criteria that are not consistent with policymakers’ preferences,
then we could see inefficiencies in the clearing of the college marketplace.
These satisfaction measures might give some hint as to the source of such
inefficiency, but our results should solely be viewed as descriptive.
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Table 2—Summary Statistics
Full Sample Analysis Sample
Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.46 0.50 0.48 0.50
White 0.76 0.43 0.81 0.39
Black 0.18 0.31 0.10 0.30
Hispanic 0.12 0.32 0.07 0.26
Asian 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
Age 45.3 14.1 47.0 12.9
Has children 0.68 0.47 0.69 0.46
Some college 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47
College graduate 0.24 0.43 0.40 0.49
Postgrad 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.44
Mother’s education 3.27 2.37 3.77 2.38
Father’s education 3.27 2.60 3.90 2.62
Income (2016 base) 69,101 190,088 82,987 199,423
Employed full time 0.59 0.49 0.65 0.48
Barron’s Selectivity Index 2.56 1.96
Forbes Top Schools rank 191 231
Mobility rate 0.02 0.01
Satisfaction 3.92 0.98
Peer satisfaction 3.92 0.42
Willingness to recommend 3.97 1.26
Degree of Attribution to college 2.78 0.83
Observations 323,218 171,317
Note: In this table we present means and standard deviations of key covariates for the full
and analysis samples, respectively. Demographics, education level and employment status
represent dummies equal to one if that characteristic is true for the respondent. Age is a
running variable measured in years. Mother’s and father’s education is measured on an eight-
point categorical scale, ranging from “Less than high school” to “Postgraduate degree”. Income
is based on self-reported levels, converted to 2016 values.Barron’s Selectivity Index takes values
from 0 to 6, with 0 being “Not ranked” and 6 being “Elite”. The Forbes Top Colleges ranking
is coded so that the value increases with rank, and nonranked colleges are set to 0. The
mobility rate is the share of students entering from the lowest quintile ending up in the top
quintile of the income distribution, as constructed by Chetty et al. (2017). The Satisfaction,
Peer satisfaction, Willingness to recommend, and Degree of attribution to college measures
are calculated using the nonstandardized answers from the items included in the satisfaction
indices described above. The latter refers to the extent to which the respondents attribute
their current labor market situation to the education they obtained. In all cases, respondents
who refused to answer are excluded.
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4 Analysis
4.1 College Quality and Willingness to Recommend
Our goal is to understand what are the characteristics of those individuals
who are eager to advocate on behalf of their schools as well as the char-
acteristics of the schools that those individuals attended. We first report
results in Table 3 from regressing the willingness to recommend (WtR)
on the aforementioned college quality metrics. In the “horse race” model
in column 1, we find a large and statistically meaningful relationship be-
tween subjective satisfaction and willingness to recommend. By contrast,
the alternative metrics all return small and substantively insignificant es-
timates.
In columns 2–8 we regress WtR on each quality metric separately. We
see that the coefficient for the satisfaction index does not change in either
model. However, unlike in column 1, we find moderately positive associ-
ations between the other metrics and WtR in the single-metric models,
although the magnitude is at most one-fifth of the association with satis-
faction. What is more, the fact that the point estimate for the satisfaction
index is substantial in both cases, even when we control for all the other
college quality measures, implies that our satisfaction index captures vari-
ation that the other metrics do not. This is also evident in the explanatory
power exhibited by the different metrics. In the bivariate regressions re-
ported in columns 2–8 we find that the metric explaining on its own the
most variation in the willingness to recommend is— by far — the satisfac-
tion index. Indeed, variation in the satisfaction index alone accounts for
30 percent of the variation in the WtR measure. By contrast, the other
college-quality metrics hardly explain any variation at all. We consider
it interesting that the established metrics appear to be substantially less
suited as predictors of WtR, both in terms of the magnitudes of the point
estimates and in terms of R-squared, particularly in the horse-race model.
For example, we find precise zeros for the Forbes ranking and the main
Chetty et al. mobility measures. These results are surprising, given the
prominence and emphasis given to some of these other measures in dis-
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Table 3—Predicting Willingness to Recommend
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Satisfaction 0.547** 0.547**
(0.003) (0.002)
Mobility Rate -0.002 0.013**
(0.005) (0.005)
1% Mobility Rate 0.008** 0.061**
(0.003) (0.007)
Mobility Rank 0.006 0.019**
(0.005) (0.005)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.013* 0.113**
(0.005) (0.004)
Forbes Ranking 0.006 0.101**
(0.004) (0.004)




Observations 155,619 171,317 155,619 155,619 155,619 171,317 171,317 171,317
R2 0.297 0.299 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.010 0.013
Note: The table reports results from estimating a set of models where willingness to recom-
mend is regressed separately on each college-quality metric. Displayed in columns 2–8 are the
resulting standardized point estimates for each metric. Column 1 reports the estimates from
a multivariate model including all the metrics. “Mean Satisfaction” and “Mean WtR” refer
to average scores for a subsample on the satisfaction index and the willingness-to-recommend
item, respectively, both measured in absolute terms on a 1–5 scale (5 highest). Cluster-robust
standard errors clustered at the college level in parenthesis. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
cussions about the college decision-making process. In fact, they suggest
that a college’s ability to produce subjective satisfaction among its alumni
by far outperforms more objective rankings when it comes to the likelihood
that people will recommend that college to others.
Next, we run the same horse-race model for certain subsamples, some
of which — such as low-income and unemployed individuals— could be
expected to be less satisfied with their educational experience. In fact,
if labor market success is something college attendees value, seemingly
poor returns should translate into low satisfaction. We display the results
from these estimations in Table 4. In column 1 we consider whether there
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are gender differences in the predictive power of the satisfaction index.
We find little indication of such differences, as the point estimates in a
model where we condition on gender are practically identical to those in
the main model presented in Table 3. Further, in column 2 we consider
whether there is heterogeneity with respect to respondents’ socioeconomic
background. We proxy SES status with maternal education level and de-
fine low SES as having a mother who did not complete high school. As
with gender, we find no indication that the association between subjec-
tive satisfaction and willingness to recommend varies with SES status.
In columns 3 and 4 we consider respondents’ labor market outcomes and
condition the horse-race model on having had either labor market success
(defined as being in the highest income category, earning more than USD
100,000 annually) or labor market struggles (defined as being unemployed
or outside the workforce). Again we find few indications that the asso-
ciation in question is different across these subgroups. If anything, we
note that the point estimate for the high-income group is somewhat lower
than in other models; overall, however, the results in Table 4 suggest that
the relationship between satisfaction and willingness to recommend un-
covered in Table 3 is stable across various background characteristics and
outcomes.5
What Might Cause Satisfaction?
If subjective satisfaction is a strong predictor of alumni’s willingness
to recommend, what might explain their satisfaction? We investigate a
variety of potential characteristics broadly categorized as either labor mar-
ket outcomes or college characteristics. While these obviously overlap to
some extent, we make this distinction to separate between individual-level
outcomes and institution-level characteristics. To investigate how satisfac-
tion levels relate to these covariates, we chart the average, unstandardized
5In Figure D.1 in the appendix we provide plots of additional subsample estimations,
where we consider a broader spectrum of labor market and educational outcomes.
We find no indication that the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are isolated to
particular segments of the sample. In Table D.1 we also show that this result is not
driven by particular age groups, as we estimate similar associations between subjective
satisfaction and willingness to recommend across all cohorts of alumni.
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Satisfaction 0.559** 0.523** 0.500** 0.549**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Mobility Rate 0.007 0.014 0.000 -0.008
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
1% Mobility Rate -0.013** -0.018 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007)
Mobility Rank 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.010
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.007 0.016 0.018+ 0.009
(0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Forbes Ranking 0.010* -0.006 0.003 -0.012
(0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Structural Quality -0.005 -0.009 -0.025** -0.003
(0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Mean Satisfaction 4.02 3.93 4.11 3.99
Mean WtR 4.02 4.01 4.19 3.96
Observations 74,491 13,346 29,363 30,980
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.269 0.266 0.285
Note: The table reports results from estimating horse-race models where willingness to rec-
ommend is regressed on the set of college-quality metrics, separately for various subsamples.
“Mean Satisfaction” and “Mean WtR” refer to average scores for that subsample on the satis-
faction index and the willingness-to-recommend item, respectively, both measured in absolute
terms on a 1–5 scale (5 highest). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the college level
in parenthesis. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
score of our satisfaction index across various subsamples in Figures 1 and
2. To do so, we simply average the numerical values related to a respon-
dent’s answers on the six items listed in Table 1 to obtain an individual
score and then average across individuals for the subsamples of interest.
The indices are then averaged for any given subsample. Note that the
satisfaction indices can take values from 1 to 5, where a 3 indicates that
a respondent neither agrees nor disagrees with a given statement. The
overall average satisfaction in the sample is 3.9.
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Figure 1: Satisfaction Levels by Labor Market Outcomes
Note: Displayed are raw average scores on the subjective satisfaction index across various in-
dicators of the respondents’ labor market outcomes. In each case, the minimum score possible
is 1 and the maximum is 5. The dashed line indicates the sample average (3.9). Education
level is the respondents’ highest completed degree, where some college includes graduates from
two-year programs. Thus college graduate refers to those having completed a four-year pro-
gram.Income level and employment status are categorical variables indicating a respondent’s
self-reported current labor market status. For the latter, Not working means that the respon-
dent does not consider themselves part of the workforce. Degree of attribution to college is an
index indicating to what extent a respondent feels that their college and education have been
helpful in their career.
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Figure 2: Satisfaction Levels by College Characteristics
Note: Displayed are raw average scores on the subjective satisfaction index across various
characteristics of the respondents’ colleges. In each case, the minimum score possible is 1
and the maximum is 5. The dashed line indicates the sample average (3.9). Barron’s refers
to the selectivity index, ranking colleges from nonselective to most selective. Forbes ranking
is the Forbes Top Colleges list comprising 650 institutions; Not ranked are respondents from
those institutions not included in the ranking, while the ranked institutions are split into three
categories. The Chetty mobility rate measures the fraction of students entering a college from
the lowest quintile of the income distribution who subsequently end up in the highest quintile.
For the purpose of this figure, the mobility-rate distribution is split into four quartiles. A
similar split into quartiles is performed for the index for structural quality, which is based on
institution-level observable characteristics.
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Figure 1 charts average satisfaction across labor market outcomes. As
is evident from the figure, we find no subsample of respondents who are
not leaning toward “satisfied.” Even those who are unemployed or report
a very low income exhibit high levels of satisfaction with their college
experience. We find both of these groups to have an average satisfaction
of almost 4 out of 5. For both employment status and income — two of
the main outcomes often used to evaluate the benefits from attending
college — satisfaction is relatively stable across outcomes, although there
are statistically significant differences between them. The lowest average
satisfaction found in any subsample is that among those in the lowest
quartile of the attribution distribution, that is, among those who feel
that their education has been the least helpful in advancing their career.
However, it should be noted that even for this group, average satisfaction
is not in the lower half of the scale. In fact, even if we look specifically
at those who (i) are either unemployed or working but earning a low
income and (ii) find themselves in the lower half of the attribution-to-
college distribution, we still find an average satisfaction slightly above
3.
We find a similar stability across the distribution of college charac-
teristics, as displayed in Figure 2. While there appears to be a positive
relationship between some of the characteristics and satisfaction, such as
increasing satisfaction with increasing selectivity, the differences are in
most cases trivial, and small. We expected larger differences for subsam-
ples where it intuitively seems reasonable that college satisfaction should
be lower, such as those individuals who today earn a low income despite
having gone to college, who are unemployed, or who attended colleges that
score low on structural measures of institutional quality, but we find few
such differences. In fact, of all the variables we considered, we find rea-
sonably large variation in the satisfaction level only for terminal academic
degree – particularly the difference between those with a postgraduate ed-
ucation and those with “some college” – and also for the extent to which
respondents report that their education has been helpful in their career
(Degree of attribution to college).
Still, we urge caution in interpreting these results. As we do not ob-
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serve counterfactual outcomes, we cannot conclude that the seemingly
high satisfaction among individuals with poor labor market outcomes is
unjustified. Their outcomes might have been even worse without the ed-
ucation they pursued. Similarly, we cannot rule out the influence of other
psychological mechanisms that might explain such high levels of satisfac-
tion — although such mechanisms would probably also operate when ex-
college students are asked to give recommendations. For example, cogni-
tive dissonance theory could explain why some report being very satisfied
despite poor outcomes, if admitting that their choices were bad or wrong
would be painful (Festinger, 1962). It could also be that respondents
suffer from egocentric bias and therefore define educational satisfaction
(and success) in a manner that is self-aggrandizing and reflects favorably
upon themselves (Dunning and Cohen, 1992; Dunning et al., 1995). On
a similar note, sociologists and philosophers argue that preferences can
be adaptive to one’s current circumstances and context, implying that
we might find high levels of satisfaction because the respondents have ad-
justed their expectations and preferences in accordance with their realized
life outcomes (Bruckner, 2009).
Determinants for College Choices
Next, we supplement our finding that alumni are overall very satisfied
with their college experience with an overview of the enrollment pattern
of the college attendees in our sample. The main takeaway from these
survey results is that, conditional on deciding to pursue higher educa-
tion, most claim to have chosen their college for reasons other than labor
market prospects or institutional prestige. In Table 5 we list the five
most common answers given by respondents to the question, “What is
the main reason you decided to enroll in your school?” (“school” in this
case being their terminal institution). As is evident in the first row, prox-
imity to home is by far the most common reason for which individuals
choose their college. In total, one in five respondents reported proximity
as the main reason for choosing the college they attended. Women re-
ported this reason more often than men, and there also appears to be a
socioeconomic gradient, as proximity to home is less likely to be reported
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College was close to home 20.48 22.47 24.14 15.95 24.72
Reputation of the school/program 12.95 12.24 9.27 18.41 11.01
Wanted a specific program 11.23 11.29 10.40 10.99 11.30
Location of college in general 7.97 8.34 7.06 8.31 6.96
It was affordable 6.70 6.48 6.48 6.01 5.91
Observations 151,236 72,446 13,678 28,497 30,536
Note: The table reports the shares of respondents who cited each reason as the main reason
for why they chose to attend their school. The reasons listed in the table are the top five
responses in all the subsamples included there. Low parental education is defined as the
mother having dropped out of high school. High income is defined as earning more than
USD 100,000 today.Not working refers to those who answered “Unemployed” or “Not in the
workforce” on their employment status.
as the reason for choosing one’s college by high-income individuals than
by individuals who are currently unemployed or whose parents have little
education. In fact, high-income individuals (those currently earning more
than USD 100,000 per year), together with those who attended a school
ranked “Most Selective” by the Barron’s Index, are alone among the sub-
samples we looked at in emphasizing school reputation over location. The
latter group is actually the one most distinct from the rest of the sample,
with roughly 40 percent responding that they chose their college for its
prestige and reputation. For all the other subsamples, practical concerns
and individual fit seem to be of more importance for college decisions.6
In addition to the reasons listed in Table 5, receiving a scholarship
and general “convenience” were other popular responses (ranks 6 and 7
overall), which reinforces the impression that prospective students value
6In Table D.2 in the appendix we estimate the horse-race model from Table 3,
but conditioned on the respondents’ main reason for their college choice. We find no
substantive variation in results across reasons.
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availability and affordability. More career-focused reasons like “Get a
good job/make money” and “Advance my career” received less support:
only 3.29 and 2.21 percent, respectively, of the sample (rank 10 and 14
overall) put forward these options as their primary motivator for college
selection.7 Note that these responses do not allow us to conclude, for
example, that students who emphasize the prestige of a college over it
being close to home will end up earning a higher income after graduation
as a result of their choice. Still, the relatively low importance placed on
characteristics pertaining to the return on investment from attending their
preferred college suggests that once the decision to enroll has been made,
prospective students choose specific colleges for a host of reasons other
than just improving their labor market prospects. In turn, this pattern
could explain why satisfaction with your college experience seems rather
detached from the labor market returns associated with it.
4.2 Peer Satisfaction and Willingness to Recommend
One concern with our preceding analysis is that, to some extent, subjec-
tive satisfaction and subjective willingness to recommend might be two
measures of the same underlying construct. To mitigate this endogeneity
concern, we replicate our preceding analysis using the leave-out-mean peer
satisfaction measure. For any given individual, this measure calculates the
average satisfaction of all other alumni graduating from the same institu-
tion within +/– 5 years of the respondent in question. Thus, it gives us
an indication of whether an institution generally tends to produce alumni
who are subjectively satisfied. This means that the peer satisfaction mea-
sure is perhaps a college-quality metric of a type that is more comparable
to the alternatives employed in our analysis and may thus be of greater
relevance to college administrators as well as researchers.
In this peer satisfaction analysis we follow the same approach as at the
beginning of this section but substitute the individual satisfaction index
7Note also that we find that those who report having enrolled in their college specif-
ically to obtain a good job or earn money, but who report being unemployed or in the
lowest income category today, still report a fairly high level of satisfaction with their
education (3.88 and 3.59, respectively).
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Table 6—Predicting Willingness to Recommend With Peer Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peer Satisfaction 0.112** 0.163**
(0.006) (0.004)
Mobility Rate 0.001 0.012*
(0.006) (0.005)
1% Mobility Rate -0.013** 0.057**
(0.005) (0.007)
Mobility Rank 0.011+ 0.020**
(0.006) (0.006)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.037** 0.118**
(0.007) (0.005)
Forbes Ranking 0.012* 0.099**
(0.005) (0.005)
Structural Quality 0.029** 0.120**
(0.007) (0.005)
Mean Peer Satisfaction 3.95
Mean WtR 3.99
Observations 126,740 136,079 126,740 126,740 126,740 136,079 136,079 136,079
R2 0.021 0.019 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.011 0.014
Note: The table reports results from estimating a set of models where willingness to recommend
is regressed separately on each college-quality metrics. Displayed in columns 2–8 are the
resulting standardized point estimates for each metric. Column 1 reports the estimates from
a multivariate model including all the metrics. Peer satisfaction is calculated as a leave-out-
mean measure of the satisfaction of a respondent’s peers, defined as those graduating from
the same institution within 5 years of the respondent. “Mean peer satisfaction” and “Mean
WtR” refer to the sample-average scores on the peer satisfaction index and the willingness-
to-recommend item, respectively, both measured in absolute terms on a 1–5 scale (5 highest).
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the college level in parenthesis. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05,
∗∗ p<0.01.
with our leave-out-mean peer measures. In Table 6, we report the results
from our horse-race models estimating the relationship between college-
quality metrics and alumni’s willingness to recommend. Although levels
of predictive power are markedly lower, as with the individual satisfaction
measure we find that peer satisfaction is the only meaningful predictor of
WtR, as is evident from column 1 in the table. In this full model, we
find that an increase by one standard deviation in average satisfaction
among your college peers is associated with an increase by 11.2 percent of
a standard deviation in the likelihood that you would recommend others
to attend the same school. We also find that the peer satisfaction estimate
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is robust to whether or not we include the other college-quality metrics
in the same model. Keep in mind that the peer satisfaction measure is
based on a leave-out-mean procedure where a respondent’s own subjective
satisfaction does not contribute to the score. Interestingly, other quality
measures appear to be substantially poorer predictors. For example, in-
creasing the selectivity of the school by one category is associated with an
increase by only 3.7 percent of a standard deviation in the willingness to
recommend, while we find no significant associations for the main Chetty
et al. mobility-rate measures.
In Table 7 we report results from estimating the peer satisfaction
horse-race models for the same subsamples as those considered in Table 4.
As before, we find the estimates to be consistent across all the subsamples
considered. However, this is not surprising given the remarkable stability
in satisfaction scores across different subsamples seen in Figures 1 and
2. Similar patterns are observed for willingness to recommend. As with
satisfaction, the most striking result is the remarkable stability, even for
groups with poor labor market outcomes that we expected would have
lower satisfaction and willingness to recommend. This is further illus-
trated in Figures B.1 and B.2 in the appendix, where we chart average
peer satisfaction levels across labor market outcomes and school charac-
teristics. As with individual satisfaction, the most apparent feature is the
stability of the peer measure, even in subsamples with poor labor market
returns.
4.3 Correlating Satisfaction With Alternative Measures
We conclude our analysis by investigating the correlation between our sat-
isfaction indices and other proposed measures of college quality. Strong
correlations might shed light on the characteristics associated with col-
leges that alumni value and that they might thus draw particularly upon
when formulating their advice. Pairwise correlations between all measures
considered are presented in Table 8. In particular, focus should be placed
on columns 1 and 2, which display the correlations between individual
satisfaction and peer satisfaction, respectively, and the alternative mea-
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Peer Satisfaction 0.101** 0.092** 0.116** 0.089**
(0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011)
Mobility Rate 0.010 0.004 0.011 -0.008
(0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
1% Mobility Rate -0.022** -0.020 -0.015* -0.016+
(0.006) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008)
Mobility Rank 0.008 0.034* -0.002 0.019
(0.008) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.041** 0.040+ 0.038** 0.035*
(0.008) (0.022) (0.013) (0.016)
Forbes Ranking 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.005
(0.007) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011)
Structural Quality 0.042** 0.031 0.028* 0.029+
(0.009) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016)
Mean Peer Satisfaction 3.94 3.88 4.04 3.91
Mean WtR 4.04 4.02 4.21 3.96
Observations 59,557 10,327 25,485 25,082
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.017 0.019 0.014
Note: The table reports results from estimating horse-race models where willingness
to recommend is regressed on the set of college-quality metrics, separately for various
subsamples. Peer satisfaction is calculated as a leave-out-mean measure of the satis-
faction of a respondent’s peers, defined as those graduating from the same institution
within 5 years of the respondent. “Mean Peer Satisfaction” and “Mean WtR” refer
to the sample average scores on the peer satisfaction index and the willingness-to-
recommend item, respectively, both measured in absolute terms on a 1–5 scale (5
highest). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the college level in parenthesis.
+ p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
sures. First, column 1 indicates that a respondent’s own satisfaction has
a correlation of 0.21 with their peers’ satisfaction. To the extent that
a person’s own satisfaction should be considered an accurate reflection
of the college’s overall ability to generate satisfaction among its students
(which giving advice based on one’s own experience might presuppose),
this correlation is low. In fact, such a low correlation between an individ-
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ual’s satisfaction and that of the remaining alumni peer group suggests
that students evaluate their experience subjectively and that experiences
vary between students within a college.
Next, rows 3–5 report correlations between our satisfaction measures
and the Chetty et al. mobility metrics. In row 3, we see that the general
mobility rates are weakly correlated with student satisfaction. That is, we
cannot say, for example, that satisfied students are generally those who
attended colleges with high social mobility. We find a comparably weak
association between the mobility rank and satisfaction. On the other
hand, there is a stronger relationship between satisfaction and the 1%
mobility rate. This is particularly the case for peer satisfaction, with which
the 1% mobility has a correlation of 0.29. Considering the substantial
upward mobility represented by a jump from the lowest quintile to the top
1% of the income distribution, it is reasonable for colleges that excel on
this metric to have satisfied students on average. In particular, we would
expect certain subsamples of students at these high-mobility schools (e.g.,
those with a low socioeconomic background, in our case defined as those
whose mothers have a low educational level) to have especially appreciated
the potential for upward mobility offered by their schools. However, for
these samples as well, we find that the correlation is, if anything, lower
between the satisfaction and mobility measures.
In the final three rows we consider examples of “objective” measures of
college quality. All three show weak to modest correlations with the indi-
vidual satisfaction measure, but strong correlations with the peer satisfac-
tion measure. Both the Barron’s Selectivity Index, the structural-quality
index, and the Forbes ranking have a correlation with peer satisfaction
which is close to 0.5. This is to be expected if colleges ranked high on
the Forbes list are also highly selective and score high on observable char-
acteristics such as admission rates, tuition, faculty salaries, etc. Judging
from these results, they also produce satisfied alumni.
Finally, in Table 9 we fit a similar horse-race model as in the analy-
sis above using the set of college-quality metrics. However, now we use
our satisfaction indices as the outcome variable, to see which metrics are
stronger predictors of alumni satisfaction. For both the individual and the
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Mobility Rate 0.003 0.016
(0.009) (0.021)
1% Mobility Rate -0.006 -0.022
(0.008) (0.020)
Mobility Rank 0.019* 0.033
(0.009) (0.022)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.092** 0.225**
(0.011) (0.032)
Forbes Ranking 0.022** 0.049*
(0.009) (0.023)
Structural Quality 0.141** 0.320**
(0.011) (0.032)
Observations 155,619 126,740
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.422
Note: The table reports results from the regression of individ-
ual and peer satisfaction, respectively, on the set of college-
quality metrics. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
peer satisfaction measure, we find that school selectivity and structural
quality are the only metrics with meaningful predictive power. However,
we note that, in the case of the individual index, the association is much
weaker. All else being equal, these estimates suggest that graduating from
a more selective school or from a school with higher structural quality is
predictive both of your own and of your peers’ satisfaction with the edu-
cational experience in that school. More generally, the results in Tables
8 and 9 indicate that the alternative measures of college quality are posi-
tively correlated with a college’s ability to generate satisfaction among its
students. However, those measures do not seem to be strong predictors of
satisfaction at the individual level, suggesting that the individual experi-
ence and evaluation of a particular college are highly subjective and only
partly correlated with the general satisfaction of the alumni population.
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5 The Role of Rankings in Decision-Making
Before discussing the implications of our findings, we would like to stress
at the onset that there are limitations to our analysis. We have no exoge-
nous variation in satisfaction that might facilitate causal estimates. The
satisfaction measures are retrospective, and we do not know the counter-
factual satisfaction levels that would have been obtained if the respondents
had chosen to attend different schools, or had experienced different labor
market outcomes. Moreover, our results shed little light on how individu-
als with no college experience view college or on how alumni view colleges
other than their own. Our results focus on alumni and on their satisfac-
tion with their own alma mater. While our analysis provides some clues,
it does not fully reveal the underlying reasons for individual satisfaction.
This could come from satisfaction with academic quality, from satisfac-
tion with the link between academic studies and subsequent careers, from
satisfaction with school amenities, from satisfaction with professional and
social networks, from satisfaction with affordability, from satisfaction with
location, from satisfaction with friends and partners met while in school,
from satisfaction with any other dimension of the types of offerings made
to students, and of course from any combination of the above.
Yet despite these limitations, our analysis provides some novel clues
to how college alumni view their educational experiences. We document
that the vast majority of college attendees are very satisfied with the edu-
cational path they took, even those who seemingly had poor labor market
returns. While the indices exhibit positive correlations with other metrics
of college quality, we find only limited evidence that subjective satisfaction
is predicted by outcomes in adulthood or by more established measures
of school quality. The satisfaction indices also have substantial predictive
power over alumni’s willingness to recommend others to follow a simi-
lar path in terms of college choices— much more than other “objective”
rankings, measures of social mobility, and college-quality metrics.
The finding that alumni hold such strong preferences for their alma
mater, that the satisfaction metrics have such a broad predictability rel-
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ative to future outcomes, and that trusted adults are so important as
college-choice advisors also have policy implications. If the criteria that
lead to satisfaction align with the goals of the central planner, then sat-
isfaction metrics might inform and reinforce strategic policy proposals.
However, if the criteria do not align with those goals, then the realities
underpinning these satisfaction metrics might instead counteract them.
As an example, suppose a central planner is trying to improve intergen-
erational mobility and that to do so, she is planning to promote colleges
that facilitate such mobility. The rankings based on Chetty et al. (2017)
may provide guidance in her choice of colleges to promote or model after.
However, given the low correlation between the Chetty et al rankings and
the satisfaction metrics, advice from adults who rely on satisfaction-based
metrics to inform recommendations will not promote the central planner’s
goals. If, by contrast, the central planner’s goal is to maximize utility for
individuals who might desire to attend college, even for pure consumption
purposes, satisfaction indices might help her attain that goal.
Our findings may also have implications for the design of informational
programs designed to affect college choice. If students rely on informa-
tion from trusted adults and trusted adults rely on satisfaction to shape
recommendations, then informational programs that are not in harmony
with satisfaction may ultimately fail. By contrast, informational programs
aimed at trusted adults might strengthen the recommendations that they
give for institutions that they did not themselves attend.
While satisfaction indices merit the caveats previously discussed, their
relevance even among diverse subsamples and their ability to predict out-
comes are striking. As those satisfaction metrics are further honed, re-
searchers might develop a richer sense of the underlying preferences that
individuals have across a wide swath of collegiate offerings. Such infor-
mation can inform both policymakers and college administrators about
how students and alumni view colleges, and about how those views might
influence future cohorts of students in their decision-making. As our re-
sults imply that satisfaction indices have relevance both for the college
decision-making process and for college evaluations, they should warrant
interest from other researchers going forward.
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More Determinants for College Choices










College was close to home 20.48 22.47 24.14 15.95 24.72
Reputation of the school/program 12.95 12.24 9.27 18.41 11.01
Wanted a specific program 11.23 11.29 10.40 10.99 11.30
Location of college in general 7.97 8.34 7.06 8.31 6.96
It was affordable 6.70 6.48 6.48 6.01 5.91
Received scholarship/aid 5.18 5.04 4.64 5.77 4.65
Convenience 4.18 4.45 5.32 4.21 3.92
Advance knowledge/like to learn 3.81 3.39 5.57 3.16 4.98
School was a good fit 3.41 3.59 2.49 2.97 2.91
Get a good job/make more money 3.29 2.82 4.87 2.76 4.00
Other 3.28 3.14 3.11 3.74 3.03
School offered online/night classes 2.86 3.49 3.19 2.97 2.31
Friends/family go there 2.22 2.23 1.51 2.19 2.11
Advance career 2.21 1.75 2.92 2.59 2.44
Got accepted/recruited 2.02 1.63 1.44 2.41 1.75
Observations 151,236 72,446 13,678 28,497 30,536
Note: Table reports share of respondents who cited this reason as the main reason for why they
chose to attend their school. The reasons listed, and the ordering, is based on the top 15 reasons
in the full sample. Low parental education is defined as the mother having dropped out of
high school. High income is defined as earning more than $100,00 today. Not working is those
who answered “Unemployed” or “Not in workforce” on their employment status. Unranked
selectivity refers to schools not ranked by the Barron’s Selectivity Index, while most selective
is the highest rank.
Chapter 4 – Essay III Appendix










Get good job/better pay 27.09 27.60 30.25 26.86 26.73
Advance knowledge/learn 17.21 17.38 20.00 14.61 19.77
Wanted to attend a specific program 13.63 14.98 13.1 13.46 15.19
Advance career 13.23 12.88 12.04 16.89 11.34
It is expected 7.59 7.26 4.03 7.02 6.09
Family influence/first to graduate 4.45 4.60 3.34 4.77 3.86
Bored/Something to do 4.05 3.87 3.73 3.83 4.26
Other reason 3.42 3.37 3.41 3.86 3.19
It was affordable 1.96 1.89 2.30 1.99 2.05
Change careers 1.74 1.71 2.06 1.43 1.85
Received scholarship/financial aid 1.55 1.00 1.67 1.63 1.65
School offered online/night classes 0.55 0.33 0.70 0.33 0.54
Recommendation from friend 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.47 0.39
Don’t know 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.37 0.45
School was a good fit 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.41 0.29
Observations 151,236 72,446 13,678 28,497 30,536
Note: Table reports share of respondents who cited this reason as the main reason for why
they chose to pursue higher education. The reasons listed, and the ordering, is based on the
top 15 reasons in the full sample. Low parental education is defined as the mother having
dropped out of high school. High income is defined as earning more than $100,000 today.
Not working is those who answered “Unemployed” or “Not in workforce” on their employment
status. Unranked selectivity refers to schools not ranked by the Barron’s Selectivity Index,
while most selective is the highest rank.
Chapter 4 – Essay III Appendix
Appendix B:
Average Individual and Peer Satisfaction Across Subsamples


























Figure B.1: Satisfaction Levels by Labor Market Outcomes
Note: Displayed are raw average scores on the individual satisfaction and the leave-out-mean
peer satisfaction index across various indicators of the respondents’ labor market outcomes.
To construct the latter we sum all satisfaction index score for alumni of a specific institution,
subtract the respondents own score, and then divide on the number of observations for that
institution.In each case, the minimum score possible is 1, and the maximum 5. The dashed
line indicates the sample average (3.9). Education level is the respondents highest completed
degree, where some college includes graduates from 2-year programs. Thus college graduate
refers to those completing a 4-year program.Income category and employment status are cate-
gorical variables indicating the respondent’s self-reported, current labor market status. For the
latter, Not working means that the respondent does not consider themselves part of the work
force. Degree of Attribution to college is an index indicating to what degree the respondent
feels their college and education has been helpful in their career.
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Figure B.2: Satisfaction Levels by College Characteristics
Note: Displayed are raw average scores on the individual satisfaction and the leave-out-mean
peer satisfaction index across various characteristics of the respondents’ colleges. To construct
the latter we sum all satisfaction index score for alumni of a specific institution, subtract the
respondents own score, and then divide on the number of observations for that institution.In
each case, the minimum score possible is 1, and the maximum 5. The dashed line indicates the
sample average (3.9). Barron’s refers to the selectivity index, ranking colleges from nonselective
to most selective. Forbes ranking is the Forbes Top Colleges list comprising 650 institutions.
Not ranked are respondents from those institutions not included in the ranking, while the
ranked institutions are split in three.The Chetty mobility rate measures the fraction of students
entering the college from the lowest quintile of the income distribution who subsequently end
up in the highest quintile. For the purpose of this graph, the mobility rate distribution is split
in four quartiles. Similarly, we split the index for structural quality, based on institution level
observable characteristics, in quartiles, and consider means separately within each of them.
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Appendix C:
Predicting Income (Replicating Rothwell, 2019)
In the following analysis we replicate and build on Rothwell (2019) who showed
that satisfaction is positively correlated with income, to investigate to what
extent satisfaction explains variation in income levels, and more so than the al-
ternative measures. We do so by running a series of regression models, paying
particular attention to the explanatory power (R-squared) of the model. We
consider two outcomes, the ECS 5-tier income category variable, as well as a
continuous measure of the log of real income. The latter is only observed for
individuals whose income is positive at the point of the survey (111,920 obser-
vations, 65.3%). We therefore include results from models using the income
category as the outcome to include those that reportedly have no income. We
find that alumni satisfaction seems to have substantial predictive power for sub-
sequent earnings.
As a first stage, we run univariate models to simply assess the predictive
power of each of the quality measures for subsequent income. To be able to
compare effect sizes across metrics, all dependent and independent variables are
standardized to reflect standard deviation units. We then regress the two income
measures on the nine separate measures of college quality to assess to what ex-
tent income is explained by variation in these metrics. The results from this
exercise are displayed in Figure C.2, where we normalize all the effect sizes to
values in the range 0 to 1, with the largest effect size taking the value 1. All
correlations displayed here are significant at the 1% level. We regress the two
income measures on nine separate measures of college quality to assess to what
extent income is explained by variation in these metrics. For the satisfaction
indices we find that a one standard deviation increase in both your own satis-
faction, and the average satisfaction of your peers appears to be predictive of
higher earnings. In fact, a one standard deviation increase in the peer satisfac-
tion measure predicts an increase in income among positive income earners of
almost 23 percent of a standard deviation, an effect size four times larger than
that of the predicted increase in income associated with attending a school with
a one standard deviation higher mobility rate. We find that for both income
measures, the point estimate for peer satisfaction measure is larger than any
other quality metric that we tested.
If we turn to the explanatory power of these simple models, we find that all
of the bivariate regressions have an R-squared in the 0.1–5.5 percent range. The
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metric that alone explains the most variation in income is our structural quality
index with an R-squared of 5.0–5.6 percent. Peer satisfaction alone explains 3.8–
4.3 percent of income variation, on par with that of for example school selectivity
and the Forbes college ranking. This implies that for our data, peer satisfaction
as a measure of college quality is equally adept at explaining subsequent alumni
income as more established metrics and rankings. In Figure C.1 we illustrate
the relative amount of explained variance across our bivariate models, with the
largest R-squared normalized to take the value 1. While it is evident that several
of these metrics are equally adept at explaining the variation in alumni income
levels, it is worth noticing the relatively poor performance of the Chetty et al.
mobility measure, despite being based on subsequent income distributions. To
that point, we see that the 1 percent mobility rate, which indicates a substantial
increase in the number of alumni who end up in the top 1 percent of the income
distribution, has a much higher R-squared.
To further explore the relative predictive power of these metrics, we also run
a “horse race” model where all quality metrics are included in the same regres-
sion. These results are charted in Figure C.3. For both the categorical and the
continuous income measure we find that peer satisfaction has the second highest
estimated predicted correlation with income, only exceeded by the comprehen-
sive structural quality index, with the Barron’s selectivity index coming in third.
The remaining metrics return smaller to insignificant effect sizes. The fact that
the point estimate for peer satisfaction remains relatively large and significant,
even when we control for all the other college quality measures, implies that
our satisfaction index captures variation that the other metrics don’t. In the
opposite case—if, say, the estimate for peer satisfaction dropped to zero once
we controlled for college selectivity—we would be concerned about the overlap
with existing measures contradicting our claim that satisfaction has potential as
a separate, additional metric for college quality. Overall, we argue that the re-
sults from the simple exercises in this section demonstrate that peer satisfaction
at worst performs as well as established quality measures in explaining alumni
income levels. The fact that these satisfaction indices are predictive of real life
outcomes to the extent that they are, adds to their saliency as indicators of
students’ academic experiences.




































































Income Category Log of Real Income
Figure C.1: Point Estimates From Bivariate Predictions of Income
Note: The figure charts beta coefficients from bivariate regression of the respective income
measures on the various proposed metrics for college quality. All coefficients are first stan-
dardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, then results are normalized, with
the largest beta coefficient set to 1. The bars are in descending order according to the beta
coefficient obtained from regression the respondents income category on the metric in question




































































Income Category Log of Real Income
Figure C.2: Explained Variation by Quality Metric
Note: The figure charts the explained variation (R
2
) in the respective income measures, when
performing a bivariate regression of that measure on the various proposed metrics for college
quality. The results are normalized, with the highest resulting R
2
set to 1. The bars are
in descending order according to the R
2
obtained from regression the respondents income
category on the metric in question.
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Figure C.3: Horse Race Model – Predicting Income
Note: The figure displays standardized coefficients and cluster-robust standard errors from
a multivariate regression using all the proposed measures of college quality as predictors of
income. The dots represent separate regressions, with (standardized) income category (top)
and the log of real income (bottom) as the dependent variables, respectively.
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Appendix D:
Horse Race Models Across More Subsamples
Table D.1—By Reason the Respondent Chose to Enroll in Their College
Reason
College was Reputation of To attend Location It was
close to home school/program specific program in general affordable
Satisfaction 0.542** 0.591** 0.529** 0.523** 0.542**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Mobility Rate -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.012 0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
1% Mobility Rate -0.008 -0.003 -0.021* -0.010 0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Mobility Rank -0.000 0.004 0.010 0.011 0.018
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.007 0.022+ 0.011 0.029+ -0.029
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
Forbes Ranking -0.004 0.002 0.025* 0.005 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Structural Quality -0.001 -0.024* -0.021+ -0.033* 0.006
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009)
Mean Satisfaction 3.75 4.29 4.03 3.90 3.77
Mean WtR 3.84 4.23 4.06 3.95 3.82
Observations 28,782 18,224 15,432 11,277 9,280
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.279 0.271 0.271 0.297
Note: “WtR” = Willingness to recommend. The table reports results from estimating horse
race models where willingness to recommend is regressed on the set of college-quality metrics,
separately for the subsamples who gave particular responses to the survey item “What is the
main reason you chose to enroll in the college/institution you did?”. “Mean Satisfaction” and
“Mean WtR” refer to average scores for that subsample on the satisfaction index and the
willingness-to-recommend item respectively, both measured in absolute terms on a 1–5 scale
(5 highest). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the college level in parenthesis. +
p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗ p<0.01.
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Table D.2—By Decade Enrolled in College
Decade
<1980 1980s 1990s 2000s ≥2010
Satisfaction 0.496** 0.533** 0.540** 0.564** 0.582**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Mobility Rate -0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
1% Mobility Rate -0.007 -0.014* -0.006 -0.004 -0.008
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Mobility Rank 0.012 0.017+ 0.005 -0.003 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
Barron’s Selectivity 0.006 0.031** 0.021* -0.016 -0.019*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Forbes Ranking 0.002 -0.010 0.005 0.013+ 0.013+
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Structural Quality 0.012 0.003 -0.015+ -0.021* -0.060**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Mean Satisfaction 3.93 3.97 3.96 3.87 3.87
Mean WtR 4.00 4.02 4.01 3.92 3.93
Observations 20,494 34,636 32,791 32,657 35,041
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.286 0.298 0.316 0.320
Note: “WtR” = Willingness to recommend. The table reports results from esti-
mating horse-race models where willingness to recommend is regressed on the set of
college-quality metrics, separately for subsamples based on the decade the respondent
attended college. “Mean Satisfaction” and “Mean WtR” refer to average scores for
that subsample on the satisfaction index and the willingness-to-recommend item re-
spectively, both measured in absolute terms on a 1–5 scale (5 highest). Cluster-robust
standard errors clustered at the college level in parenthesis. + p<0.1, ∗ p<0.05, ∗∗
p<0.01.
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Figure D.1: Predictors of Willingness to Recommend for Different Sub-
samples
Note: The figures chart results from estimating a set of models where willingness to recommend
is regressed on a set of college quality metrics. Displayed are the resulting standardized point
estimates for each metric, with 95% confidence intervals. We run separate models for each
of subsamples indicated in each figure. Education Level is the respondents highest completed
degree, where some college includes graduates from 2-year programs. Thus college graduate
refers to those completing a 4-year program. Degree of Attribution to College is an index
indicating to what degree the respondent feels their college and education has been helpful in
their career.
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Figure D.1: Continued.
Note: The figures chart results from estimating a set of models where willingness to recommend
is regressed on a set of college quality metrics. Displayed are the resulting standardized point
estimates for each metric, with 95% confidence intervals. We run separate models for each of
subsamples indicated in each figure. Income Category and Employment Status are categorical
variables indicating the respondent’s self-reported, current labor market status. For the latter,
Not working means that the respondent does not consider themselves part of the work force.
